Problems with the “Do no harm” principle in the presence of uncertainty

In a paper entitled, Counterfactual Harm: A Counter-argument, Amit Sawant and Mats Stensrud write:

A core principle in medicine is non-maleficence, often equated with “do no harm.” A formal definition of harm based on counterfactual reasoning has been proposed and popularized. This notion of harm has been promoted in simple settings with binary treatments and outcomes. Here, we highlight a problem with this definition in settings involving multiple treatment options. Illustrated by an example with three tuberculosis treatments (say, A, B, and C), we demonstrate that the counterfactual definition of harm can produce intransitive results: B is less harmful than A, C is less harmful than B, yet C is more harmful than A when compared pairwise. . . . In contrast, an interventionist definition of harm based on expected utility forgoes counterfactual comparisons and ensures transitive treatment rankings.

I agree, and this is related to what we wrote in our Russian roulette paper. I’ve always been uncomfortable with utility functions that depend on outcomes that have never occurred. I recognize that counterfactual utilities can make sense psychologically (this includes concepts such as uncertainty aversion and regret), but not normatively, not for what I’ve referred to as institutional decision analysis. This new paper by Sawant and Mats Stensrud goes beyond our Russian roulette paper by introducing a new example and continuing continuous outcomes.

Also related is this paper by Stensrud with Aaron Sarvet, “Rejoinder to ‘”Harm” in personalized medicine–an alternative perspective.'”

This guy has a transformer-based election forecasting model

Harvey Olden writes:

I’ve developed an election prediction model based on a transformer architecture; I thought you might find it interesting. The model will update its information automatically in the run-up to the midterm elections; you can also click on a state/district to see what information the model is leaning on to make its predictions. You can find an explainer for exactly how it works in the website.

I can’t follow the explanation myself, but that’s on me, that I’ve never actually learned exactly what a transformer is. This is not a boast—I’d be a better statistician if I understood such things—just my honest admission of imperfection.

So, given that, I can’t say much about the above forecast, but I thought it might interest some of you, at least from a methodological perspective. There must be some aspects of forecast uncertainty that are well captured by this model and also some weaknesses, corners of probability space where the model architecture induces artifacts (by analogy to the edge-case absurdities we found in a different sort of forecasting models a few years ago and which made their way into Section 8.1 of our Bayesian Workflow book, under the heading, “Exploring inferences to reveal problems with a model”). I haven’t been following the 2026 races closely enough to know what problems to look for, and I don’t see a Github site or anything else with the model’s data, code, or predictive simulations. But if that’s out there somewhere, then youall can take a look.

Stochastic potential outcomes: A discussion with Ang Yu and Jonas Mikhaeil

Ang Yu read the Russian Roulette paper (by Jonas Mikhaeil and me) and wrote:

I was wondering whether it might be useful to alternatively frame the problem in terms of stochastic versus deterministic interventions as opposed to potential outcomes. I have attached a short note on your paper and would appreciate your thoughts.

Jonas replied:

1. If I [Jonas] understand correctly, the interventional framework is meant to avoid counterfactuals altogether (e.g. Didelez, et al., 2012), right? In this case, one might be able to avoid the problems with “counterfactual decision problems” altogether by rephrasing them as classical decision problems under interventions?
Maybe this is exactly what you have in mind. I think this would be a very interesting conceptual contribution.

2. What I like about the stochastic potential outcomes perspective is that it allows us to model which uncertainty/variation we want to incorporate in the definition of the treatment (bullet vs. pistol). By defining the utility as a functional over the distribution of the stochastic potential outcome, we can integrate out the uncertainty that remains after treatment assignment. With this additional model choice, we can choose which uncertainty is irrelevant (and hence integrated out prior) to our decision problem.

3. I’m not entirely sure I understand how this would be accomplished by switching from deterministic to stochastic interventions. I’m sure this is an oversight on my part, and I would be excited to see this perspective be fleshed out.
My immediate question would be the following: potential outcomes are defined on the level of the individual, so it makes sense to distinguish between averaging over the treatment vs. averaging over an individual’s outcome. Accordingly, we can define the utility by only averaging over an individual’s outcome, fixing a treatment, and then consider the expected utility by averaging over treatment assignment.
In the interventional framework, I’m not sure how one would distinguish between the outcome Y of an individual being deterministic vs. stochastic for a given intervention? Because of this, I’m not clear how one would first integrate out individual-level uncertainty to define the utility and then calculate the expected utility based on treatment assignment in the interventional framework. (i.e. can what you call U(R6) be understood as an average over an individual’s outcome given a treatment?) I’m sure this is my oversight. I would love to hear what you think.

4. Following up on point 3: Does the Russian roulette paradox appear/disappear when switching from a deterministic vs. stochastic interventions perspective? Essentially, I’m wondering if the choice of how to model the intervention (deterministic vs. stochastic) allows to include/integrate out different levels of uncertainty in the decision problem.

Ang responded:

1. I think so. Didelez et al. 2012 was one of the earliest works in the stochastic intervention literature. Terminology and notation evolved over time in the literature, but their “regime” is the same as what I call “intervention”, and their distinction between atomic and random interventions is the same as my distinction between deterministic and stochastic interventions.

2. I agree that being able to integrate out sort of the “inner” uncertainty is important. If I understand your point correctly, my sense is simply that we already have an existing framework that can do exactly that: we just need to rephrase your point. In the stochastic intervention framework, intervention is pistol and treatment is bullet. So we can integrate over treatments and get the utility of an intervention for each individual.

3. I think the content of the stochastic intervention and stochastic potential outcomes frameworks is exactly the same, just different labels. In my mind, Y_{i, R6} for individual i is a random variable because of the randomness in the intervention R6. So we can call E[Y_{i, R6}] an average over the randomness of the potential outcomes or the randomness of the intervention. The difference is in naming, not substance. Does that make sense?

4. I think I’m not inventing a new way to solve to paradox, but just pointing out the connection between your solution and the literature on stochastic interventions.

My quick thought on all of this is that you can have stochasticism in the intervention or in the outcome conditional on the intervention. One way to see this is in the Russian roulette example: conditional on the chamber of the bullet, you can consider the intervention to be stochastic, but unconditional on the chamber, you can consider the outcome to be stochastic.

Or here’s an example with both sources of variation (or, you could say, “stochastic” aspects): Consider a treatment that is some sort of naturally growing herb that is gathered in the wild, so not a controlled compound. The intervention is stochastic because you might happen to get a sample of the herb that has a large amount of the active ingredient or you might get a dud that has very little. But the outcome will also be stochastic because the active ingredient will not always work. Actually, we could add a third level of variation by saying that (a) the active ingredient could work for some people and not others, and (b) even for the people for whom the ingredient works, it won’t always be effective.

For another example, consider physical therapy as a treatment for sciatica:

(i) To start with, there are lots of way that physical therapy is done; different physical therapists do different things. So the intervention of “physical therapy” is stochastic, if you don’t define ahead of time what will be done and who will be doing it.

(ii) For any given physical therapy intervention, there will be some people for whom it has no chance of working, because of the condition they have. This could be considered as stochastic, but I’d prefer to think of it as deterministic, conditional on a latent variable which contains details of the patient’s underlying medical condition.

(iii) If a patient is given a therapy that can work, the actual effectiveness will be stochastic. You could go full Rubin and consider the outcome as deterministic, conditional on a latent variable which contains the potential outcomes, but I think there can be a benefit to using a stochastic model, recognizing that there’s randomness in the course of the treatment.

For an even cleaner example, consider a coaching program to improve people’s basketball skills, where the outcome is a test where they take 100 shots and you count how many go in:

(i) Some coaches are better than others. So it makes sense to think of the intervention as stochastic.

