“So in that sense the silly statistics in the paper is no big deal, it serves as a sort of rhetorical flourish?”

Richard Feldman writes:

I’m a long-time reader and sometimes commenter on the blog. I’ve learned a lot – and been entertained – by many of the posts.

A paper was just published in Science on a theme that is potentially of interest to your blog readership, and that has the potential to enter the news, given its political nature. It’s not my research area, but the statistical practice to which I object crops up in my discipline – ecology – quite often. In fact, I’m reviewing a paper right now that does something similar.

The paper is “Partisan disparities in the funding of science in the United States.”

What has me question my sanity as someone trying to engage in good statistical practice is that the authors ran a regression with the covariates of interest (party control of the presidency, house, and senate) and many “control” variables and then a simple model with the covariates of interest and just one “control” variable. (A whole other issue is using the term control to describe the additional covariates and to refer to party control…in the same figure!). In the main figure in the text, they present both results – from the simple and full model – but clearly emphasize the results from the simple model. They justify their emphasis on the simpler model with what sounds ludicrous to me: “Collinear controls may absorb relevant variance, and the descriptive meaning of a regression coefficient becomes increasingly opaque as more variables are included in the model.”

I call the above the “have your cake and eat it too” approach to interpreting regressions. You propose that there are a series of factors to consider when measuring the effect of a variable of interest, but then interpret the effect as if those other factors weren’t important. I think there tends to be a default sentiment that coefficients in multiple regression are difficult to interpret – in the paper I’m reviewing, this is what the authors say – because of a lack of understanding that it is the effect when the other variables are at a pre-specified value (usually zero or their mean, but now with R packages like marginaleffects it is easy to specify those values). Am I right to have an unease about the approach of running multiple and simple regressions at the same time, but interpreting just the simple regression?

In addition to the above, the paper analyses an untold number of models – “alternative specifications” – and uses an NHST approach without considering the inflation of Type I error.

I agree that this is a pretty empty paper, published in a prestigious journal just because it’s on a topic of interest to the editors and also it’s wrapped in a clean-looking package. In addition to the flaws noted above, there’s also the problem that they don’t start their analysis earlier, a period during which the Democrats were in continuous control of Congress for several decades. On the other hand, their general point seems correct, that until this year science funding has had steady bipartisan support. So in that sense the silly statistics in the paper is no big deal, it serves as a sort of rhetorical flourish?

Analysis of tonight’s election results (and why I don’t need to do it anymore)

Back in the day, I would do a post-election post, summarizing information from the election outcomes and exit polls. For example, after the 2008 election:

As with previous Republican candidates, McCain did better among the rich than the poor:

outcome1.png

The gap between young and old has increased—a lot:

ages.png

But there was no massive turnout among young voters. According to the exit polls, 18% of the voters this time were under 30, as compared to 17% of voters in 2004. (By comparison, 22% of voting-age Americans are under 30.)

The red/blue map was not redrawn; it was more of a national partisan swing. See this state-by-state scatterplot of Obama vote in 2008 vs. Kerry vote in 2004:

2004_2008_actual.png

The standard deviation of the state swings (excluding D.C. and the unusual case of Hawaii) was 3.3%. That is, after accounting for the national swing in Obama’s favor, most of the states were within 3% of where they were, compared to their relative positions in 2004.

By comparison, here’s the 2000/2004 graph:

2000_2004.png

The standard deviation of these state swings was 2.4%. This was even less variation–2004 was basically a replay of 2000—still, the relative state swings of 3.3% in 2008 were not large by historical standards.

Again, Obama didn’t redraw the map; he shifted the map over in his favor. (Or, to put it more precisely, the economy shifted the map over in the Democrats’ favor and Obama took advantage of this.)

Here’s the map showing where Obama and McCain did better or worse than expected based on 2004:

2004_2008_map_actual.png

Finally, how did the pre-election polls do? Here’s the scatterplot:

2008_2008.png

I see some systematic patterns: Obama underperformed where the polls had him way down, and he outperformed where the polls had him up.

But I don’t need to do this sort of thing anymore.

Why not? Because the news media do it well all by themselves now. The New York Times page is good, also freelance sites by analysts such as former Fivethirtyeight.com honchos Nate Silver and Elliott Morris. There’s been an impressive improvement in political analysis in the past 25 years.

Back in the day, the election-night and post-election summaries in the news media were frustratingly crude. As the votes came in, the TV networks would just report raw totals based on X% of the vote in state Y, without even trying to do any analytics, even anything as simple as tallying the swing from those precincts compared to the previous election. And then the next day you just get a list of the winners along with some exit poll results.

What’s changed?

First, exit polling has become more difficult—all those mail-in votes—so there’s more of a focus on the actual election results. Second, outsiders such as Nate have upped the game, leading other news organizations to follow. Third, data processing is better so that now sites can immediately make this sort of display:

Things didn’t use to be this way. Back in 2000, I was in a meeting with the news media exit poll consortium and I was trying to persuade them to look at swings and to do MRP to help with their noisy data . . . and they didn’t listen to me. They were a happy monopoly and didn’t need no fancy analytics. But look at the news media now. I have the impression that campaigns are much more sophisticated in their analyses too.

I’d like to say that the media and political campaigns have caught up with academic political science. But it would be more accurate to say that they’ve surpassed us. I still think academic political science has useful things to contribute: new methods such as MRPW, innovative data collection and presentation from CES and others, and also we have the space to try to systematically understand trends such as trickle-down polarization. As well as all sorts of work out there that I haven’t even heard of. But these analyses I used to do, looking at swings, going back and forth between the local story and the big picture? The news media can do it better. I guess that’s how Bill James must feel when he sees modern sports analytics: he has his insights, but the stuff he did that was difficult and innovative back in the 1980s is now out there, and at a much more sophisticated level.

P.S. I’m hoping in a few months to get a detailed report from Yair and his team, reporting not just what happened in the vote but what was going on underneath. Kind of like their reports from 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024. Each of these came out in the May following the election, so stay tuned.

Survey Statistics: Times/Siena Polls and Times Voter Trends

Yesterday Andrew wrote about Alan Zaslavsky, who recently passed.

This is typical of his work in that it was innovative, with applied importance, and understated.

As Fan Li quoted, Alan was “the best applied statistician on earth”. I’ll write more Alan stories soon. He was my PhD advisor and hero.

Since it is election day, let’s talk about methods to analyze polls, where Alan’s legacy can’t be overstated. Fan Li mentioned work with Alan on balancing covariates, cited by Huling & Mak (2024) in their work on energy balancing weights, which are used by the Times/Siena Poll. This Survey Statistics series has discussed a few Times/Siena Poll decisions over the last year.

This week, in “The Final Polls Show a Blue Surge. Can We Trust Them?” Nate Cohn compares how the 2026 polls would look without these big changes, and sees they would be on average more than 3 points higher for Democrats.

Last week Andrew wrote about MRP at the NYT. So cool ! Their methodology article says:

The estimates do not report a margin of sampling error because they are not based on a sample of the population. The estimates are derived from multiple models, which are each subject to different kinds of error.

Yes, there are many kinds of error to consider, in “Margin of Error” we discussed how to get an MRP margin of error assuming no nonresponse bias after the MRP adjustments, no measurement error, and no model misspecification. In “Total Margin of Error” we saw that in election polls from 1998 to 2014, Shirani-Mehr et al. found that total survey error is about twice the reported margins of error. Even if you have margins of error to report, visualizing them is challenging (see Gelman and Price 1999 “All maps of parameter estimates are misleading”).

I was curious about the relationship between their MRP methods and their weighting methods. (See “MRPW”, “struggles with equivalent weights”, continued struggles, and “equivalent models, equivalent weights (locally)”, and “structured MRP to smooth survey weights”.) The only mention I found of their weights is:

The polls were joined to the given year’s voter file and reweighted to match the voter file by L2’s modeled race, party, age and interactions thereof, with the original survey weight as the base weight. The adjusted survey weight was used in all subsequent race models.

So they calibrate the base weights to match the voter file, see Lumley 2010 Chapter 7.

It’s been a few months since I’ve blogged about the logit shift, so it is time. (See: “2 flavors of calibration”, 2nd helpings (multinomial outcomes), 3rd helpings (multivariate outcomes), 4th helpings (more on multivariate outcomes), “logit shift and raking”.) The NYT uses a version of this shift:

The resulting individual-level probabilities were adjusted in multiple steps to match the actual election result by precinct. First, the probability that a voter would support a minor party candidate was adjusted to match the minor party proportion of the vote. Second, the probability that a voter would support a major party candidate was adjusted to match a candidate’s major party vote share in the precinct. Finally, the probability that a voter would support the Democratic or Republican candidate was calculated by multiplying the adjusted Democratic and Republican share of the major party vote by the adjusted major party vote share of the precinct.

Presumably they’re doing something like:

  1. E(shift_a(P(major party | X))) = P(major party) solve for a.
  2. Then either:
    1. E(shift_b(P(Dem | major party, X))) = P(Dem | major party) solve for b. Or
    2. E(shift_a(P(major party | X)) * shift_b(P(Dem | major party, X))) = P(Dem) solve for b.

2A isn’t quite right: it implies E(shift_a(P(major party | X))) * E(shift_b(P(Dem | major party, X))) = P(Dem). But we want 2B to hold, and the two are equivalent only if the individual-level probabilities for major party and for Dem given major party are uncorrelated.

