I’m not saying that you should use Bayesian inference for all your problems. I’m just giving seven different reasons to use Bayesian inference–that is, seven different scenarios where Bayesian inference is useful:
1. Decision analysis. You can pipe your posterior uncertainty into a decision analysis and work out the expected utility of different decision options. This is O.G. Bayesian decision making, and we have some examples in Chapter 9 of BDA3. Indeed, this formulation can handle uncertainties in the utilities as well as in the probabilities that come up in the decision problem.
2. Propagation of uncertainty. You can use posterior simulations to get uncertainties for any function of parameters, latent data, and predictive data. For a simple example, suppose you fit a line, y = a + bx + error, and you want inference for the x-intercept, the value of x where E(y|x) = 0. This is just the solution to the equation 0 = a + bx, that is, x = -a/b. The point is, if you fit the regression and get posterior simulations for (a, b), you can directly get uncertainty for -a/b, which is a problem that can be challenging analytically, especially as models get more complicated. I actually don’t recommend you look at such ratios; here I’m just giving this as a simple example.
3. Prior information. OK, this one should be pretty clear! For a simple example, see Section 9.4 of Regression and Other Stories. Or this paper with Zwet. The point is that there are lots of real problems where the prior is about as strong as, or stronger, than the data, and it’s good to have a method that works in such problems.
4. Regularization. Set up a big model with sparse data and your parameter estimates are gonna be noisy. Bayesian inference with informative priors is one way to “regularize,” that is, to get more stable estimates. This is different from item #3 above in that the prior used for regularization doesn’t need to represent subject-matter knowledge; it can just be set up with the goal of producing regularized estimates that have good statistical properties. The regularization prior is still “information” in the mathematical sense, but it’s coming from a different place and it can map to the external world in a different way.
5. Combining multiple sources of information. Just think about multilevel modeling. Here’s an example from pharmacology where we use soft constraints (that is, informative priors) to combine data from trials of two different drugs. Or multilevel regression and poststratification, where even if we’re using data from just one survey, we’re getting inference for multiple states, and you can think of this as combining the survey responses from different states. Also you’re combining information from a survey and a census.
6. Latent data and parameters. When a model is full of parameters–perhaps even more parameters than data–you can’t estimate them all. Instead we can consider the parameters as “latent data” and give them a joint probability model, which we can then estimate using Bayesian inference. Examples include latent continuous preferences underlying choice data, unobserved internal concentrations in pharmacology models, and intermediate states in all sorts of process models.
7. Enabling you to go further. Lots of the above ideas revolve around Bayesian inference being useful for models that are too large or complicated to estimate using maximum likelihood or other traditional approaches to point estimation. In practice, this implies that Bayesian inference doesn’t just allow you to fit models we otherwise would’ve had difficulty fitting; it also enables us to push out the frontier. Now that we can fit more complicated models, we’re more likely to do so. For example, we’ll set up latent-variable measurement error models where before we would’ve just ignored the errors or applied some analytical correction.
That said, I recognize that Bayesian inference can require some effort and that any specific benefit of Bayesian inference can be attained using other methods: just use regularization to estimate parameters, treat uncertain quantities as latent data, and summarize uncertainty using joint predictive simulations. No reason to call it “Bayesian,” and it can sometimes be ok–even useful–to use incoherent specifications for different parts of your problem. Bayesian inference works for the problems I’ve worked on, by way of the tools that I’ve learned and developed to build, fit, check, compare, expand, visualize, and use models. Other tools will work for other people in other settings.
The reason for this post is to lay out several different motivations for Bayesian inference. It’s easy to just pick one or two (for example, prior information and regularization, or decision analysis and propagation of uncertainty) without seeing the big picture. So I thought it would be helpful to put all these different things in one place.
8) Comparing multiple models/explanations in a rational way.
There actually is no way to rationally consider a model in isolation. No matter how bad the fit, it will (and should, according to a posterior ~1) still be accepted if there are no other alternatives. However, in practice there are always vague “data is wrong somehow” and god/aliens did it explanations lurking, implicitly ready to play “god of the gaps”.
In fact I would rank this #1.
Likewise, a perfectly fit model doesn’t mean much if there are a dozen other explanations just as precise and accurate. So many philosophy of science considerations become clear by simply applying Bayes rule.
Anon:
I disagree with you on Bayesian model comparison, for reasons discussed here and here.
We are all busy people here, can you quote the arguments and evidence you are referring to?
Anon:
As the saying goes, I’d do anything for statistics, but I won’t do that.
I think point 2 here is really important, and also undercuts some of what people feel to be the initial complexity or difficulty of learning/utilizing Bayesian methods as opposed to more traditional frequentist models. The fact that you just get these quantities/uncertainties piped through means that you can always just be working with a posterior, and it is quite simple to describe that posterior estimate or combine and compare it with others.
In contrast, I find that whenever I used frequentist models, even once I learned some new procedure for analyzing X or Y type of data, all of a sudden you’d learn at the end that you need to some entirely new procedure to quantify a confidence interval or that the uncertainty wasn’t actually computable. You end up with a toolkit of completely disparate procedures and processes, whereas simply learning the flexibility of Bayesian regression models and how uncertainty flows through allows you to tackle pretty much every form of statistical question I encountered.