(ii) Some people will be more amenable to coaching than others. For example, some people will be motivated by the coaching to practice; others won’t. I prefer to model this with a latent variable representing differences between people, but even then there can be a stochastic element: for example, maybe I’m the sort of person who would be motivated to practice, but I just happen to be very busy during the month of the coaching. You could code my state of busyness as a latent variable, but there could be all sorts of unmeasured or even unmeasurable factors affecting my receptiveness during that month, and at some point it makes more sense to bite the bullet and call it stochastic, in the same way that we consider a die roll to be stochastic even though in theory we could predict it pretty well given enough information on initial conditions.

(iii) Any particular coaching will work better for some people than others. There are different ways to have problems with your basketball shot, and different people will be able to improve in different ways. This could be considered as an interaction between the flavor of treatment and the player in the experiment, and it could be modeled with sufficient pre-treatment information on the players, but in practice it could make sense to model much or even all of this variation as stochastic.

(iiii) Finally, how many shots go in, conditional on the average probability of success? That’s stochastic. Again, you could follow Rubin (1974) and consider the outcome of the test to be deterministic, under the philosophy that “the great book of life has already been written; we just haven’t read it yet”; but to me it makes much more sense to consider the success probabilities or expected outcomes as fixed but unknown, with the actual outcomes as stochastic.

I’ve written before about the border between conditioning and randomness–it comes up in non-causal settings too. See here: https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/augie4.pdf and here: https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2022/12/23/a-probability-isnt-just-a-number-its-part-of-a-network-of-conditional-statements/

To which Ang responded:

I appreciate you laying out more generally different possible sources of randomness. On a philosophical level, they all make sense. From a practical perspective, though, I wonder if it’s useful to fully parse everything out. Stochastic interventions have proved useful in a lot of epidemiological and sociological applications. And I think the Russian roulette can also be framed as a stochastic intervention. In all those cases, it seems sufficient to explicitly consider only two sources of variation: the random variation in the intervention (e.g., bullet or no bullet), and the variation in potential outcomes across individuals. Please feel free to blog our discussion!

On a side note, I recently read VanderWeele and Hernan (2013), which framed a variant of stochastic intervention as a case of treatments with multiple versions. The stochastic intervention considered there also directly comes from a real empirical application.

I actually think we’re in agreement here. I too think it can be useful to allow stochastic potential outcomes. Indeed, I think the idea of the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA) can be misleading, in that SUTVA requires that outcomes be modeled deterministically. In my above note, I said that any stochastic potential outcome can be expressed in reduced form as a deterministic potential outcome–but for modeling purposes, the stochastic model often makes more sense. So I guess there was something unclear in my paragraphs just above, in that I wasn’t doing a good job in conveying this perspective.

R-hat, August 1990

I came up with R-hat when working at Bell Labs in the summer of 1990.

Here’s the story, and below is the first version of the paper, exactly as I wrote it.

First, here are some recent things to read regarding monitoring convergence from iterative simulations:

And now, here’s the original R-hat paper from 1990. I (appropriately) included Rubin as a coauthor, as the idea came about after many long phone conversations, and when I brought up this idea, Rubin picked up on it right away, as it was close to methods he had developed for inference from multiple imputations.

To all:

Here’s the abstract of the work I’ve done this summer. It’s stored in the file,
/fs5/gelman/abstract.bell, and copies of the Figures 1-3 are on Trevor’s desk.
Any comments are of course appreciated; I’m at [email protected].

On the Routine Use of Markov Chains for Simulation

Andrew Gelman and Donald Rubin, 6 August 1990

corrected version: 8 August 1990

1. Simulation

In probability and statistics we can often specify multivariate distributions
many of whose properties we do not fully understand–perhaps, as in the
Ising model of statistical physics, we can write the joint density function, up
to a multiplicative constant that cannot be expressed in closed form.
For an example in statistics, consider the Normal random
effects model in the analysis of variance, which can be
easily placed in a Bayesian framework with a conjugate prior distribution.
All the conditional densities of the resulting posterior distribution
are simple, but marginal densities can only be written in integral form and
can only be calculated approximately. (For details, see Kinderman and Snell
(1980) or Pickard (1987) for the Ising model, and Lindley and Smith (1972)
for the Bayesian random effects model.)

In such cases, we may not even be able to compute marginal moments of the
difficult distribution, let alone more complicated and interesting summaries
that would help us understand a probability model or posterior inference.
When direct methods such as analytic or numerical integration of “nuisance”
parameters are not computationally feasible, we might try Monte Carlo simulation;
in the simplest form, we draw a finite set of independent random samples from our
distribution, and then calculate desired distributional summaries as functions of
the sampled points. The Monte Carlo method is quite general and powerful; it is
easy to calculate arbitrary quantities of interest
such as the expected long-distance correlation in the Ising model or a posterior
95% confidence region for the largest block effect in a random effects model.
Any aspect of the distribution can be approximated to any desired accuracy if
the number of independently sampled points is large enough.
Simulation also has the advantage of flexiblility: once a sample is drawn, it
can be used to learn about any number of different distributional summaries.

2. Markov chain methods

Drawing independent random samples is a wonderful tool that is unfortunately not
available for every distribution; in particular, the Ising model and random
effects posterior distributions mentioned above do not permit direct
simulation. Fortunately, a form of indirect simulation method exists for
any multivariate distribution if we can calculate its joint density
(up to a multiplicative constant) or if we can sample from all its univariate
conditional densities. The first of these methods was introduced by
Metropolis et al. (1953) in the Journal of Chemical Physics. Our work focuses
on a similar and slightly simpler method called the Gibbs sampler by Geman and
Geman (1984) in an article for the IEEE.

Let F(x) be our distribution; the Metropolis algorithm takes a starting (vector)
point x0 and constructs a series x1, x2, . . ., that is a sample from an
ergodic Markov chain whose stationary distribution is F(x). Computer
simulation of the series requires calculation of the density f(x) (up to a
constant). These samples xj are not independent; however, the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain is
correct, so if we take a long enough series, the set of values {x1, . . ., xn}
takes the place of the distribution just as an
independent random sample does (although of course an independent sample
carries more information than a Markov chain sample of the
same length).

The Gibbs sampler is a similar algorithm, which produces a Markov chain that
converges to the desired distribution, this time requiring draws from all the
univariate conditional densities at each iteration.

3. Have we converged yet?

Markov chain simulation methods are attractive for many problems because they
enable us to flexibly summarize intractable multivariate distributions by making
full use of the mathematical structure we do know, using a tool we think we
understand–Monte Carlo simulation. Unfortunately, using a sample of a Markov
chain to estimate a distribution raises an immediate question: how long a series
is needed? After one or two steps, we are almost certainly still too close to
the starting point to hope for unbiased summaries. Asymptotically, the chain is
stationary, and all is OK (with some loss of efficiency compared to independent
samples, as mentioned above).

To obtain a feeling for the practical difficulties, we ran the Gibbs sampler for
2000 steps to simulate a case of the Ising model. To give the minimum of details:
x is a vector of binary variables defined on a 100 by 100 lattice; each step of
the Gibbs sampler took on the order of 10,000 computations; and we summarize
each iterate xj by the sample correlation r on the lattice–a function r(x) that
lies between -1 and 1. Theoretical calculations (Pickard, 1987) show that
under our model–the Ising model with beta = 0.5–the marginal distribution
of r is approximately Gaussian with mean around 0.85 or 0.9 and standard
deviation around 0.01. We’d like to know whether the set {r(x1), . . .,
r(x2000)} from the simulated Markov chain can serve as a substitute for the
marginal distribution of r.

Figure 1 shows the values of r(xj), for j=1 to 2000. (r(x0) = 0, and the first
few values are cut off to improve resolution on the graph.) The Markov chain
seems to have “converged to stationarity” after the thousand or so steps required
to shake off its initial state. How do we know it has converged, though? Figure
2 zooms in of the first 500 steps of the series, whose apparent convergence we
know to be illusory. For comparison we ran the Gibbs
sampler again for 2000 steps, but this time starting at a point x0 for which
r(x0) = 1; Figure 3 displays the series r(xj), which again seems to have
converged nicely. To destroy all illusions about convergence, hold
Figures 1 and 3 up to the light. The two Markov chains have “converged” to
different distributions! We are, of course, still observing transient
behavior.