It’s hard to write prose to describe something technical. The NYT level of methods transparency is great !

Election Day special: Why it can be rational to vote

I think I can best do my civic duty by running this one every Election Day, just like Art Buchwald on Thanksgiving. . . .

With a national election coming up, and with the publicity at its maximum, now is a good time to ask, is it rational for you to vote? And, by extension, wass it worth your while to pay attention to whatever the candidates and party leaders have been saying for the year or so? With a chance of casting a decisive vote that is comparable to the chance of winning the lottery, what is the gain from being a good citizen and casting your vote?

The short answer is, quite a lot. First the bad news. With 100 million voters, your chance that your vote will be decisive–even if the national election is predicted to be reasonably close–is, at best, 1 in a million in a battleground district and much less in a noncompetitive district such as where I live. (The calculation is based on the chance that your district’s vote will be exactly tied, along with the chance that your district’s electoral vote is necessary for one party or the other to take control of a house of congress. Both these conditions are necessary for your vote to be decisive.) So voting doesn’t seem like such a good investment.

But here’s the good news. If your vote is decisive, it will make a difference for 300 million people. If you think your preferred candidate could bring the equivalent of a $50 improvement in the quality of life to the average American–not an implausible hope, given the size of the Federal budget and the impact of decisions in foreign policy, health, the courts, and other areas–you’re now buying a $1.5 billion lottery ticket. With this payoff, a 1 in 10 million chance of being decisive isn’t bad odds.

And many people do see it that way. Surveys show that voters choose based on who they think will do better for the country as a whole, rather than their personal betterment. Indeed, when it comes to voting, it is irrational to be selfish, but if you care how others are affected, it’s a smart calculation to cast your ballot, because the returns to voting are so high for everyone if you are decisive. Voting and vote choice (including related actions such as the decision to gather information in order to make an informed vote) are rational in large elections only to the extent that voters are not selfish.

That’s also the reason for contributing money to a candidate: Large contributions, or contributions to local elections, could conceivably be justified as providing access or the opportunity to directly influence policy. But small-dollar contributions to national elections, like voting, can be better motivated by the possibility of large social benefit than by any direct benefit to you. Such civically motivated behavior is consistent with both small and large anonymous contributions to charity.

The social benefit from voting also explains the declining response rates in opinion polls. In the 1950s, when mass opinion polling was rare, we would argue that it was more rational to respond to a survey than to vote in an election: for example, as one of 1000 respondents to a Gallup poll, there was a real chance that your response could noticeably affect the poll numbers (for example, changing a poll result from 49% to 50%). Nowadays, polls are so common that a telephone poll was done recently to estimate how often individuals are surveyed (the answer was about once per year). It is thus unlikely that a response to a single survey will have much impact.

So, yes, if you are in a district or state that might be close, it is rational to vote.

For further details, see our articles in Rationality and Society and The Economist’s Voice.

I’d like to add one more thing. You’ve all heard about low voter turnout in America, but, among well-educated, older white people, turnout is around 90% in presidential elections. Some economists treat this as a source of amusement—and, sure, I’d be the first to admit that well-educated, older white people have done a lot of damage to this country—but it’s a funny thing . . . Usually economists tend not to question the actions of this particular demographic. I’m not saying that the high turnout of these people (e.g., me) is evidence that voting is rational. But I would hope that it would cause some economists to think twice before characterizing voting as irrational or laughable.

(And, no, it’s not true that “the closer an election is, the more likely that its outcome will be taken out of the voters’ hands.” See the appendix on the last page of this article for a full explanation, with calculus!)

P.S. See here and here for some earlier discussion of these points.

Alan Zaslavsky

We had a wonderful cohort of students in the statistics Ph.D. program at Harvard in the late 1980s, and I learned so much, not just from the faculty and from my contemporaries in the program, but also from those who were a couple years ahead of us: those students who seemed to know everything that was going on in our seminar courses and who were deeply involved in theoretical and applied research projects. Our program was kind of disorganized, but this had the benefit that every homework assignment was in itself an open-ended challenge—that’s a polite way of saying that it usually wasn’t clear what the professor actually wanted us to do—and I would take the work of these older students as an inspiration to try to go as deeply as I could in attacking these problems. At that time I hadn’t yet heard the expression, God is in every leaf of every tree, but I guess that’s one place I learned it.

The older students who were the most influential to me were T. E. Raghunathan, John Carlin, and Alan Zaslavsky. Each of them combined technical competence—no, that doesn’t sound quite right, let me rephrase this as a level of comfort with the necessary mathematics that allowed them to move beyond the mathematical details—to “chunk” the math, as it were—to focus on the deeper and more challenging statistical questions (my point here being that if you’ve internalized the math, it becomes transparent and you don’t feel like you’re doing algebra or whatever, you can just see through to the next step), with a talent for getting to the heart of applied problems (which, again, requires both the ability and inclination to do the necessary work, and the rarer ability to be able to step back and reassess your models and methods), along with a worldly or selfless maturity and wisdom. By “selfless,” I don’t mean they were “saints”—whatever that means!—but rather that, in their conversations about life, politics, etc., they were able to place the immediate and the long-term in the same frame, as it were. I was formed by so many people in that program, but these students provided intellectual and moral leadership.

I’ve collaborated with Raghu and John on various projects and hope to do so again, but right now I’ll talk about Alan because he recently passed away after a very full life and career. Alan was already about 40 when he was in our program—he was officially an applied math Ph.D. student at MIT, but he was working with Don Rubin at Harvard so we thought of him as one of us. As Chris Schmid put it, “Alan was one of those rare people who could tell you were wrong or maybe you might want to think about something in a slightly different way without making you feel bad and at the same teaching you something that you always appreciated.” After graduating from college in the late 1960s, Alan worked as a teacher and a union organizer for a decade or so before going to grad school, and then after his Ph.D. he took a faculty position at Harvard public health and also was involved in government service.

Alan’s work during and immediately after his Ph.D. involved census adjustment. An important contribution was his paper, Combining Census, Dual-System, and Evaluation Study Data to Estimate Population Shares, which begins:

The 1990 census and Post-Enumeration Survey produced census and dual system estimates (DSE) of population by domain, together with an estimated sampling covariance matrix of the DSE. Estimates of the bias of the DSE were derived from various PES evaluation programs. Of the three sources, the unadjusted census is the least variable but is believed to be the most biased, the DSE is less biased but more variable, and the bias estimates may be regarded as unbiased but are the most variable. This article addresses methods for combining the census, the DSE, and bias estimates obtained from the evaluation programs to produce accurate estimates of population shares, as measured by weighted squared- or absolute-error loss functions applied to estimated population shares of domains. Several procedures are reviewed that choose between the census and the DSE using the bias evaluation data or that average the two with weights that are constant across domains. A multivariate hierarchical Bayes model is proposed for the joint distribution of the undercount rates and the biases of the DSE in the various domains. The specification of the model is sufficiently flexible to incorporate prior information on factors likely to be associated with undercount and bias. When combined with data on undercount and bias estimates, the model yields posterior distributions for the true population shares of each domain. The performance of the estimators was compared through an extensive series of simulations. The hierarchical Bayes procedures are shown to outperform the other estimators over a wide range of conditions and to be robust against misspecification of the models. The various composite estimators, applied to preliminary data from the 1990 Census and evaluation programs, yield similar results that are closer to the DSE than to the census. Analysis of a revised data set yields qualitatively similar estimates but shows that the revised post-stratification improves on the original one.

This is typical of his work in that it was innovative, with applied importance, and understated. Alan continued to work on the census, but his later career focused on health care policy, with hundreds of influential collaborative papers as well as methodological innovations. Among other things, he had some very useful thoughts on hierarchical modeling (see links here and here).

And here’s a graph that Shira recently shared from Alan’s paper, Statistical Issues in Reporting Quality Data: Small Samples and Casemix Variation:

Again you see the combination of general ideas and clarity with a focus on a particular application. The rest of us can than take these insights and use them elsewhere.

Science is not naturally aligned

This is Jessica. Last spring I wrote about how some AI for science rhetoric is unrealistically optimistic about how much faster science will progress now that LLM agents can tackle problems fairly independently. The vision is that we can just automate the production of truth. Since then I’ve been thinking more about why exactly this seems naive from a metascientific perspective. 

On some level it seems obvious: scientific progress has always depended on value judgments and people collectively negotiating what counts as “objective”, as well as incentives that support a pipeline of new researchers who want to become experts so they can shape future directions. So why does pushback against the let’s-just-automate-science narrative often fall flat, getting dismissed as being anti-AI or nostalgic? 

One problem is that it’s easy to sound tautological in making some of these arguments – e.g., people are necessary for science because people have always guided science. Consider what’s been playing out in math, where some see new AI-verified solutions from frontier models as evidence that there is no longer anything standing in the way to progress, leading to claims like “math is solved.” The other side insists that we also need human understanding for such results to really be progress. But by accepting the premise that correctness can be separated from understanding, the latter gets seen as an optional mental state that we want to keep around for sentimental reasons, and those insisting on it are cast as defensive protectors of the guild. 

My thinking is that a big part of the problem here is that the stories we tell ourselves as a society about how science proceeds – objectively, dispassionately, etc. – have become so ingrained that it’s hard for us to acknowledge some aspects of how scientific “truths” actually arise. For various reasons, we’ve been conditioned to think about science in terms of a value-free ideal. The pull of this and earlier scientific ethics like “mechanical objectivity,” striving to eliminate the role of human value-based judgment in science, remains strong, despite most philosophers agreeing these ideals are unrealistic. By putting automated theorizing, experimentation, and interpretation in reach, AI seems like everything the value-free ideal could ever want. And so some interpret any insistence on understanding as an obstruction to the rapid progress we can now enjoy. 

