Miha Gazvoda shares this post with the above title and the subtitle, “Using Bayesian multilevel models to correct bias and calibrate uncertainty.”
He’s using the chickens model from our Slamming the Sham paper in the more general setting of placebo control tests.
In econometrics, a “placebo control test” does not need to literally involve a placebo treatment; it more generally is used to describe a procedure in which the same statistical analysis that was used to estimate a causal effect is applied to a different dataset, or a different part of the existing dataset, in which the treatment did not occur.
For example, if you want to measure the effect of an intervention that occurred in 2021, you could repeat the analysis but using data from a different year. Or if you want to measure the effect on a particular outcome, you could repeat the analysis but looking at a different outcome that should be unaffected by the treatment.
The idea is that, if your estimation method has an artifact or systematic bias, this should show up in the placebo analysis as well, indicating a problem. Conversely, if the placebo analysis does not show an effect, this is taken as evidence that there is no artifact.
In his post, Gazvoda argues that, rather than using the result of the placebo check to make a go/no-go decision, it should be possible to partially adjust the treatment effect to account for the information in that supplementary analysis.
This makes sense to me, and of course I’m happy that he’s using our chickens model.
There’s a tricky thing going on here with the placebo check, which, interestingly, arose in the chicken example too, and that is that we usually don’t have any good theory for where the effect is coming from in the placebo control. After all, if our causal identification is working as designed, we shouldn’t even need the placebo comparison, as we’re already getting an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. The placebo control is typically there to address unspecified concerns of bias. And, indeed, in practice, researchers don’t always do placebo controls. And when, as hoped, the placebo control shows no statistically significant effect, the inclination is to take that as a reassurance and move on, in the same way that is done with other robustness checks.
The lesson Gasvoda takes from the chickens example is that if replications are available, you can assess the evidence for the placebo adjustments being relevant: you can fit a multilevel model to estimate how much adjustment needs to be done.
From a sociology-of-science point of view, it’s interesting to me that the conventions in biomedical statistics and econometrics go in opposite directions:
– In biomedical statistics, the default recommended behavior is to compute the difference in differences, taking the estimated effect from the main experiment and subtracting the estimate from the placebo experiment. As we explain in the chickens paper, this correction has the disadvantage of doubling the variance of the estimate, a true statistical crime if, as is often the case, the effect of the placebo treatment is indistinguishable from zero.
– In econometrics, the default procedure, if you’re calling it “difference-in-differences estimation,” is the same as above. But if you’re calling it “placebo control,” and the placebo estimate is not statistically significant from zero, the default is to ignore the placebo results entirely, not to adjust for them.
In general we recommend a partial adjustment, with the amount of adjustment depending on the problem at hand. If there is internal replication, as in the chickens example, the appropriate adjustment factor can be estimated from the data. If it’s a one-shot experiment, you’ll need to use prior information. I don’t have any good examples demonstrating how to do that; it’s something we should do.
For economists, the concept is that since you cannot empirically evaluate the identifying assumptions underpinning the chosen design, you should instead consider natural generalizations of these assumptions which are amenable to falsification. Failure to convincingly falsify these generalizations is taken to increase their plausibility, which then transfers credibility to the untestable assumptions actually underlying the design. If instead you treat this exercise as a way to estimate bias and correct for it in the main analysis, you’ve now pushed the falsification obligation back a step. E.g., if we’re doing DiD and observe nonparallel pretrends, you could subtract off the differential pretrend, but for this to be convincing you would then have to look at the pre-pretrend and replicate the same triple difference exercise. And so on.
There is a separate question of whether it makes sense to perform a significance test for these exercises and proceed only if significant. I think there is some understanding of the problems with this, especially because these tests sometimes have low power. It is perhaps better to think of this as analogous to equivalence testing, in which we prespecify how much deviation is considered problematic, then check whether an interval estimate is precise enough to rule out deviations that large.