Interestingly, the means of the series in Figures 1 and 3 differ, but
the variances are roughly equal. We’re not sure why, but it seems to be a
general feature in these Markov chain simulations that the variance converges
before the mean.

All simulations and plots were done using the New S Language:
A Programming Environment for Data Analysis and Graphics.

4. The answer: parallel Markov chains

To restate the general problem: we wish to summarize an intractable
distribution F(x) by running the Gibbs sampler (or a similar method such as the
Metropolis algorithm) until the distribution of the set of Markov chain
iterates is close to F. As shown in the previous section, convergence seems
impossible to monitor from a single finite realization of the Markov chain;
consequently, we follow the implicit suggestion of Figures 1 and 3 and track
several parallel sample paths.

Consider m independent runs of the Gibbs sampler, each of length n, starting
from m different initial states x10, . . ., xm0:

series 1: x11, . . ., x1n
. . .
series m: xm1, . . ., xmn.

Again, we focus attention on a univariate summary, say r(x); we want to
use the observed simulations rij to determine whether the series of r’s are
close to convergence after n steps.
To understand our method, consider the set of series as m blocks, each with
n observations, in the one-way analysis of variance layout (that is, ignore the
time ordering in the series). We will work with the total sum of squares
(with (mn-1) degrees of freedom) and the “within” sum of squares (with
(m-1)(n-1) degrees of freedom).

First assume for simplicity that the starting points of the simulated series
are themselves independent random samples from F(x). (Of course, if this
condition could be obtained in practice,
a Markov chain simulation method would not be
needed.) With independent starting points, all values of any series
are independent of all the values of any other series, and the unconditional
variance of any point rij is just the marginal variance var r under the
distribution F. We can then estimate var r, given the “data matrix” (rij),
by [total SS – (within SS)/m] / ((m-1)n). (Algebraic derivations appear
in the longer version of this article.) Given the assumption of initial
independence, this “between” estimate of variance
(not the same as the usual “between” estimate in ANOVA) is unbiased for finite
series of any length.

In contrast, the estimated variance within the series, (within SS) / ((m-1)(n-1)),
has expectation var r only in the limit as n -> infinity.
For finite series, the expected within mean square increases with n, assuming,
as is likely, that the random variables r(x1), r(x2), . . ., from the Markov
chain are positively correlated. The discrepancy between the two estimates
of var r suggests a test: declare the Markov chain to have converged when
the within mean square is close to the variance estimate between series, with
confidence intervals derived from classical ANOVA theory. Because of the
dependence within blocks, the degrees of freedom of the between and within
estimates are less than (m-1)n and m(n-1), respectively. We can
approximately correct for this information loss (once again, details will be
provided in the longer article).

Once we are close enough to convergence to be satisfied, the variance estimates
and degrees of freedom corrections alluded to above allow us to estimate the
marginal summaries E r, var r, and Normal-theory confidence intervals for our
Monte Carlo approximations. We can run the series longer if more precision
is desired, and can repeat the process to study the marginal distributions of
other parameters (without, of course, having to simulate any new series of x’s).

In practice, the starting points of the parallel series can never be sampled
independently with distribution F(x); the simulated series are thus no longer
stationary for any finite n, formally invalidating the above analysis. We
currently have two strategies designed to make the independence assumption
approximately true. First, we try to pick starting values that are far apart and,
if anything, more dispersed than independent random samples. The m parallel series
should then start far apart and grow closer as they approach stationarity, as in
Figures 1 and 3; since the variance between series declines with n, the
comparison-of-variances test should be conservative. Second, we reduce the
effect of the starting values by crudely throwing away the the first half
of each simulated series until approximate convergence has been reached.
Once again, Figures 1 and 3 illustrate how a few early steps
of the Markov chain can greatly distort estimates of means and variances
within series. We hope that the conservative strategies of starting with
dispersed points and throwing away early simulations will yield confidence
regions that are wider than those obtained by the ideal method, but that
still have good coverage properties.

The idea of comparing parallel simulations is not new; for
example, Fosdick (1959) applied the Metropolis algorithm to the Ising model
by simulating four series independently, from each of two different starting
points. Approximate convergence was declared when the two groups of series
became indistinguishable on the scale of a prechosen error bound.

5. Some references

Ehrman, J. R., Fosdick, L. D., and Handscomb, D. C. (1960).
Computation of order parameters in an Ising lattice by the Monte Carlo method.
{\em Journal of Mathematical Physics} {\bf 1} 547–558.

Fosdick, L. D. (1959). Calculation of order parameters in a binary
alloy by the Monte Carlo method. {\em Physical Review} {\bf 116}, 565–573.

Geman, S., and Geman, D. (1984). Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs
distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images. {\em IEEE Transactions
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence} {\bf 6}, 721–741.

Hammersley, J. M., and Handscomb, D. C. (1964), chapter 9. {\em Monte Carlo
Methods}. London: Chapman and Hall.

Kinderman, R., and Snell, J. L. (1980). {\em Markov Random Fields and
their Applications}. Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society.

Lindley, D. V., and Smith, A. F. M. (1972). Bayes estimates for the linear
model. {\em Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B} {\bf 34}, 1–41.

Metropolis, N., Rosenbluth, A. W., Rosenbluth, M. N., Teller, A. H., and
Teller, E. (1953). Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines.
{\em Journal of Chemical Physics} {\bf 21}, 1087–1092.

Pickard, D. K. (1987). Inference for discrete Markov fields: the
simplest nontrivial case. {\em Journal of the American Statistical Association}
{\bf 82} 90–96.

Ripley, B. D. (1981). {\em Spatial Statistics}, p. 16ff. New York: Wiley.

Tanner, M. A., and Wong, W. H. (1987). The calculation of posterior
distributions by data augmentation. {\em Journal of the American Statistical
Association} {\bf 82}, 528–550.

“In the run-up to the trial, the brothers conducted an elaborate public relations campaign . . . also arranged for payments to influencers and podcasters who made sympathetic social media posts about the case.”

From a news article about some recently-convicted rapists:

Three brothers who ran a yearslong conspiracy to traffic women and girls for sex were sentenced to 30 years each in prison on Tuesday . . . The brothers, more accustomed to moving around in powerful and wealthy circles in New York and Miami, must now wait to see which federal prison they are sent to. They have also taken steps to try and secure a pardon.

That last link takes you to this story:

Tal, Oren and Alon Alexander, three prominent brothers convicted of running a decades-long sex-trafficking scheme in New York earlier this year, have enlisted the lawyer Alan M. Dershowitz in their apparent pursuit of a pardon from President Trump.

They retained him in March 2025, nearly 11 months before their trial began in New York federal court, and since then have paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars, according to financial documents obtained by The New York Times.

Those documents include a copy of a check for $250,000, as well as a wire transfer receipt and an invoice from Mr. Dershowitz requesting an additional $250,000. . . .

We can laugh at buffoonish Epstein associates such as Nobel-winner Richard “Axel” Foley and Ted-talk star Dan “Redhead” Ariely, but this seems worse. Convicted sex offenders enlist legal associate of convicted sex offender to solicit a pardon from a convicted sex offender. There is a logic to it, I admit.

Also this:

In the run-up to the trial, the brothers conducted an elaborate public relations campaign . . . the brothers had worked with a Hollywood public relations firm that has been linked to several high-profile smear campaigns. . . . The brothers also arranged for payments to influencers and podcasters who made sympathetic social media posts about the case.

Which reminds me of the intimidation tactics employed by Theranos and Cambridge University to suppress reporting on their frauds, and the too-close-to-home story we discussed yesterday, of some Facebook executives plotting a “Merchants of Doubt”-style smear job on an academic critic of their industry.