I’ve been looking for the strong reasons why science is not “naturally aligned”, in the sense that we can just remove ourselves and expect it to proceed in some spectacular AI-powered fashion. Philosophers of science have made a few arguments that are helpful here. Helen Longino has written about how to create the idea of objective knowledge, all you really only need people to believe that things exist independently of our perceptions, and a shared language. Once you have these things, it becomes possible for individual scientists to look to others to gain knowledge on things we haven’t directly experienced–critical to science being a cooperative endeavor. We can also criticize scientific claims. And criticism, when it’s functioning, drives belief change and defines conventions for how values can and cannot influence evidence. What we consider acceptable or objective gets negotiated and refined over time. It isn’t handed down from nature, but that’s how mechanical objectivity would like to see it: put the trust in procedure alone and eliminate the messy human aspect as much as possible. 

There’s also a thought experiment in the work of philosopher Robert Brandom that feels analogous to what gets lost with new fully-AI generated and verified results in fields like math, CS, stats, etc. He imagines a community where people acquire beliefs about the world through reliable processes, but they can’t provide any reasons for what they believe. If they knew that their inferences were arrived at reliably, that itself would be a kind of rationale, so they cannot know that. He asks whether such a community could have knowledge. He concludes that they cannot, despite their true beliefs about the world, because with no ability to give and ask for reasons, they can’t even have the concept of reliability. 

One way to look at what’s missing is accountability. To be able to believe things that we haven’t experienced ourselves, we need people who can answer for the results. If we buy Longino’s view of the role of criticism in creating concepts like objectivity in the first place, criticism has to have the opportunity to change something for knowledge to continue being built. Otherwise we get scientific-looking things, but not progress.

AI-verification of new AI results is interesting because it is a kind of reason we can give for believing new results are reliable. But the way we develop frontier AI models isn’t really designed to instill basic aspects of scientific accountability, leaving a  disconnect. For example, we don’t train agents to have persistent state, making it hard for them to maintain commitments or update beliefs consistently as challenges come in. There should be something at stake, so that reputation effects constrain what gets claimed.

More importantly, if we can’t engage in and defend new results because AI’s abiltiy to reason so far exceeds ours, we lose the processes that shape our human judgment capacities, so that eventually we lack the ability to judge AI’s scientific outputs at all. I don’t think we’ve gotten there yet, but its the logical conclusion if we willingly write ourselves out of the picture. At that point I’m not sure what we’ve attained by having AI do the science for us. Some might argue that this is okay in domains where all you care about is directly controlling nature, but even there it’s not so easy to eliminate the need for value-based judgment, without ending up in a weird dystopia where any ability to manipulate things around you counts as science. And so misalignment with our goals continues to be a threat. 

I wrote something longer as I was thinking about all this, published here. Curious to hear any thoughts on what else comes into play, including counter-arguments. 

Most legislative races are so far from being close that there’s essentially no practical electoral benefit from moderation. But there is the argument that if you run a lot of extremists all over the country, that this will make things harder for your party’s moderates in the few swing states and swing districts out there.

Peter Dorman writes:

Have you seen this? The debate is interesting in general, but I think you would be especially interested in the empirical claims about issue polls and their relationship to electoral outcomes.

I [Dorman] have a concern that none of them address, the role of low propensity/engagement voters. My understanding is that in 2024 the Trump campaign acquired some secret sauce that enabled it to score *very* big among the low-pro’s. Whether that was engineered in some way or just pure luck (or some combination), we don’t know yet, but it played a crucial role. What interests me is that working class designation, generally by education, likely correlates tightly with being low engagement, to the extent that they would be almost impossible to disentangle in observational samples. Yet we hear a lot of pontificating based on the belief that the D’s lost a large chunk of the working class and have to do A, B or C to get it back. Maybe. But perhaps it’s about the distinctive characteristics of the low-pro’s, how they form their fluid political beliefs and what motivates them to get out and vote. And lurking in the background is the possibility that, already by mid-2024, the tech titans working for Trump had obtained backdoor access to social media accounts, allowing them to test content in low-pro samples in real time. If I had that capacity and I were them, that’s what I would have done.

The above-linked forum reminds me of this discussion of mine, “The WAR war and the electoral benefits of running more moderate candidates for political office.” The forum has a zillion discussants. I’m surprised they didn’t ask me for a comment!

Peter adds:

Normally, when we talk about measurement and construct error, we have a pretty clear idea in mind of what we want to be measuring, and then we compare our actual proxies to them. But with this debate about issue polling, it’s nearly the other way around. We *don’t* have a clear idea of what a political opinion or belief is, where it comes from or how it interacts with behavior, but we go out and get respondents to check a Likert box about an issue we’ve defined for them.

My hunch is that social media data, which we’re not supposed to have, may come the closest to getting observations on beliefs — their formation, their trajectories, their interactions with other dimensions of social and political life — that we’re likely to get. If you control the platform you can even conduct experiments. That’s why I suspect that political operations that include Palantir et al. are probably at a huge advantage.

I don’t know how much that they can use that is more effective than what can be found in the voter file. But maybe.

The other thing is that the linked forum focuses on strategies for the Democrats. But the same ideas apply to the Republican party. Most legislative districts are so close that there’s essentially no practical electoral benefit from moderation. But there is the argument that if you run a lot of extremists all over the country, that this will make things harder for your party’s moderates in the few swing states and swing districts out there.

“Evolutionary psychology hypotheses are testable and falsifiable.”

Eric Charnov points to this recent article by William Costello et al., which begins:

The field of evolutionary psychology has often been the target of allegations that its hypotheses are unfalsifiable. . . .

We . . . present evidence of several evolutionary psychological hypotheses that have generated specific, falsifiable predictions; undergone multiple empirical tests; and been refuted. Specifically, we discuss the evidentiary status of (a) the ovulatory shift in mate preferences (dual-mating) hypothesis, (b) the mate deprivation hypothesis of rape, and (c) the kin altruism hypothesis for the evolution of male homosexuality. We contrast these with the wide range of evolutionary psychology hypotheses whose specific predictions have been robustly supported by empirical data.

. . . many academics continue to perceive evolutionary psychology as unfalsifiable, despite evidence to the contrary, a misconception that has also permeated mainstream culture. . . . By illustrating that hypotheses generated by evolutionary psychology can be directly tested with appropriate scientific rigor, we dispel these pervasive misconceptions and highlight the field’s heuristic potential for generating valuable insights into human behavior.

It’s interesting to see this article. I have to admit I have a generally negative view of evolutionary psychology, a view that probably isn’t so fair. The problem is that I’ve been exposed to a lot of bad evolutionary psychology . . . David Weakliem and I wrote a whole article about it.

Also some blog posts. Let’s search on “evolutionary psychology” and see what comes up:

2025:  I have a horrible feeling sometimes that heavily promoted crap research on space aliens, cold showers, mind-body healing, schoolyard evolutionary psychology, extra-sensory perception, magic golf balls, air rage, himmicanes, subliminal smiley faces, etc etc etc, has softened the ground so that the seeds of more evil trees could then be planted and take root.

2023:  Hey—here’s some ridiculous evolutionary psychology for you, along with some really bad data analysis.

2022:  Evolutionary psychology in economics: Mo papers, mo problems

And some things I’ve written:

2025:  I don’t mean this in a sinister way, necessarily, the idea that crafty researchers are using their networking powers to insert bad work into the literature—even though, yes, I think this happens all the time—but rather in more general terms, that it takes a lot of active effort to keep these bad ideas in embodied cognition, evolutionary psychology, subliminal effects, etc., continuing in the scientific literature. In the same way that the Loch Ness monster, UFOs as space aliens, and various political conspiracy theories require constant refreshing to stay in the news. Yes, people hold all sorts of silly beliefs—a third of Americans say they believe in ghosts!—but passive belief is not enough. Well-connected people need to be actively promoting them, or they drift to the back of the collective consciousness.

2025: The [erroneous] belief that if a general phenomenon (e.g., “nudge,” or “evolutionary psychology,” or “social priming”) is real, that it will show up in the same direction no matter how it is studied (for nudging this could be investment decisions or food choice or risky behaviors; for evolutionary psychology this could be the sex of babies or religious behavior or voting behavior; for social priming this could be walking speed or hormone levels or political attitudes; etc.).

2025:  I also don’t see any substantive theory behind the claims, other than that it seems very intuitive to people that (1) the sex of a baby should be predictable and (2) sex ratios should vary a lot.

I think the basis for that first intuition is gender essentialism: men and women are so clearly different that it just stands to reason that they should somehow be externally distinguishable (in the pre-ultrasound era) even in the womb, and that the sex of the baby should be influenced by various ways as might be explained by gender essentialism.

I think the basis for the second intuition is what Tversky and Kahneman called “the law of small numbers”: everybody knows someone with several siblings, all of the same sex. People don’t have a sense of the huge sample size that would be needed to learn anything useful from such data, even setting aside selection and recall issues. Also, gender essentialism: it just stands to reason that parents of boys should be more masculine, in some way, than parents of girls. This bit of intuition can be backed up by endless speculation of the sort that is called evolutionary psychology and which plays well in Freakonomicsland.

2024:  In some settings, I fear that “replication” is serving a shiny object to distract people from the central issues of measurement, and I think that’s what’s going on here. The authors of this study were working with some vague ideas of evolutionary psychology, and they seem to be working under the assumption that, if you’re interested in theory X, that the way to science is to gather some data that have some indirect connection to X and then compute some statistical analysis in order to make an up-or-down decision (“statistically significant / not significant” or “replicated / not replicated”).

Again, that’s not enuf! Science isn’t just about theory, data, analysis, and conclusions. It’s also about measurement. It’s quantitative. And some measurements and designs are just too noisy to be useful.

2012:  Schoolyard Evolutionary Biology: The idea that, because of evolution, all people are equivalent to all other people, except that all boys are different from all girls.

OK, so that’s some attitude.

That said, I don’t recall ever characterizing the hypotheses coming from evolutionary psychology as unfalsifiable.

Let me put it this way: I think that evolutionary psychology can produce falsifiable predictions (there I agree with Costello et al.); I also think it is often employed in an unfalsifiable way, either by motivating flexible stories that can explain any possible data pattern, or though flexible data analysis (“forking paths”) that can fit any theory.

Stepping back, I don’t think evolutionary psychology, as a whole, is falsifiable. But that’s ok. I don’t think that any science is falsifiable as a whole. I don’t think chemistry or physics are falsifiable either. Evolutionary psychology, like chemistry and physics, is a framework under which falsifiable theories can be developed. Which is fine; indeed, Costello et al. carefully write, “Evolutionary psychology hypotheses are testable and falsifiable,” not that evolutionary psychology as a whole is testable and falsifiable. I would just amend their statement to, “Some evolutionary psychology hypotheses are testable and falsifiable.”

But then you get to the specific cases in the paper, the several evolutionary psychological hypotheses that they say were “refuted,” and . . . I don’t know!

What they describe as “refutations” look to me more like unsuccessful replications. Or, more specifically, results that are not statistically significant. But a not-statistically-significant finding is, at most, a refutation of the hypothesis that the average effect is large (relative to the standard error of estimation); it does not refute the hypothesis that there is a nonzero effect, or that there is an effect in a specified direction.

This is not to say that data can’t inform theorizing in this area. I just think that the framework of “falsification” isn’t so useful here, as it doesn’t address three key factors in the experimental human sciences:

1. The uncertainty involved in learning from statistical evidence in the presence of variation or noisy measurements;

2. The often shaky connection between underlying scientific theories and the particular statistical models being tested;

3. Variation in effects, which can be positive in some settings and negative in others, making it difficult to pin down exactly what is the hypothesis being tested.

For better or worse, I think we need to give up on strict falsificationism and move to a more Lakatosian perspective in which theories are informed by data. And all this presupposes that we’re doing serious science and not screwing around with experiments that are essentially pure noise.

Again, these are issues with the human sciences in general, nothing special about evolutionary psychology here.

Problems with the “Do no harm” principle in the presence of uncertainty

In a paper entitled, Counterfactual Harm: A Counter-argument, Amit Sawant and Mats Stensrud write:

A core principle in medicine is non-maleficence, often equated with “do no harm.” A formal definition of harm based on counterfactual reasoning has been proposed and popularized. This notion of harm has been promoted in simple settings with binary treatments and outcomes. Here, we highlight a problem with this definition in settings involving multiple treatment options. Illustrated by an example with three tuberculosis treatments (say, A, B, and C), we demonstrate that the counterfactual definition of harm can produce intransitive results: B is less harmful than A, C is less harmful than B, yet C is more harmful than A when compared pairwise. . . . In contrast, an interventionist definition of harm based on expected utility forgoes counterfactual comparisons and ensures transitive treatment rankings.

I agree, and this is related to what we wrote in our Russian roulette paper. I’ve always been uncomfortable with utility functions that depend on outcomes that have never occurred. I recognize that counterfactual utilities can make sense psychologically (this includes concepts such as uncertainty aversion and regret), but not normatively, not for what I’ve referred to as institutional decision analysis. This new paper by Sawant and Stensrud goes beyond our Russian roulette paper by introducing a new example and considering continuous outcomes.

Also related is this paper by Stensrud with Aaron Sarvet, “Rejoinder to ‘”Harm” in personalized medicine–an alternative perspective.'”

This guy has a transformer-based election forecasting model

Harvey Olden writes:

I’ve developed an election prediction model based on a transformer architecture; I thought you might find it interesting. The model will update its information automatically in the run-up to the midterm elections; you can also click on a state/district to see what information the model is leaning on to make its predictions. You can find an explainer for exactly how it works in the website.

I can’t follow the explanation myself, but that’s on me, that I’ve never actually learned exactly what a transformer is. This is not a boast—I’d be a better statistician if I understood such things—just my honest admission of imperfection.

So, given that, I can’t say much about the above forecast, but I thought it might interest some of you, at least from a methodological perspective. There must be some aspects of forecast uncertainty that are well captured by this model and also some weaknesses, corners of probability space where the model architecture induces artifacts (by analogy to the edge-case absurdities we found in a different sort of forecasting models a few years ago and which made their way into Section 8.1 of our Bayesian Workflow book, under the heading, “Exploring inferences to reveal problems with a model”). I haven’t been following the 2026 races closely enough to know what problems to look for, and I don’t see a Github site or anything else with the model’s data, code, or predictive simulations. But if that’s out there somewhere, then youall can take a look.

Stochastic potential outcomes: A discussion with Ang Yu and Jonas Mikhaeil

Ang Yu read the Russian Roulette paper (by Jonas Mikhaeil and me) and wrote:

I was wondering whether it might be useful to alternatively frame the problem in terms of stochastic versus deterministic interventions as opposed to potential outcomes. I have attached a short note on your paper and would appreciate your thoughts.

Jonas replied:

1. If I [Jonas] understand correctly, the interventional framework is meant to avoid counterfactuals altogether (e.g. Didelez, et al., 2012), right? In this case, one might be able to avoid the problems with “counterfactual decision problems” altogether by rephrasing them as classical decision problems under interventions?
Maybe this is exactly what you have in mind. I think this would be a very interesting conceptual contribution.

2. What I like about the stochastic potential outcomes perspective is that it allows us to model which uncertainty/variation we want to incorporate in the definition of the treatment (bullet vs. pistol). By defining the utility as a functional over the distribution of the stochastic potential outcome, we can integrate out the uncertainty that remains after treatment assignment. With this additional model choice, we can choose which uncertainty is irrelevant (and hence integrated out prior) to our decision problem.

3. I’m not entirely sure I understand how this would be accomplished by switching from deterministic to stochastic interventions. I’m sure this is an oversight on my part, and I would be excited to see this perspective be fleshed out.
My immediate question would be the following: potential outcomes are defined on the level of the individual, so it makes sense to distinguish between averaging over the treatment vs. averaging over an individual’s outcome. Accordingly, we can define the utility by only averaging over an individual’s outcome, fixing a treatment, and then consider the expected utility by averaging over treatment assignment.
In the interventional framework, I’m not sure how one would distinguish between the outcome Y of an individual being deterministic vs. stochastic for a given intervention? Because of this, I’m not clear how one would first integrate out individual-level uncertainty to define the utility and then calculate the expected utility based on treatment assignment in the interventional framework. (i.e. can what you call U(R6) be understood as an average over an individual’s outcome given a treatment?) I’m sure this is my oversight. I would love to hear what you think.

4. Following up on point 3: Does the Russian roulette paradox appear/disappear when switching from a deterministic vs. stochastic interventions perspective? Essentially, I’m wondering if the choice of how to model the intervention (deterministic vs. stochastic) allows to include/integrate out different levels of uncertainty in the decision problem.

Ang responded:

1. I think so. Didelez et al. 2012 was one of the earliest works in the stochastic intervention literature. Terminology and notation evolved over time in the literature, but their “regime” is the same as what I call “intervention”, and their distinction between atomic and random interventions is the same as my distinction between deterministic and stochastic interventions.

2. I agree that being able to integrate out sort of the “inner” uncertainty is important. If I understand your point correctly, my sense is simply that we already have an existing framework that can do exactly that: we just need to rephrase your point. In the stochastic intervention framework, intervention is pistol and treatment is bullet. So we can integrate over treatments and get the utility of an intervention for each individual.

3. I think the content of the stochastic intervention and stochastic potential outcomes frameworks is exactly the same, just different labels. In my mind, Y_{i, R6} for individual i is a random variable because of the randomness in the intervention R6. So we can call E[Y_{i, R6}] an average over the randomness of the potential outcomes or the randomness of the intervention. The difference is in naming, not substance. Does that make sense?

4. I think I’m not inventing a new way to solve to paradox, but just pointing out the connection between your solution and the literature on stochastic interventions.

My quick thought on all of this is that you can have stochasticism in the intervention or in the outcome conditional on the intervention. One way to see this is in the Russian roulette example: conditional on the chamber of the bullet, you can consider the intervention to be stochastic, but unconditional on the chamber, you can consider the outcome to be stochastic.

Or here’s an example with both sources of variation (or, you could say, “stochastic” aspects): Consider a treatment that is some sort of naturally growing herb that is gathered in the wild, so not a controlled compound. The intervention is stochastic because you might happen to get a sample of the herb that has a large amount of the active ingredient or you might get a dud that has very little. But the outcome will also be stochastic because the active ingredient will not always work. Actually, we could add a third level of variation by saying that (a) the active ingredient could work for some people and not others, and (b) even for the people for whom the ingredient works, it won’t always be effective.