As I wrote a few years ago: Yes, this is a credulous age. But this credulity does not occur in a vacuum. What’s stunning is the way in which frauds can stay afloat even after they’ve been exposed. Not that this is new. That Chariots of the Gods guy kept selling books even after it was common knowledge that it was all bogus. I just think we need to keep more of an eye on the active efforts that people take, not just to promote crap, but to attack those who point out the problems.

These are some of the richest and most powerful people in the world and they’re too greedy to respond to criticism in an honest and open way. Which shouldn’t surprise me: They got where they are today by breaking the rules, and they are celebrated and rewarded for it, so why change their behavior now?

They play by their own rules:

P.S. I’ll share one more item, which is unrelated except that I happened to come across it while going through the other files:

it’s an attempt from mathematician Jonathan Farley to tap Epstein for $5 million . . . in a letter dated July 30, 2019, and sent to the disgraced financier care of the Metropolitan Correctional Center. Sorry, Jonathan, you were too late!

P.P.S. The question naturally arises, Why am I posting this? After all, my comparative advantage lies in statistical modeling, causal inference, and social science. There are lots of people out there who can share political outrage-of-the-week stories; I’m hardly needed for that, and in this case I’m not even to serve to usefully amplify the story, given that it was already reported in a newspaper with a circulation in the millions.

As always, my answer is that I give my take on such events because they relate to things that are closer to my core interests.

First off, the story directly reminded me of what I learned yesterday, that it appears that some evil people from a fabulously rich corporation were talking about enlisting my aid in a secret hit job (what our homophobic Stanford friend Niall Ferguson might call “some opposition research on Mr. H”). That annoyed me! The story discussed in the present post is worse, in that they’re doing this on behalf not just of greedy plutocrats but for actual rapists. What I’m saying here is that I saw the article in the newspaper, it connected in my mind to the recent business I’d been thinking about, so I was motivated to express myself.

The other thing is the Jeffrey Epstein connection, here exemplified by Alan Dershowitz (who reportedly is working on getting a pardon for the rapists) and Mark Zuckerberg (who reportedly has fostered a culture at his company of lying and media manipulation). Beyond my own indirect connections to Epstein (my Ph.D. adviser was one of the many Harvard types who flattered the financier in the hope of extracting some money from him), I’m interested in the story as a social scientist and a student of the worst as well as the best in the intellectual and business worlds.

Finally, that Jonathan Farley note was just too good not to share. I’m just picturing the mathematician at his desk, hearing that Epstein is now in jail, and thinking: “Ummmm, I guess this is my last chance . . . if I play my cards right, I can get 5 million dollars and a chair at Oxford. It probably won’t pan out but it can’t hurt to try.” Aaahhhh, but it could hurt!

As always, I laugh because otherwise I would cry.

Bou-Rabee’s breakthrough paper, “Persistence Pays: Square-root condition-number dependence for Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin Monte Carlo …”

This post is from Bob

This one’s a big deal.

Bou-Rabee, Nawaf. 2026. Persistence Pays: Square-root condition-number dependence for Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin Monte Carlo with a non-reversibly updated accept/reject uniform. arXiv 2610.35781.

Abstract: We prove accelerated mixing for a Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin sampler: the OBABO splitting with friction 2 * sqrt(m), adjusted with Neal’s non-reversibly updated uniform, which is redrawn after every epoch of E steps. For targets exp(−U) on ℝ^d with m * I ⪯ ∇^2 U ⪯ L * I and an L_H-Lipschitz Hessian, started from a Gaussian at an approximate minimizer, the chain reaches total variation accuracy ε after Õ(sqrt(κ * d) + sqrt(L_H) * (d/m)^0.75) gradient evaluations, where κ=L/m and Õ hides logarithmic factors. The sqrt(κ) term is necessary, already on Gaussian targets. The proof discretizes Lu’s entropic hypocoercivity by means of an entropy inequality for free transport, so that the relative entropy of the unadjusted chain decays at a rate of order sqrt(m) up to a discretization bias. With the non-reversibly updated uniform, the leading energy errors of velocity Verlet telescope along a path. A coupling argument combines the two. On Bayesian logistic regression posteriors for two standard data sets, which satisfy these assumptions, the gradient cost of the chain with the non-reversibly updated uniform grows roughly like the square root of the condition number at the posterior mode, and that of standard adjusted OBABO roughly like its 3/4 power.

Note the square-root in the condition-number dependence. This is the tightest result we know for a discrete-step, adjusted sampler (i.e., one we can implement as a black-box). The full set of concavity and Lipschitz assumptions are in the abstract above (strongly log concave, Lipschitz in the Hessian). For what it’s worth, Claude (5.5 medium effort) concurs that nobody has proved a result this tight in condition number before.

The scales here get confusing, pardon my pun, so let’s establish some intuition from simple cases (skip this paragraph and the next if you know condition numbers). Suppose we have a multivariate normal distribution. The Hessian (matrix of second partial derivatives) of the negative log density is constant around the density and equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix. In general (i.e., not just for normals) for a point that is log concave (i.e., the Hessian is positive definite), the condition number is the ratio of the largest eigenvalue of that Hessian to the smallest eigenvalue. To simplify even further, suppose the covariance is diagonal, so that Sigma[m,m] represents the variance of variable m and all the off diagonal entries are zero (i.e., zero correlation). In that case, the eigenvalues are just the Sigma[m,m] and the condition number is just the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the smallest eigenvalue. The problem for sampling with algorithms like random-walk Metropolis, Langevin, or Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, is that their run time is multiplied by the condition number. For a standard normal, where Sigma[m,m] is 1 for every m, the condition number is 1, and that’s the fastest we can get, because condition numbers are >= 1 by construction. That’s why we try to precondition our target posteriors with mass matrixes to make them (or their gradients in the case of Nutpie) look more normal (e.g., with non-centered parameterizations).

Why is posterior exploration time proportional to the condition number? It’s because we have to set the step size to accommodate the direction of highest curvature, then we have to take a number of steps traverse the scale of the direction of lowest curvature. For all of these samplers, traversing a distance takes quadratic time. So the algorithm is quadratic in the ratio of scales, which makes it linear in the condition number.

This is why reducing the condition number is so appealing. Sparse NUTS, from Cole Monnahan, works exceptionally well for mixed-effects models by preconditioning with a sparse Hessian located at the max marginal likelihood estimate (e.g., the estimate produced by lme4 or TMB). Note to Stan devs: We should adapt this for brms through TMB—it’s too model specific for Stan and we don’t have the linear algebra tools we need built into C++.

Why is this paper such a breakthrough? The assumptions on which the guarantee is based are standard in theoretical work, namely that the density must be strictly log concave with Lipschitz-bounded Hessians. Bou-Rabee establishes that generalized Hamiltonian Monte Carlo with one step (aka “kinetic Langevin”) has run time that grows only with the square root of the condition number! This kinetic or generalized part of the algorithm refers to the way momentum is refreshed. Rather than fully refreshing momentum, a new momentum is taken and averaged with the existing momentum at a fixed mixing rate (which could presumably be randomized, but not made dependent on state). The bottom line is that run time for a fixed level of accuracy grows with the ratio of scales (i.e., the square root of the condition) rather than the ratio of squared scales (i.e., the condition number). And unlike something like NUTS or WALNUTS, swapping in a new acceptance probability sequence couldn’t be much easier to implement.

Why is this a big deal? The main obstacle to Stan’s sampling, as I’ve just realized while building Walnuts and Walnutpie and evaluating on a ton of real-world models, is that the condition number remains high in most posteriordb models and models Andrew’s suggested, even after diagonal preconditioning with a mass matrix using either the NUTS or Nutpie divergence target. A ratio of scales as low as 10 will cause a 100-fold slowdown in sampling. That is, if I sample normal(0, diag_matrix([1, 10]’)) in Stan, it’s 100 times slower than if I sample normal(0, diag_matrix[1, 1]). The low-rank and diagonal approach from Nutpie helps here where it’s stable, but so far I haven’t found it to be as stable as the diagonal preconditioned in my evaluations.