For another example, consider physical therapy as a treatment for sciatica:

(i) To start with, there are lots of way that physical therapy is done; different physical therapists do different things. So the intervention of “physical therapy” is stochastic, if you don’t define ahead of time what will be done and who will be doing it.

(ii) For any given physical therapy intervention, there will be some people for whom it has no chance of working, because of the condition they have. This could be considered as stochastic, but I’d prefer to think of it as deterministic, conditional on a latent variable which contains details of the patient’s underlying medical condition.

(iii) If a patient is given a therapy that can work, the actual effectiveness will be stochastic. You could go full Rubin and consider the outcome as deterministic, conditional on a latent variable which contains the potential outcomes, but I think there can be a benefit to using a stochastic model, recognizing that there’s randomness in the course of the treatment.

For an even cleaner example, consider a coaching program to improve people’s basketball skills, where the outcome is a test where they take 100 shots and you count how many go in:

(i) Some coaches are better than others. So it makes sense to think of the intervention as stochastic.

(ii) Some people will be more amenable to coaching than others. For example, some people will be motivated by the coaching to practice; others won’t. I prefer to model this with a latent variable representing differences between people, but even then there can be a stochastic element: for example, maybe I’m the sort of person who would be motivated to practice, but I just happen to be very busy during the month of the coaching. You could code my state of busyness as a latent variable, but there could be all sorts of unmeasured or even unmeasurable factors affecting my receptiveness during that month, and at some point it makes more sense to bite the bullet and call it stochastic, in the same way that we consider a die roll to be stochastic even though in theory we could predict it pretty well given enough information on initial conditions.

(iii) Any particular coaching will work better for some people than others. There are different ways to have problems with your basketball shot, and different people will be able to improve in different ways. This could be considered as an interaction between the flavor of treatment and the player in the experiment, and it could be modeled with sufficient pre-treatment information on the players, but in practice it could make sense to model much or even all of this variation as stochastic.

(iiii) Finally, how many shots go in, conditional on the average probability of success? That’s stochastic. Again, you could follow Rubin (1974) and consider the outcome of the test to be deterministic, under the philosophy that “the great book of life has already been written; we just haven’t read it yet”; but to me it makes much more sense to consider the success probabilities or expected outcomes as fixed but unknown, with the actual outcomes as stochastic.

I’ve written before about the border between conditioning and randomness–it comes up in non-causal settings too. See here: https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/augie4.pdf and here: https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2022/12/23/a-probability-isnt-just-a-number-its-part-of-a-network-of-conditional-statements/

To which Ang responded:

I appreciate you laying out more generally different possible sources of randomness. On a philosophical level, they all make sense. From a practical perspective, though, I wonder if it’s useful to fully parse everything out. Stochastic interventions have proved useful in a lot of epidemiological and sociological applications. And I think the Russian roulette can also be framed as a stochastic intervention. In all those cases, it seems sufficient to explicitly consider only two sources of variation: the random variation in the intervention (e.g., bullet or no bullet), and the variation in potential outcomes across individuals. Please feel free to blog our discussion!

On a side note, I recently read VanderWeele and Hernan (2013), which framed a variant of stochastic intervention as a case of treatments with multiple versions. The stochastic intervention considered there also directly comes from a real empirical application.

I actually think we’re in agreement here. I too think it can be useful to allow stochastic potential outcomes. Indeed, I think the idea of the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA) can be misleading, in that SUTVA requires that outcomes be modeled deterministically. In my above note, I said that any stochastic potential outcome can be expressed in reduced form as a deterministic potential outcome–but for modeling purposes, the stochastic model often makes more sense. So I guess there was something unclear in my paragraphs just above, in that I wasn’t doing a good job in conveying this perspective.

R-hat, August 1990

I came up with R-hat when working at Bell Labs in the summer of 1990.

Here’s the story, and below is the first version of the paper, exactly as I wrote it.

First, here are some recent things to read regarding monitoring convergence from iterative simulations:

And now, here’s the original R-hat paper from 1990. I (appropriately) included Rubin as a coauthor, as the idea came about after many long phone conversations, and when I brought up this idea, Rubin picked up on it right away, as it was close to methods he had developed for inference from multiple imputations.

To all:

Here’s the abstract of the work I’ve done this summer. It’s stored in the file,
/fs5/gelman/abstract.bell, and copies of the Figures 1-3 are on Trevor’s desk.
Any comments are of course appreciated; I’m at [email protected].

On the Routine Use of Markov Chains for Simulation

Andrew Gelman and Donald Rubin, 6 August 1990

corrected version: 8 August 1990

1. Simulation

In probability and statistics we can often specify multivariate distributions
many of whose properties we do not fully understand–perhaps, as in the
Ising model of statistical physics, we can write the joint density function, up
to a multiplicative constant that cannot be expressed in closed form.
For an example in statistics, consider the Normal random
effects model in the analysis of variance, which can be
easily placed in a Bayesian framework with a conjugate prior distribution.
All the conditional densities of the resulting posterior distribution
are simple, but marginal densities can only be written in integral form and
can only be calculated approximately. (For details, see Kinderman and Snell
(1980) or Pickard (1987) for the Ising model, and Lindley and Smith (1972)
for the Bayesian random effects model.)

In such cases, we may not even be able to compute marginal moments of the
difficult distribution, let alone more complicated and interesting summaries
that would help us understand a probability model or posterior inference.
When direct methods such as analytic or numerical integration of “nuisance”
parameters are not computationally feasible, we might try Monte Carlo simulation;
in the simplest form, we draw a finite set of independent random samples from our
distribution, and then calculate desired distributional summaries as functions of
the sampled points. The Monte Carlo method is quite general and powerful; it is
easy to calculate arbitrary quantities of interest
such as the expected long-distance correlation in the Ising model or a posterior
95% confidence region for the largest block effect in a random effects model.
Any aspect of the distribution can be approximated to any desired accuracy if
the number of independently sampled points is large enough.
Simulation also has the advantage of flexiblility: once a sample is drawn, it
can be used to learn about any number of different distributional summaries.

2. Markov chain methods

Drawing independent random samples is a wonderful tool that is unfortunately not
available for every distribution; in particular, the Ising model and random
effects posterior distributions mentioned above do not permit direct
simulation. Fortunately, a form of indirect simulation method exists for
any multivariate distribution if we can calculate its joint density
(up to a multiplicative constant) or if we can sample from all its univariate
conditional densities. The first of these methods was introduced by
Metropolis et al. (1953) in the Journal of Chemical Physics. Our work focuses
on a similar and slightly simpler method called the Gibbs sampler by Geman and
Geman (1984) in an article for the IEEE.

Let F(x) be our distribution; the Metropolis algorithm takes a starting (vector)
point x0 and constructs a series x1, x2, . . ., that is a sample from an
ergodic Markov chain whose stationary distribution is F(x). Computer
simulation of the series requires calculation of the density f(x) (up to a
constant). These samples xj are not independent; however, the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain is
correct, so if we take a long enough series, the set of values {x1, . . ., xn}
takes the place of the distribution just as an
independent random sample does (although of course an independent sample
carries more information than a Markov chain sample of the
same length).

The Gibbs sampler is a similar algorithm, which produces a Markov chain that
converges to the desired distribution, this time requiring draws from all the
univariate conditional densities at each iteration.

3. Have we converged yet?

Markov chain simulation methods are attractive for many problems because they
enable us to flexibly summarize intractable multivariate distributions by making
full use of the mathematical structure we do know, using a tool we think we
understand–Monte Carlo simulation. Unfortunately, using a sample of a Markov
chain to estimate a distribution raises an immediate question: how long a series
is needed? After one or two steps, we are almost certainly still too close to
the starting point to hope for unbiased summaries. Asymptotically, the chain is
stationary, and all is OK (with some loss of efficiency compared to independent
samples, as mentioned above).

To obtain a feeling for the practical difficulties, we ran the Gibbs sampler for
2000 steps to simulate a case of the Ising model. To give the minimum of details:
x is a vector of binary variables defined on a 100 by 100 lattice; each step of
the Gibbs sampler took on the order of 10,000 computations; and we summarize
each iterate xj by the sample correlation r on the lattice–a function r(x) that
lies between -1 and 1. Theoretical calculations (Pickard, 1987) show that
under our model–the Ising model with beta = 0.5–the marginal distribution
of r is approximately Gaussian with mean around 0.85 or 0.9 and standard
deviation around 0.01. We’d like to know whether the set {r(x1), . . .,
r(x2000)} from the simulated Markov chain can serve as a substitute for the
marginal distribution of r.

Figure 1 shows the values of r(xj), for j=1 to 2000. (r(x0) = 0, and the first
few values are cut off to improve resolution on the graph.) The Markov chain
seems to have “converged to stationarity” after the thousand or so steps required
to shake off its initial state. How do we know it has converged, though? Figure
2 zooms in of the first 500 steps of the series, whose apparent convergence we
know to be illusory. For comparison we ran the Gibbs
sampler again for 2000 steps, but this time starting at a point x0 for which
r(x0) = 1; Figure 3 displays the series r(xj), which again seems to have
converged nicely. To destroy all illusions about convergence, hold
Figures 1 and 3 up to the light. The two Markov chains have “converged” to
different distributions! We are, of course, still observing transient
behavior.