The algorithm that Bou-Rabee analyzed was introduced by Radford Neal in the following paper, which I thought I had discussed here before, but can’t find any trace.

Neal, Radford. 2020. Non-reversibly updating a uniform [0,1] value for Metropolis accept/reject decisions. arXiv 2001.11950.

This paper is typical of Neal’s paper, introducing a very simple idea with a profound effect that’s explained so that a beginner can understand it and code it. We used it as a reference for my work with Gilad Turok and Chirag Modi (and also Alex Barnett) on delayed rejection generalized HMC, which I’ve blogged as Multiscale generalized HMC with delayed rejection.

I’m still a bit confused about how the regular condition number works compared to the one Langmore et al. generated for normal targets in HMC, which I blogged about as Condition numbers for HMC and the funnel. Nawaf told me before that Langmore’s work was only for normals, but it still seems relevant.

I better get busy adding this algorithm to Walnutpie. I’d planned to do it at some future date, but it looks like this is probably the sampler we should be using everywhere. Stay tuned for more evaluation.

Tension vs. excitement during NBA games

This is related to our discussion of the martingale property of calibrated probability forecasts.

Jeremy Lu writes:

I’m a former student of Dr. Jennifer Hill at NYU and have been keeping up with your blog. I noticed some people write to you with questions and wanted to ask you a question of my own.
For some background, I scraped together every NBA game since 1996. Each game has a tension metric, which measures how uncertain the outcome of a game is (detailed calculation here: https://www.inpredictable.com/2020/04/an-update-to-tension-index-with-assist_11.html)
and an excitement metric, which calculates how far the probability graph “travels” over the course of the game. There’s been a lot of talk about the NBA becoming boring, so I wanted to see if this could be measured statistically.
I’ve made boxplots of the daily median excitement and tension of the regular season. The idea is, if a viewer turned on a random game one day and watched it, how would they perceive how engaging the NBA was?
image.png

image.png

We can see that (at least with this methodology), over time, excitement has increased slightly, and tension has decreased. Regarding excitement and tension — these two variables are highly correlated (Spearman coefficient of 0.91). So my question is:
Does it make sense that excitement and tension are positively correlated, but over time, excitement has slightly increased and that tension has slightly decreased? Am I doing something wrong here or simply misunderstanding correlation and trends over time? Is it a sort of paradoxical relationship where looking at individual factors vs. the aggregate is different? (for example, player A may have a higher 2 point percentage and 3 point percentage than player B, but a lower overall field goal percentage, due to the proportion of their 2pt vs 3 pt shots)
image.png
I’ve graphed all the games across all the seasons and used a LOESS regression (x axis excitement, y axis tension). One thing I noticed is that in the past, the lines of fit get flatter; but more recently, there is still a slight upwards slope  remaining as we get to the higher tensions and excitements. Wondering if this means anything at all.
My reply:
1.  Maybe it’s a mistake to take these definitions of “tension” and “excitement” too seriously.  There are times when I think it can make sense to consider properties of applied interest and give them mathematical definitions (as when we defined “partisan bias” and “electoral responsiveness” here:  https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/electoral3.pdf) but often these names can be misleading.  So maybe you’d be better off with a more direct measure such as the number of lead changes in the second half of the game, or something like that.
2.  These trends seem small compared to the variation.  This again suggests the appeal of more direct measures.  Think of it from the perspective of a casual fan who might watch 10 or 20 games during the year.  You could ask how many of these games would be boring, or something like that.
3.  For your graphs I would recommend straight-up scatterplots, as I think the box plots create a lot of distracting artifacts.  I’d also use a cleaner x-axis, for example just label every 10 years, and also it’s not clear how to interpret the y-axis, which I guess is related to points 1 and 2 above.

We interrupt our usual programming to inform you that I was never hired by Facebook to do a hit job on Jonathan Haidt.

So. I got some emails today from various people, pointing me to this item from a court filing:

This seems to be the story:

Meta internally set a goal to “get the academic community to disavow” and “turn against” professor Jonathan Haidt, who has linked social media use to mental health decline, as it in-house rebuffed internal efforts to study social media’s impact on teen health, according to recently unredacted documents filed publicly Friday. . . .

Notes taken during a March 8, 2023, meeting show Meta Vice President Curtiss Cobb’s suggested goal for the “Haidt assignment,” was, “how do we get the academic community to disavow Haidt?” Under the topic, a sole bullet point says “can’t co-opt them, so how do we enrage them?” . . .

The meeting notes also reveal that Meta employees discussed how the company could work with “the academics” to “get Gellman to write a take-down piece” on Haidt, referring to Columbia University statistician Andrew Gelman . . .

And this:

The employee wrote that Curtiss “thinks we need to focus on the media” to convince reporters that Haidt is “not credible.” Meta’s staffers also apparently discussed contacting a media figure referred to as “Gellman” to “write a take-down piece” about Haidt. It was not immediately clear who Gellman was.

It’s not immediately clear to me who Gellman is either!

But I will tell you this. I’ve never been contacted by anyone at Facebook or Meta regarding Jonathan Haidt or his work.

One of the above-linked articles mentions a court date from last year, in which “Meta abruptly settled the dispute, cutting a $17.1 billion deal with the states.”

$17.1 billion! OK, I wouldn’t expect all of that money, just for writing one little hit piece, but what if Meta had offered me $1.71 billion, or $171 million, or even just a trifling $17.1 million. Would I have done the job for them for that amount of money? I’d like to say, No, I’m too ethical for that, but . . . this a counterfactual about which we have no direct data, as they never approached me! My guess is that, had they dangled those dollars in front of me, I’d just have mocked them, kind of like how I mocked those Dialog 2022 scammers. But we’ll never know!

In all seriousness, this revelation about Facebook’s public relations team is absolutely horrible—we’re talking about some of the richest and most powerful people in the world conspiring to interfere with the open processes of science, journalism, and the law—but it’s hardly surprising, given what we’ve learned from insider accounts such as Careless People, the memoir by Sarah Wynn-Williams, or, for that matter, the despicable behavior of the bigshot legal teams in the Theranos and Cambridge University scandals.

Oddly enough, I have at times received money from Facebook; indeed, they’re listed on our sponsors page, along with other crowd favorites such as Disney, Amazon, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Back in 2016, Facebook gave me a no-strings-attached donation of $25,000 through Columbia University to spend on my research. This came from their data science team, which to my knowledge had nothing to do with the creepy behavior described above. I also spoke at their offices once (a technical talk, nothing about take-down pieces in the media), and they use lots of multilevel modeling, Bayesian inference, and Stan. Going through my old emails, it seems that we received some Facebook funding in 2020 for a computer science Ph.D. student who was working with me on a project involving probabilistic programming. We also applied for a couple of academic Facebook grants that we didn’t get. Also I gave Goel, Mason, and Watts some advice twenty years ago regarding their project on social networks that used a Facebook survey.

But nothing from them regarding social media’s impact on teen health. I guess that “get Gellman to write a take-down piece” was one of those bright ideas that never made it out of the conference room. Or else they approached a different person, maybe someone actually named Gellman.

Survey Statistics: how to measure hospital quality ?

Last week we chatted about hopes for a new edition of Lumley 2010.

Preview

Alan Zaslavsky recommends this textbook in his course. After taking the course in 2011, I asked Alan to advise my PhD. Alan’s work extends across most topics in Lumley’s textbook and beyond. One focus is statistical issues in measuring the quality of a hospital: how can we compare hospitals who see different distributions of patients (i.e. casemix) ? Zaslavsky 2001 explains a few approaches, including direct standardization.

Let:

  • Y = complications
  • X = sickness of the patient
  • R = hospital, can be A or B
  • Y(A) = complications if treated by hospital A
  • Y(B) = complications if treated by hospital B

To compare hospitals A and B, we want to compare Y(A) versus Y(B). We cannot do this for one patient, because at least one of Y(A) or Y(B) is not observed. But we can compare averages. We can compare E(E(Y(A) | X, R = A)) versus E(E(Y(B) | X, R = B)) where the outer expectations are with respect to some standard casemix of X. Direct standardization estimates the inner expectations with the mean in each X stratum. As Zaslavsky 2001 points out, this needs modification if there are no patients in a stratum, or when X is continuous. Instead, the inner expectations can be estimated with regression models.

See Figure 2 from Zaslavsky 2001:

Lumley 2010 points out that direct standardization is mathematically equivalent to poststratification:

 

Six questions about political polarization and my responses

Mary Murray writes:

I am a Year 12 student in the UK currently completing an Extended Project Qualification (EPQ), an independent research project equivalent to half an A-Level.

I intend to study law at a competitive university and hope to pursue a career as a foreign correspondent covering the United States in the future. My strong interest in contemporary American politics, is what has inspired me to aim to do this.

My EPQ explores modern political polarisation in the United States, focusing on debates surrounding constitutional rights such as gun legislation, abortion, and freedom of speech. As well as the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and the media in shaping political discourse and public opinion.

I would be extremely grateful for the opportunity to ask you a few questions about American politics. Your expert opinion would not only be invaluable to helping me succeed in my EPQ, but also really helpful in providing me advice on how to get into such a specific field.

Here were her questions:

1. Political polarisation is frequently described as being at unprecedented levels in the United States. How do experts measure polarisation, and what are the key limitations of these measurements?

2. When examined using data from the past few decades, do you believe contemporary American polarisation represents a significant structural shift compared to late 20th-century politics?

3. To what extent is modern political polarisation driven by political elites and party leadership rather than by ordinary voters?

4. Is there clear evidence that modern media increases political polarisation, or does it mainly amplify the perception of division?

5. In your research, does redistricting significantly contribute to political polarisation, or are broader social and ideological factors more important?

6. Some experts argue that rising affective polarisation poses risks to democratic norms. Based on available data, do you believe current levels of division threaten democratic stability in the United States?

And here are my responses:

1. Three ways that experts measure trends in polarization are from votes in legislatures (Democrats voting more consistently on the left and Republicans voting more consistently on the left), individual votes (less split-ticket voting, more party-line voting), and surveys of political attitudes (Democrats more consistently taking positions on the left, Republicans more consistently taking positions on the right).

2. Yes, definitely.

3. It’s both. Polarization mostly starts in the elites and then trickles down to ordinary voters.

4. It’s both. Much of political polarization is indeed the perception of polarization; also, though, there’s evidence that partisan media can move people to hold more extreme views.

5. The U.S. Senate is about as polarized as the U.S. House, and the Senate isn’t subject to gerrymandering at all, so I think the answer is that there are fewer close races in general. Part of this is due to redistricting, but there’s also just more geographic variation in how people vote.

6. It’s hard to for me to say.

MRP at NYT

Coincidentally, or maybe not, on the same day that our New York Times contact informed me about their new job opening, Yair points us to this new feature at the NYT website, “Times Voter Trends” at the NYT. Yair writes:

It’s a voter-file-based estimate of how every demographic group voted in every state, with survey models poststratified to the full file and calibrated to precinct results. It’s basically the approach we’ve been running at Catalist for years, which of course grew out of the MRP work you and I did together. Here’s a description of the methodology.

They use gradient boosting instead of a multilevel model [what we’ve called Regularized Prediction and Poststratification — AG], but the overall structure is very similar. It’s great to see these methods going increasingly mainstream.

Here are the relevant research papers:

[2013] Deep interactions with MRP: Election turnout and voting patterns among small electoral subgroups. American Journal of Political Science 57, 762-776. (Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman)

[2020] Voter registration databases and MRP: Toward the use of [2020] Voter registration databases and MRP: Toward the use of large scale databases in public opinion research. databases in public opinion research. Political Analysis 28, 507-531. (Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman)

My Ph.D. adviser once told us that the true sign of success is when people use your methods without even citing you. That’s when you know the ideas are fully in circulation.

One-year election analytics fellowship at the New York Times

Will Davis writes:

We ended up hiring somebody who had seen the job posting through your blog, and he is fantastic.

I also wanted to let you know that we have a fellowship slot open.

This is a one-year, full-time position to get to be a part of the Election Analytics department at The Times and get to work with the team that produces The Needle, The Times/Siena Poll, our early vote trackers, analytical journalism about elections and, starting this election, Times Voter Trends.

The exact form of this role will depend on the individual’s background. Candidates that are more comfortable writing than coding and want to deepen their technical skills to more easily answer questions themselves and candidates that bring a background as a developer or statistician and want to work on their ability to communicate your ideas in words will be considered equally.

The deadline to apply is Nov. 20, no exceptions.

This looks interesting and important.

Skepticism about the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test

The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), which we discussed the other day, has been critiqued in a series of papers:

– Construct validity evidence reporting practices for the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test: A systematic scoping review

– Why most research based on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is unsubstantiated and uninterpretable: A response to Murphy and Hall (2024)

– Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test scores demonstrate poor structural properties in nine large non-clinical samples

– Validation of the reading the mind in the eyes test requires an interpretable factor model

And these criticisms have been summarized in a piece aimed at a wider audience:

– The widely used measure of “theory of mind” needs to be re-examined, along with the long-standing claim that autism is linked to a lack of this ability.

I don’t know this literature and will offer no professional opinion. From personal experience, I have general skepticism about anything involving looking people in the eyes!

World’s dumbest AI spam just dropped

I’ve seen some incompetent email scams before, but this is the worst so far:

From: ** <**@gmail.com>
Subject: Availability inquiry: statistical-design review for FormalismBench
Date: October 23, 2026 at 04:01:24 EDT
To: [email protected]

Dear Professor Gelman,

I’m an AI assistant helping ** prepare FormalismBench, a research prototype evaluating AI choices among direct proof, reusable lemmas, representation construction, and abstention in Lean. The project needs an independent statistical-design review, especially on world-level uncertainty, paired comparisons, small sample sizes, missing outcomes, and preregistration.

Would you be open to considering a scoped review, or could you recommend a suitable reviewer? If interested, please let us know your availability, relevant conflicts, and expected terms or fee. No one has been assigned, and we do not assume unpaid work. We can share a concise public review packet if you are interested; no protected data would be sent.

Thank you,
AI assistant supporting **
FormalismBench

Begin forwarded message:

From: ** <**@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Availability inquiry: statistical-design review for FormalismBench
Date: October 23, 2026 at 04:17:44 EDT
To: [email protected]

Good morning Professor Massot,

My sincere apologies for the mistaken spam by the AI agent. I’m **, an AI researcher from **, and PhD student at **. I was running a long horizon multiagent system on a thought experiment.
Please accept my sincere apologies.

**

“Good morning Professor Massot,” indeed.

As the saying goes, AI may be stupid, but people are stupider.

Ideological bias in “Ideological bias in the production of research findings”

John Nielsen-Gammon points to a recent article, “Ideological bias in the production of research findings,” by George J. Borjas and Nate Breznau, which states:

Our study exploits an opportunity to observe 158 researchers working independently in 71 teams during an experiment. After being asked their position on immigration policy, they used the same data to answer the same empirical question: Does immigration affect public support for social welfare programs? . . . teams composed of pro-immigration researchers estimated more positive impacts of immigration on public support for social programs, while anti-immigration teams estimated more negative impacts. The differences arise because different teams adopted different model specifications.

This makes sense. A statistical model is intended to be some useful approximation to reality, as informed by data and the modeler’s theoretical understanding. People with different political ideologies will naturally have different theoretical understandings, and this will lead to different model specifications.

Nielsen-Gammon wanted to emphasize these excerpts from the paper:

We document the role of ideology in the production of research findings by taking advantage of the unique crowdsourced experiment designed by N. Breznau, E. Mark Rinke, and A. Wuttke (20) (henceforth BRW). In their experiment, 71 research teams (comprising 158 researchers) received the same data to test the specific hypothesis that immigration reduces support for social policies among the public…As part of the experiment and before any empirical analysis was done, the participating researchers were asked about their attitudes toward immigration; specifically, whether immigration laws “should be made tougher” or “should be relaxed.”