Interestingly, the means of the series in Figures 1 and 3 differ, but
the variances are roughly equal. We’re not sure why, but it seems to be a
general feature in these Markov chain simulations that the variance converges
before the mean.

All simulations and plots were done using the New S Language:
A Programming Environment for Data Analysis and Graphics.

4. The answer: parallel Markov chains

To restate the general problem: we wish to summarize an intractable
distribution F(x) by running the Gibbs sampler (or a similar method such as the
Metropolis algorithm) until the distribution of the set of Markov chain
iterates is close to F. As shown in the previous section, convergence seems
impossible to monitor from a single finite realization of the Markov chain;
consequently, we follow the implicit suggestion of Figures 1 and 3 and track
several parallel sample paths.

Consider m independent runs of the Gibbs sampler, each of length n, starting
from m different initial states x10, . . ., xm0:

series 1: x11, . . ., x1n
. . .
series m: xm1, . . ., xmn.

Again, we focus attention on a univariate summary, say r(x); we want to
use the observed simulations rij to determine whether the series of r’s are
close to convergence after n steps.
To understand our method, consider the set of series as m blocks, each with
n observations, in the one-way analysis of variance layout (that is, ignore the
time ordering in the series). We will work with the total sum of squares
(with (mn-1) degrees of freedom) and the “within” sum of squares (with
(m-1)(n-1) degrees of freedom).

First assume for simplicity that the starting points of the simulated series
are themselves independent random samples from F(x). (Of course, if this
condition could be obtained in practice,
a Markov chain simulation method would not be
needed.) With independent starting points, all values of any series
are independent of all the values of any other series, and the unconditional
variance of any point rij is just the marginal variance var r under the
distribution F. We can then estimate var r, given the “data matrix” (rij),
by [total SS – (within SS)/m] / ((m-1)n). (Algebraic derivations appear
in the longer version of this article.) Given the assumption of initial
independence, this “between” estimate of variance
(not the same as the usual “between” estimate in ANOVA) is unbiased for finite
series of any length.

In contrast, the estimated variance within the series, (within SS) / ((m-1)(n-1)),
has expectation var r only in the limit as n -> infinity.
For finite series, the expected within mean square increases with n, assuming,
as is likely, that the random variables r(x1), r(x2), . . ., from the Markov
chain are positively correlated. The discrepancy between the two estimates
of var r suggests a test: declare the Markov chain to have converged when
the within mean square is close to the variance estimate between series, with
confidence intervals derived from classical ANOVA theory. Because of the
dependence within blocks, the degrees of freedom of the between and within
estimates are less than (m-1)n and m(n-1), respectively. We can
approximately correct for this information loss (once again, details will be
provided in the longer article).

Once we are close enough to convergence to be satisfied, the variance estimates
and degrees of freedom corrections alluded to above allow us to estimate the
marginal summaries E r, var r, and Normal-theory confidence intervals for our
Monte Carlo approximations. We can run the series longer if more precision
is desired, and can repeat the process to study the marginal distributions of
other parameters (without, of course, having to simulate any new series of x’s).

In practice, the starting points of the parallel series can never be sampled
independently with distribution F(x); the simulated series are thus no longer
stationary for any finite n, formally invalidating the above analysis. We
currently have two strategies designed to make the independence assumption
approximately true. First, we try to pick starting values that are far apart and,
if anything, more dispersed than independent random samples. The m parallel series
should then start far apart and grow closer as they approach stationarity, as in
Figures 1 and 3; since the variance between series declines with n, the
comparison-of-variances test should be conservative. Second, we reduce the
effect of the starting values by crudely throwing away the the first half
of each simulated series until approximate convergence has been reached.
Once again, Figures 1 and 3 illustrate how a few early steps
of the Markov chain can greatly distort estimates of means and variances
within series. We hope that the conservative strategies of starting with
dispersed points and throwing away early simulations will yield confidence
regions that are wider than those obtained by the ideal method, but that
still have good coverage properties.

The idea of comparing parallel simulations is not new; for
example, Fosdick (1959) applied the Metropolis algorithm to the Ising model
by simulating four series independently, from each of two different starting
points. Approximate convergence was declared when the two groups of series
became indistinguishable on the scale of a prechosen error bound.

5. Some references

Ehrman, J. R., Fosdick, L. D., and Handscomb, D. C. (1960).
Computation of order parameters in an Ising lattice by the Monte Carlo method.
{\em Journal of Mathematical Physics} {\bf 1} 547–558.

Fosdick, L. D. (1959). Calculation of order parameters in a binary
alloy by the Monte Carlo method. {\em Physical Review} {\bf 116}, 565–573.

Geman, S., and Geman, D. (1984). Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs
distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images. {\em IEEE Transactions
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence} {\bf 6}, 721–741.

Hammersley, J. M., and Handscomb, D. C. (1964), chapter 9. {\em Monte Carlo
Methods}. London: Chapman and Hall.

Kinderman, R., and Snell, J. L. (1980). {\em Markov Random Fields and
their Applications}. Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society.

Lindley, D. V., and Smith, A. F. M. (1972). Bayes estimates for the linear
model. {\em Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B} {\bf 34}, 1–41.

Metropolis, N., Rosenbluth, A. W., Rosenbluth, M. N., Teller, A. H., and
Teller, E. (1953). Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines.
{\em Journal of Chemical Physics} {\bf 21}, 1087–1092.

Pickard, D. K. (1987). Inference for discrete Markov fields: the
simplest nontrivial case. {\em Journal of the American Statistical Association}
{\bf 82} 90–96.

Ripley, B. D. (1981). {\em Spatial Statistics}, p. 16ff. New York: Wiley.

Tanner, M. A., and Wong, W. H. (1987). The calculation of posterior
distributions by data augmentation. {\em Journal of the American Statistical
Association} {\bf 82}, 528–550.

“In the run-up to the trial, the brothers conducted an elaborate public relations campaign . . . also arranged for payments to influencers and podcasters who made sympathetic social media posts about the case.”

From a news article about some recently-convicted rapists:

Three brothers who ran a yearslong conspiracy to traffic women and girls for sex were sentenced to 30 years each in prison on Tuesday . . . The brothers, more accustomed to moving around in powerful and wealthy circles in New York and Miami, must now wait to see which federal prison they are sent to. They have also taken steps to try and secure a pardon.

That last link takes you to this story:

Tal, Oren and Alon Alexander, three prominent brothers convicted of running a decades-long sex-trafficking scheme in New York earlier this year, have enlisted the lawyer Alan M. Dershowitz in their apparent pursuit of a pardon from President Trump.

They retained him in March 2025, nearly 11 months before their trial began in New York federal court, and since then have paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars, according to financial documents obtained by The New York Times.

Those documents include a copy of a check for $250,000, as well as a wire transfer receipt and an invoice from Mr. Dershowitz requesting an additional $250,000. . . .

We can laugh at buffoonish Epstein associates such as Nobel-winner Richard “Axel” Foley and Ted-talk star Dan “Redhead” Ariely, but this seems worse. Convicted sex offenders enlist legal associate of convicted sex offender to solicit a pardon from a convicted sex offender. There is a logic to it, I admit.

Also this:

In the run-up to the trial, the brothers conducted an elaborate public relations campaign . . . the brothers had worked with a Hollywood public relations firm that has been linked to several high-profile smear campaigns. . . . The brothers also arranged for payments to influencers and podcasters who made sympathetic social media posts about the case.

Which reminds me of the intimidation tactics employed by Theranos and Cambridge University to suppress reporting on their frauds, and the too-close-to-home story we discussed yesterday, of some Facebook executives plotting a “Merchants of Doubt”-style smear job on an academic critic of their industry.

As I wrote a few years ago: Yes, this is a credulous age. But this credulity does not occur in a vacuum. What’s stunning is the way in which frauds can stay afloat even after they’ve been exposed. Not that this is new. That Chariots of the Gods guy kept selling books even after it was common knowledge that it was all bogus. I just think we need to keep more of an eye on the active efforts that people take, not just to promote crap, but to attack those who point out the problems.

These are some of the richest and most powerful people in the world and they’re too greedy to respond to criticism in an honest and open way. Which shouldn’t surprise me: They got where they are today by breaking the rules, and they are celebrated and rewarded for it, so why change their behavior now?

They play by their own rules:

P.S. I’ll share one more item, which is unrelated except that I happened to come across it while going through the other files:

it’s an attempt from mathematician Jonathan Farley to tap Epstein for $5 million . . . in a letter dated July 30, 2019, and sent to the disgraced financier care of the Metropolitan Correctional Center. Sorry, Jonathan, you were too late!

P.P.S. The question naturally arises, Why am I posting this? After all, my comparative advantage lies in statistical modeling, causal inference, and social science. There are lots of people out there who can share political outrage-of-the-week stories; I’m hardly needed for that, and in this case I’m not even to serve to usefully amplify the story, given that it was already reported in a newspaper with a circulation in the millions.

As always, my answer is that I give my take on such events because they relate to things that are closer to my core interests.

First off, the story directly reminded me of what I learned yesterday, that it appears that some evil people from a fabulously rich corporation were talking about enlisting my aid in a secret hit job (what our homophobic Stanford friend Niall Ferguson might call “some opposition research on Mr. H”). That annoyed me! The story discussed in the present post is worse, in that they’re doing this on behalf not just of greedy plutocrats but for actual rapists. What I’m saying here is that I saw the article in the newspaper, it connected in my mind to the recent business I’d been thinking about, so I was motivated to express myself.

The other thing is the Jeffrey Epstein connection, here exemplified by Alan Dershowitz (who reportedly is working on getting a pardon for the rapists) and Mark Zuckerberg (who reportedly has fostered a culture at his company of lying and media manipulation). Beyond my own indirect connections to Epstein (my Ph.D. adviser was one of the many Harvard types who flattered the financier in the hope of extracting some money from him), I’m interested in the story as a social scientist and a student of the worst as well as the best in the intellectual and business worlds.

Finally, that Jonathan Farley note was just too good not to share. I’m just picturing the mathematician at his desk, hearing that Epstein is now in jail, and thinking: “Ummmm, I guess this is my last chance . . . if I play my cards right, I can get 5 million dollars and a chair at Oxford. It probably won’t pan out but it can’t hurt to try.” Aaahhhh, but it could hurt!

As always, I laugh because otherwise I would cry.

Bou-Rabee’s breakthrough paper, “Persistence Pays: Square-root condition-number dependence for Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin Monte Carlo …”

This post is from Bob

This one’s a big deal.

Bou-Rabee, Nawaf. 2026. Persistence Pays: Square-root condition-number dependence for Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin Monte Carlo with a non-reversibly updated accept/reject uniform. arXiv 2610.35781.

Abstract: We prove accelerated mixing for a Metropolis-adjusted kinetic Langevin sampler: the OBABO splitting with friction 2 * sqrt(m), adjusted with Neal’s non-reversibly updated uniform, which is redrawn after every epoch of E steps. For targets exp(−U) on ℝ^d with m * I ⪯ ∇^2 U ⪯ L * I and an L_H-Lipschitz Hessian, started from a Gaussian at an approximate minimizer, the chain reaches total variation accuracy ε after Õ(sqrt(κ * d) + sqrt(L_H) * (d/m)^0.75) gradient evaluations, where κ=L/m and Õ hides logarithmic factors. The sqrt(κ) term is necessary, already on Gaussian targets. The proof discretizes Lu’s entropic hypocoercivity by means of an entropy inequality for free transport, so that the relative entropy of the unadjusted chain decays at a rate of order sqrt(m) up to a discretization bias. With the non-reversibly updated uniform, the leading energy errors of velocity Verlet telescope along a path. A coupling argument combines the two. On Bayesian logistic regression posteriors for two standard data sets, which satisfy these assumptions, the gradient cost of the chain with the non-reversibly updated uniform grows roughly like the square root of the condition number at the posterior mode, and that of standard adjusted OBABO roughly like its 3/4 power.

Note the square-root in the condition-number dependence. This is the tightest result we know for a discrete-step, adjusted sampler (i.e., one we can implement as a black-box). The full set of concavity and Lipschitz assumptions are in the abstract above (strongly log concave, Lipschitz in the Hessian). For what it’s worth, Claude (5.5 medium effort) concurs that nobody has proved a result this tight in condition number before.

The scales here get confusing, pardon my pun, so let’s establish some intuition from simple cases (skip this paragraph and the next if you know condition numbers). Suppose we have a multivariate normal distribution. The Hessian (matrix of second partial derivatives) of the negative log density is constant around the density and equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix. In general (i.e., not just for normals) for a point that is log concave (i.e., the Hessian is positive definite), the condition number is the ratio of the largest eigenvalue of that Hessian to the smallest eigenvalue. To simplify even further, suppose the covariance is diagonal, so that Sigma[m,m] represents the variance of variable m and all the off diagonal entries are zero (i.e., zero correlation). In that case, the eigenvalues are just the Sigma[m,m] and the condition number is just the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the smallest eigenvalue. The problem for sampling with algorithms like random-walk Metropolis, Langevin, or Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, is that their run time is multiplied by the condition number. For a standard normal, where Sigma[m,m] is 1 for every m, the condition number is 1, and that’s the fastest we can get, because condition numbers are >= 1 by construction. That’s why we try to precondition our target posteriors with mass matrixes to make them (or their gradients in the case of Nutpie) look more normal (e.g., with non-centered parameterizations).

Why is posterior exploration time proportional to the condition number? It’s because we have to set the step size to accommodate the direction of highest curvature, then we have to take a number of steps traverse the scale of the direction of lowest curvature. For all of these samplers, traversing a distance takes quadratic time. So the algorithm is quadratic in the ratio of scales, which makes it linear in the condition number.

This is why reducing the condition number is so appealing. Sparse NUTS, from Cole Monnahan, works exceptionally well for mixed-effects models by preconditioning with a sparse Hessian located at the max marginal likelihood estimate (e.g., the estimate produced by lme4 or TMB). Note to Stan devs: We should adapt this for brms through TMB—it’s too model specific for Stan and we don’t have the linear algebra tools we need built into C++.

Why is this paper such a breakthrough? The assumptions on which the guarantee is based are standard in theoretical work, namely that the density must be strictly log concave with Lipschitz-bounded Hessians. Bou-Rabee establishes that generalized Hamiltonian Monte Carlo with one step (aka “kinetic Langevin”) has run time that grows only with the square root of the condition number! This kinetic or generalized part of the algorithm refers to the way momentum is refreshed. Rather than fully refreshing momentum, a new momentum is taken and averaged with the existing momentum at a fixed mixing rate (which could presumably be randomized, but not made dependent on state). The bottom line is that run time for a fixed level of accuracy grows with the ratio of scales (i.e., the square root of the condition) rather than the ratio of squared scales (i.e., the condition number). And unlike something like NUTS or WALNUTS, swapping in a new acceptance probability sequence couldn’t be much easier to implement.

Why is this a big deal? The main obstacle to Stan’s sampling, as I’ve just realized while building Walnuts and Walnutpie and evaluating on a ton of real-world models, is that the condition number remains high in most posteriordb models and models Andrew’s suggested, even after diagonal preconditioning with a mass matrix using either the NUTS or Nutpie divergence target. A ratio of scales as low as 10 will cause a 100-fold slowdown in sampling. That is, if I sample normal(0, diag_matrix([1, 10]’)) in Stan, it’s 100 times slower than if I sample normal(0, diag_matrix[1, 1]). The low-rank and diagonal approach from Nutpie helps here where it’s stable, but so far I haven’t found it to be as stable as the diagonal preconditioned in my evaluations.

The algorithm that Bou-Rabee analyzed was introduced by Radford Neal in the following paper, which I thought I had discussed here before, but can’t find any trace.

Neal, Radford. 2020. Non-reversibly updating a uniform [0,1] value for Metropolis accept/reject decisions. arXiv 2001.11950.

This paper is typical of Neal’s paper, introducing a very simple idea with a profound effect that’s explained so that a beginner can understand it and code it. We used it as a reference for my work with Gilad Turok and Chirag Modi (and also Alex Barnett) on delayed rejection generalized HMC, which I’ve blogged as Multiscale generalized HMC with delayed rejection.

I’m still a bit confused about how the regular condition number works compared to the one Langmore et al. generated for normal targets in HMC, which I blogged about as Condition numbers for HMC and the funnel. Nawaf told me before that Langmore’s work was only for normals, but it still seems relevant.

I better get busy adding this algorithm to Walnutpie. I’d planned to do it at some future date, but it looks like this is probably the sampler we should be using everywhere. Stay tuned for more evaluation.

Tension vs. excitement during NBA games

This is related to our discussion of the martingale property of calibrated probability forecasts.

Jeremy Lu writes:

I’m a former student of Dr. Jennifer Hill at NYU and have been keeping up with your blog. I noticed some people write to you with questions and wanted to ask you a question of my own.
For some background, I scraped together every NBA game since 1996. Each game has a tension metric, which measures how uncertain the outcome of a game is (detailed calculation here: https://www.inpredictable.com/2020/04/an-update-to-tension-index-with-assist_11.html)
and an excitement metric, which calculates how far the probability graph “travels” over the course of the game. There’s been a lot of talk about the NBA becoming boring, so I wanted to see if this could be measured statistically.
I’ve made boxplots of the daily median excitement and tension of the regular season. The idea is, if a viewer turned on a random game one day and watched it, how would they perceive how engaging the NBA was?
image.png

image.png

We can see that (at least with this methodology), over time, excitement has increased slightly, and tension has decreased. Regarding excitement and tension — these two variables are highly correlated (Spearman coefficient of 0.91). So my question is:
Does it make sense that excitement and tension are positively correlated, but over time, excitement has slightly increased and that tension has slightly decreased? Am I doing something wrong here or simply misunderstanding correlation and trends over time? Is it a sort of paradoxical relationship where looking at individual factors vs. the aggregate is different? (for example, player A may have a higher 2 point percentage and 3 point percentage than player B, but a lower overall field goal percentage, due to the proportion of their 2pt vs 3 pt shots)
image.png
I’ve graphed all the games across all the seasons and used a LOESS regression (x axis excitement, y axis tension). One thing I noticed is that in the past, the lines of fit get flatter; but more recently, there is still a slight upwards slope  remaining as we get to the higher tensions and excitements. Wondering if this means anything at all.
My reply:
1.  Maybe it’s a mistake to take these definitions of “tension” and “excitement” too seriously.  There are times when I think it can make sense to consider properties of applied interest and give them mathematical definitions (as when we defined “partisan bias” and “electoral responsiveness” here:  https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/electoral3.pdf) but often these names can be misleading.  So maybe you’d be better off with a more direct measure such as the number of lead changes in the second half of the game, or something like that.
2.  These trends seem small compared to the variation.  This again suggests the appeal of more direct measures.  Think of it from the perspective of a casual fan who might watch 10 or 20 games during the year.  You could ask how many of these games would be boring, or something like that.
3.  For your graphs I would recommend straight-up scatterplots, as I think the box plots create a lot of distracting artifacts.  I’d also use a cleaner x-axis, for example just label every 10 years, and also it’s not clear how to interpret the y-axis, which I guess is related to points 1 and 2 above.