The research teams produced wildly different estimates of the impact of immigration. As BRW [page 5 of (20)] note, “no two teams arrived at the same set of numerical results or took the same major decisions during data analysis.” Our study examines this variation to determine whether the dispersion depends on researcher priors about immigration…Research teams that had strong pro-immigration sentiments were more likely to obtain positive parameter estimates, suggesting that immigration increases public support for social programs, which social and behavioral scientists consider to be an indicator of increased social cohesion (31). Conversely, strongly anti-immigration teams were more likely to obtain negative estimates, potentially suggesting that immigration reduces social cohesion.

We demonstrate that the combinations of five specific research design decisions account for about two-thirds of the difference in the impacts reported by pro- and anti-immigration teams. The research design choices that could uniquely produce large negative effects were taken almost exclusively by anti-immigration teams and vice versa for pro-immigration teams. In short, research design is endogenous and provides the mechanism through which ideology enters the process of producing research findings. Last, dispersion in the quality of the model specifications adopted by different teams, as measured by a random and double-blind review of each modeling strategy by other researchers in the experiment, shows that anti- and pro-immigration teams received lower peer referee scores than moderate teams.

Our finding that ideology matters conflicts with the BRW [page 5 of (20)] conclusion that “researcher characteristics do not explain outcome variance.” The reason for the difference is substantively important: The preferred statistical analysis in BRW was a regression model…where the dependent variable—the team’s estimate of the impact of immigration on social cohesion—was regressed on a variable measuring the team’s ideology jointly with a vector of many other variables that described characteristics of the model specification used by the team…Our analysis, however, documents that this regression model is misspecified if its purpose is to determine whether ideology plays an independent role in the production of research findings. The variables indicating various aspects of the regression specification are endogenous and are the mechanism through which ideology influences statistical estimates.

In summary, the endogenous research design choices made by teams with immigration ideologies in either tail of the immigration sentiment distribution happen to produce parameter estimates that seem consistent with the teams’ pre-existing ideological priors. Note that we are careful to say “choices” as plural here because a key finding of the original BRW study was that no single specification choice mattered much (e.g., logit or OLS). A more recent study, which simulates the multiverse of all possible choices in the BRW experimental data, confirms that indeed no single specification choice explains much of the variation, but that higher-order interactions of those choices explain much of the meaningful variation in outcomes (32).

This is interesting, and it’s always good to see people talking about the multiverse. I know we’ve succeeded with this idea when people talk about it without even feeling the need to refer to our paper on the topic; the idea is just in the air.

There was just one thing that bothered me about the Borjas and Breznau article, and that is the ideological framing of the research question from the original study.

The question was, “Does immigration affect public support for social welfare programs?”, and the finding was, “teams composed of pro-immigration researchers estimated more positive impacts of immigration on public support for social programs, while anti-immigration teams estimated more negative impacts.”

This is interesting. In the current U.S. context, the dominant view on the left is pro-immigration and pro- public support for social programs, while the dominant view on the right is anti-immigration and anti- public support for social programs.

There’s an asymmetry here.
– Researchers on the left see a virtuous circle: more immigration (a good thing) leads to more support for social programs (another good thing); or a vicious circle: less immigration (a bad thing) leads to less support for social programs (another bad thing).
– In contrast, researchers on the right see something more like a stable system: more immigration (a bad thing) leads to less support for social programs (a good thing); or less immigration (a good thing) leads to more support for social programs (a bad thing).

Perhaps this is a general aspect of the left and the right, that, traditionally the left thinks things can just get better and better, or worse and worse, whereas the right tends to believe in stability, that apparent good things have their negatives, whereas apparent bad things aren’t all bad. Contrarianism can be thought of as, in some general terms, a conservative position.

But I think this pattern is unintentionally obscured by Borjas and Breznau, because they identify support for social welfare programs as “social cohesion”; for example, they write that the “estimated effect of immigration on social cohesion is more positive if the researchers are pro-immigration and more negative if the researchers are anti-immigration.”

By talking about “social cohesion,” though, they’re already stacking the deck! Everybody likes increased social cohesion; it’s positively viewed from left, right, and center. But increased public support for social welfare programs is viewed as a negative from the right.

From that perspective, I see two problems with the “social cohesion” frame. The first is that it’s accepting a liberal or center-left view by default, which doesn’t seem right in a project that’s all about ideological differences between left and right. The second problem is that it obscures one of the key results, which is that, according to their analysis, both liberal and conservative researchers see increased immigration as having a positive outcome on the “support for social programs” issue: for liberals, more immigration is good, and it leads to the positive outcome of more support for social programs; for conservatives, more immigration is bad, but it leads to the positive outcome of less support for social programs. Again, this is consistent with the big-picture view in which liberals see good policies as leading to more good things, whereas conservatives are more inclined to see things as balancing out: restricting immigration is a good policy which will unfortunately lead to the bad outcome of more support for social programs, but that’s the way things go.

P.S. The above post is about averages. At an individual level, there are libertarian conservatives who support increased immigration and reduced social spending, and there are national liberals who support decreased immigration and increased social spending.

A big problem with conventional experimentation or A/B testing is that the treatment effect can vary over time and it can depend on the entire history of the treatment. Usual comparisons miss this point.

Andrea Bronzini points to this article and writes:

I’m working on experimentation tooling and wrote a brief note about a failure mode I keep seeing: “winning” A/B tests often lose uplift after rollout.

My claim is that the typical setup mixes novelty response with steady-state effect because assignment happens after first exposure, and the outcome is time-dependent.

My reply: I think he is identifying a real problem. The problem he identifies is a special case of the issue that the treatment effect can vary over time and it can depend on the entire history of the treatment, and I guess that ultimately the best solution is to model these sources of variation.

I also like this bit from his webpage:

He saw how the industry’s obsession with certainty slowed businesses down… so he decided to fix it. . . .

Confidence ≠ Certainty.
Data is never complete.
And that’s why we need to embrace taking decisions with risk.
Progress belongs to those who act while others wait.

Also relevant is my talk (not yet a paper), It’s About Time.

How to get the most out of Bayesian Data Analysis

Appendix B of our new Bayesian Workflow book is called “How to get the most out of Bayesian Data Analysis”:

Our thinking about Bayesian statistics is summarized in the books Bayesian Data Analysis, third edition (BDA3), by Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, Vehtari, and Rubin (2013), and Statistical Rethinking: A Bayesian Course with Examples in R and Stan, second edition, by McElreath (2020). There is no point in repeating the material in BDA3 here. Instead we go through it, chapter by chapter, pointing out the parts that should be most helpful for learning Bayesian workflow using Stan.

And here’s the appendix right here for you.

My exchange with Yann LeCun about killer robots

This was from 2022. Yann LeCun:

People being scared to death of technological progress is nothing new either.

There is a very long list of retrospectively-hilarious fears of every new technological or cultural progress.

An interesting case is the printing press, which the catholic church saw as potentially destroying the fabric of society.
And that, it did.
And we are all better off for it.
https://newsletter.pessimistsarchive.org

Me:

I have to admit, I’m scared of drones flying around with machine guns.

LeCun:

I’m scared of machines guns in the wrong hands, which includes those of average citizens.
I’m scared of machine guns mounted on drones controlled by unsavory characters.
But I don’t really mind them in the hands of the well-trained military of a liberal democracy for the defense of freedom.

Me:

There are two questions here:

1. Given that the technology exists to make drones flying around with machine guns, what should our government do about it?

2. Am I scared of drones flying around with machine guns?

The answer to question 1 is complicated. I guess that our government has many options, including research and development on more effective drones flying around with machine guns; research and development on anti-drone weapons; and negotiating treaties to limit research, development, and deployment of these devices.