We interrupt our usual programming to inform you that I was never hired by Facebook to do a hit job on Jonathan Haidt.

So. I got some emails today from various people, pointing me to this item from a court filing:

This seems to be the story:

Meta internally set a goal to “get the academic community to disavow” and “turn against” professor Jonathan Haidt, who has linked social media use to mental health decline, as it in-house rebuffed internal efforts to study social media’s impact on teen health, according to recently unredacted documents filed publicly Friday. . . .

Notes taken during a March 8, 2023, meeting show Meta Vice President Curtiss Cobb’s suggested goal for the “Haidt assignment,” was, “how do we get the academic community to disavow Haidt?” Under the topic, a sole bullet point says “can’t co-opt them, so how do we enrage them?” . . .

The meeting notes also reveal that Meta employees discussed how the company could work with “the academics” to “get Gellman to write a take-down piece” on Haidt, referring to Columbia University statistician Andrew Gelman . . .

And this:

The employee wrote that Curtiss “thinks we need to focus on the media” to convince reporters that Haidt is “not credible.” Meta’s staffers also apparently discussed contacting a media figure referred to as “Gellman” to “write a take-down piece” about Haidt. It was not immediately clear who Gellman was.

It’s not immediately clear to me who Gellman is either!

But I will tell you this. I’ve never been contacted by anyone at Facebook or Meta regarding Jonathan Haidt or his work.

One of the above-linked articles mentions a court date from last year, in which “Meta abruptly settled the dispute, cutting a $17.1 billion deal with the states.”

$17.1 billion! OK, I wouldn’t expect all of that money, just for writing one little hit piece, but what if Meta had offered me $1.71 billion, or $171 million, or even just a trifling $17.1 million. Would I have done the job for them for that amount of money? I’d like to say, No, I’m too ethical for that, but . . . this a counterfactual about which we have no direct data, as they never approached me! My guess is that, had they dangled those dollars in front of me, I’d just have mocked them, kind of like how I mocked those Dialog 2022 scammers. But we’ll never know!

In all seriousness, this revelation about Facebook’s public relations team is absolutely horrible—we’re talking about some of the richest and most powerful people in the world conspiring to interfere with the open processes of science, journalism, and the law—but it’s hardly surprising, given what we’ve learned from insider accounts such as Careless People, the memoir by Sarah Wynn-Williams, or, for that matter, the despicable behavior of the bigshot legal teams in the Theranos and Cambridge University scandals.

Oddly enough, I have at times received money from Facebook; indeed, they’re listed on our sponsors page, along with other crowd favorites such as Disney, Amazon, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Back in 2016, Facebook gave me a no-strings-attached donation of $25,000 through Columbia University to spend on my research. This came from their data science team, which to my knowledge had nothing to do with the creepy behavior described above. I also spoke at their offices once (a technical talk, nothing about take-down pieces in the media), and they use lots of multilevel modeling, Bayesian inference, and Stan. Going through my old emails, it seems that we received some Facebook funding in 2020 for a computer science Ph.D. student who was working with me on a project involving probabilistic programming. We also applied for a couple of academic Facebook grants that we didn’t get. Also I gave Goel, Mason, and Watts some advice twenty years ago regarding their project on social networks that used a Facebook survey.

But nothing from them regarding social media’s impact on teen health. I guess that “get Gellman to write a take-down piece” was one of those bright ideas that never made it out of the conference room. Or else they approached a different person, maybe someone actually named Gellman.

Survey Statistics: how to measure hospital quality ?

Last week we chatted about hopes for a new edition of Lumley 2010.

Preview

Alan Zaslavsky recommends this textbook in his course. After taking the course in 2011, I asked Alan to advise my PhD. Alan’s work extends across most topics in Lumley’s textbook and beyond. One focus is statistical issues in measuring the quality of a hospital: how can we compare hospitals who see different distributions of patients (i.e. casemix) ? Zaslavsky 2001 explains a few approaches, including direct standardization.

Let:

  • Y = complications
  • X = sickness of the patient
  • R = hospital, can be A or B
  • Y(A) = complications if treated by hospital A
  • Y(B) = complications if treated by hospital B

To compare hospitals A and B, we want to compare Y(A) versus Y(B). We cannot do this for one patient, because at least one of Y(A) or Y(B) is not observed. But we can compare averages. We can compare E(E(Y(A) | X, R = A)) versus E(E(Y(B) | X, R = B)) where the outer expectations are with respect to some standard casemix of X. Direct standardization estimates the inner expectations with the mean in each X stratum. As Zaslavsky 2001 points out, this needs modification if there are no patients in a stratum, or when X is continuous. Instead, the inner expectations can be estimated with regression models.

See Figure 2 from Zaslavsky 2001:

Lumley 2010 points out that direct standardization is mathematically equivalent to poststratification:

 

Six questions about political polarization and my responses

Mary Murray writes:

I am a Year 12 student in the UK currently completing an Extended Project Qualification (EPQ), an independent research project equivalent to half an A-Level.

I intend to study law at a competitive university and hope to pursue a career as a foreign correspondent covering the United States in the future. My strong interest in contemporary American politics, is what has inspired me to aim to do this.

My EPQ explores modern political polarisation in the United States, focusing on debates surrounding constitutional rights such as gun legislation, abortion, and freedom of speech. As well as the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and the media in shaping political discourse and public opinion.

I would be extremely grateful for the opportunity to ask you a few questions about American politics. Your expert opinion would not only be invaluable to helping me succeed in my EPQ, but also really helpful in providing me advice on how to get into such a specific field.

Here were her questions:

1. Political polarisation is frequently described as being at unprecedented levels in the United States. How do experts measure polarisation, and what are the key limitations of these measurements?

2. When examined using data from the past few decades, do you believe contemporary American polarisation represents a significant structural shift compared to late 20th-century politics?

3. To what extent is modern political polarisation driven by political elites and party leadership rather than by ordinary voters?

4. Is there clear evidence that modern media increases political polarisation, or does it mainly amplify the perception of division?

5. In your research, does redistricting significantly contribute to political polarisation, or are broader social and ideological factors more important?

6. Some experts argue that rising affective polarisation poses risks to democratic norms. Based on available data, do you believe current levels of division threaten democratic stability in the United States?

And here are my responses:

1. Three ways that experts measure trends in polarization are from votes in legislatures (Democrats voting more consistently on the left and Republicans voting more consistently on the left), individual votes (less split-ticket voting, more party-line voting), and surveys of political attitudes (Democrats more consistently taking positions on the left, Republicans more consistently taking positions on the right).

2. Yes, definitely.

3. It’s both. Polarization mostly starts in the elites and then trickles down to ordinary voters.

4. It’s both. Much of political polarization is indeed the perception of polarization; also, though, there’s evidence that partisan media can move people to hold more extreme views.

5. The U.S. Senate is about as polarized as the U.S. House, and the Senate isn’t subject to gerrymandering at all, so I think the answer is that there are fewer close races in general. Part of this is due to redistricting, but there’s also just more geographic variation in how people vote.

6. It’s hard to for me to say.

MRP at NYT

Coincidentally, or maybe not, on the same day that our New York Times contact informed me about their new job opening, Yair points us to this new feature at the NYT website, “Times Voter Trends” at the NYT. Yair writes:

It’s a voter-file-based estimate of how every demographic group voted in every state, with survey models poststratified to the full file and calibrated to precinct results. It’s basically the approach we’ve been running at Catalist for years, which of course grew out of the MRP work you and I did together. Here’s a description of the methodology.

They use gradient boosting instead of a multilevel model [what we’ve called Regularized Prediction and Poststratification — AG], but the overall structure is very similar. It’s great to see these methods going increasingly mainstream.

Here are the relevant research papers:

[2013] Deep interactions with MRP: Election turnout and voting patterns among small electoral subgroups. American Journal of Political Science 57, 762-776. (Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman)

[2020] Voter registration databases and MRP: Toward the use of [2020] Voter registration databases and MRP: Toward the use of large scale databases in public opinion research. databases in public opinion research. Political Analysis 28, 507-531. (Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman)

My Ph.D. adviser once told us that the true sign of success is when people use your methods without even citing you. That’s when you know the ideas are fully in circulation.

One-year election analytics fellowship at the New York Times

Will Davis writes:

We ended up hiring somebody who had seen the job posting through your blog, and he is fantastic.

I also wanted to let you know that we have a fellowship slot open.

This is a one-year, full-time position to get to be a part of the Election Analytics department at The Times and get to work with the team that produces The Needle, The Times/Siena Poll, our early vote trackers, analytical journalism about elections and, starting this election, Times Voter Trends.

The exact form of this role will depend on the individual’s background. Candidates that are more comfortable writing than coding and want to deepen their technical skills to more easily answer questions themselves and candidates that bring a background as a developer or statistician and want to work on their ability to communicate your ideas in words will be considered equally.

The deadline to apply is Nov. 20, no exceptions.

This looks interesting and important.