As to question 2: Yeah, I’m scared of drones flying around with machine guns! Partly because the “bad guys” might use them in terrorism, and partly because “the good guys” might use them in terrorism. The U.S. has been a liberal democracy for a long time and that hasn’t stopped its military from terroristic acts from time to time.

Anyway, yeah, it’s scary to me. Sometimes I see little drones flying around in the park. If I thought they might have machine guns on them . . . jeez!

I guess it also depends on what you call a “liberal democracy.” Considering countries that have recently started wars, Russia and Israel don’t count: Russia has elections but it seems to be pretty much understood that they’re controlled by the government, and Israel has what’s called a herrenvolk democracy, which is a liberal democracy only for the dominant ethnic group. The U.S. is a liberal democracy with a well-trained military, but it’s not always used “in defense of freedom.”

I guess it’s that last bit—“in defense of freedom”—that’s the sticking point. Arguably the ability to wage war with machine guns mounted on drones will enable military leaders, whether or not they’re from liberal democracies–to act aggressively, not in defense of freedom at all.

Another way to look at it is that “unsavory characters” are everywhere. And giving people the power to kill remotely can perhaps bring out the unsavoriness of some characters.

In any case, LeCun is a computer scientist and I’m a statistician, and neither of us will be in charge of government policy. Which I guess is a good thing. At least, I know it’s a good thing that I’m not in charge of anything.

Real political reporters use data journalism techniques to catch fakers at “Wedgewood Polls”

Mary Radcliffe, Elliott Morris, Cooper Burton, and Fiftyplusone report:

On Tuesday, Oct. 20, FiftyPlusOne reached out to Wedgewood Polls, a self-professed polling firm, with a request for comment on an investigation we had conducted into their alleged survey research. . . .

We reached out to them to ask who they were and confirm the methodology statement on their website. We were given two names, Jack Sims and Andrew Prater. We were able to independently confirm that Sims had previous experience in the polling industry and reviewed their methodology statement in detail. It is not atypical for a pollster to leave an existing firm, form their own, and self-fund some surveys to build reputation; we had no reason at the time to believe this case was any different. Wedgewood operated as if it were a legitimate polling firm, including collecting money from donors to conduct crowd-funded polls, and sharing raw survey data (which we now have confirmed was fraudulent) with FiftyPlusOne on Oct. 19, 2026.

How did Radcliffe et al. figure out Wedgewood data were fake?

First, in FiftyPlusOne’s data from this vendor [Pollfish, an online survey platform], the ID variable for a person appears as a roughly even mix between a standard string of numbers (e.g., “1234567890”) and a string of numbers prefixed by a hyphen (e.g., “-1234567890”). Second, the transaction identifier correlates almost 1:1 with the time a person submitted their survey. We confirmed with Pollfish that this is the expected behavior of these columns, and verified that data from another pollster who has used the platform also produces patterns that match ours.

However, the respondent and transaction IDs recorded in survey data that Wedgewood provided to FiftyPlusOne do not match these expected patterns. Wedgewood told us it conducted a recent poll of the Mississippi Senate race using the same survey platform that we tested, Pollfish. However, in Wedgewood’s data, the respondent and transaction IDs do not behave the same way they do in FiftyPlusOne’s data, or in data from the third-party pollster we consulted. Additionally, they do not comport with the descriptions of these columns given to us by the survey platform.

These are just two of many factors that make FiftyPlusOne suspicious of the veracity of the polls being published by Wedgewood.

Maybe there’s an innocent explanation . . . OK, maybe not:

We detailed these concerns to Wedgewood and, they publicly responded indicating that their polls were indeed fake.

Where did the suspicion come from? Radcliffe et al. tell the story:

Last week, we received a credible tip from a trusted source that Wedgewood Polls might be faking data. We had received tips about Wedgewood in the past, but this particular tip had something crucial that other reports didn’t: evidence. So we asked Wedgewood to provide us with the raw data from their most recent survey, a Mississippi poll conducted Oct. 12 – 14, 2026 . . . We were already wary of this survey. The poll was released just hours after a prominent race rater, Sabato’s Crystal Ball, had changed its rating of this race from Safe Republican to Likely Republican (somewhat of a surprise to elections watchers) and showed Hyde-Smith up only 4 points over Colom. That’s a notable coincidence.

When we got the raw data from Wedgewood, we found that it was surprisingly clean. For example, the raw, unweighted data was 67 percent white and 31 percent Black, fairly close to what might be a reasonable statewide estimate of around 60 percent white and 37 percent Black. The design effect for the poll, a measure of how much the pollster had to weight the data in order to get a representative sample, was 1.18, which is fairly low. . . .

It’s possible, however, to achieve lower design effects by using quotas or other techniques to construct a more representative sample at the time of recruitment. . . . We double-checked with Wedgewood that they didn’t use quotas to create their sample, which could explain the low design effect. A quota is a mechanism by which a pollster can constrain the sample, to ensure the panel provider returns a certain minimum number or percentage of respondents in each demographic group, and appears to be the only way Pollfish allows researchers to control the demographics of the sample during fielding. They said they didn’t, which made the low design effect especially unusual. But we were still left with a question: Was there anything that actually proved the data was fabricated?

That’s when we decided to try to replicate their survey, to the last detail. . . .

Lots more information at the link.

Radcliffe et al. then step back to survey the bigger picture:

It’s getting easier to conduct low-quality polls — or fake them altogether. . . . the wrongdoing we have uncovered on the part of Wedgewood Polls is just the most recent in a series of cases of pollsters manipulating and fabricating data. . . . AI-powered tools for generating content such as websites, PDFs, and spreadsheets have made it easier for those willing to act in bad faith to produce potentially bogus documentation of results that match the quality of those produced by legitimate research firms.

This reminds me of our recent post, It’s fine to use computer-generated survey responses—if you don’t care about the data anyway!

In this case, “Wedgewood Polls” responded with a social media post describing themselves as “an experimental project to demonstrate the vulnerabilities, lack of oversight, and overall low barrier to entry in the modern political polling industry.” Maybe so, but it’s kind of suspicious that they happened to release this statement on the very day that they got caught.

I continue to think there are too many polls, even just counting the legitimate ones. As I wrote back in 2004, and it’s so much truer now:

The U.S. is over-polled. You might have noticed this during the recent election campaign when national polls were performed roughly every 2 seconds. . . . My complaint is not new, but this recent campaign was particularly irritating because it became commonplace for people to average batches of polls to get more accurate estimators. As news consumers, we’re like gluttons stuffing our faces with 5 potato chips at a time, just grabbing them out of the bag.

There are two problems with all these polls. First, they’re a waste of time and money. Millions of people wasting time answering polls. Instead they could be planting flowers, cooking dinner, enjoying themself in some way. The second problem is that all these useless polls have decreased people’s willingness to participate in surveys (for example, of public health) that could have general benefit.

The problem with horserace journalism is: first, journalism resources are limited, and effort that goes into horserace journalism could crowd out more valuable journalism; second, it can degrade public discourse.

The connection of too many polls and too much horserace journalism is that they feed on each other: the polls provide headlines for horserace journalism, and horserace journalism motivates more polls.

Throwing fake polls into the mix makes things that much worse. Good job by Radcliffe et al. to catch these particularly noxious offenders.

Survey Statistics: textbooks adding non-probability sampling chapters

Last week I asked for your favorite survey statistics textbooks. Thank you for many fun recommendations here and on Bluesky ! I am compiling a reading list for after the election. Here’s some not-blue-sky on the AT in TN:

Ben Schneider and Winston Lin share my love for Lumley 2010. I agree that it’s fun and a second edition would rock.

Preview

Some recommended books added sections on non-probability sampling in their new editions:

Lumley 2010 already includes material applicable to non-probability sampling, see e.g. “2 flavors of calibration”. If there is a second edition maybe it will follow the books above and add a chapter about non-probability sampling ?

(See “probability samples vs epsem samples vs SRS samples” for more about the term “non-probability sampling”.)