Our new book, Active Statistics, is now available!

Coauthored with Aki Vehtari, this new book is lots of fun, perhaps the funnest I’ve ever been involved in writing. And it’s stuffed full of statistical insights. The webpage for the book is here, and the link to buy it is here or directly from the publisher here.

With hundreds of stories, activities, and discussion problems on applied statistics and causal inference, this book is a perfect teaching aid, a perfect adjunct to a self-study program, and an enjoyable bedside read if you already know some statistics.

Here’s the quick summary:

This book provides statistics instructors and students with complete classroom material for a one- or two-semester course on applied regression and causal inference. It is built around 52 stories, 52 class-participation activities, 52 hands-on computer demonstrations, and 52 discussion problems that allow instructors and students to explore the real-world complexity of the subject. The book fosters an engaging “flipped classroom” environment with a focus on visualization and understanding. The book provides instructors with frameworks for self-study or for structuring the course, along with tips for maintaining student engagement at all levels, and practice exam questions to help guide learning. Designed to accompany the authors’ previous textbook Regression and Other Stories, its modular nature and wealth of material allow this book to be adapted to different courses and texts or be used by learners as a hands-on workbook.

It’s got 52 of everything because it’s structured around a two-semester class, with 13 weeks per semester and 2 classes per week. It’s really just bursting with material, including some classic stories and lots of completely new material. Right off the bat we present a statistical mystery that arose with a Wikipedia experiment, and we have a retelling of the famous Literary Digest survey story but with a new and unexpected twist (courtesy of Sharon Lohr and J. Michael Brick). And the activities have so much going on! One of my favorites is a version of the two truths and a lie game that demonstrates several different statistical ideas.

People have asked how this differs from my book with Deborah Nolan, Teaching Statistics: A Bag of Tricks. My quick answer is that Active Statistics has a lot more of everything, it’s structured to cover an entire two-semester course in order, and it’s focused on applied statistics. Including a bunch of stories, activities, demonstrations, and problems on causal inference, a topic that is not always so well integrated into the statistics curriculum. You’re gonna love this book.

You can buy it here or here. It’s only 25 bucks, which is an excellent deal considering how stuffed it is with useful content. Enjoy.

Hey! Here’s some R code to make colored maps using circle sizes proportional to county population.

Kieran Healy shares some code and examples of colored maps where each region is given a circle in proportion to its population. He calls these “Dorling cartograms,” which sounds kinda mysterious to me but I get that there’s no easy phrase to describe them. It’s clear in the pictures, though:

I wrote to Kieran asking if it was possible to make the graphs without solid circles around each point, as that could make them more readable.

He replied:

Yeah it’s easy to do that, you just give different parameters to geom_sf(), specifically you set the linewidth to 0 so no border is drawn on the circles. So instead of geom_sf(color=“gray30”) or whatever you say geom_sf(linewidth=0). But I think this does not in fact make things more readable with a white, off-white, or light gray background:

The circle borders do a fair amount of work to help the eye see where the circles actually are as distinct elements. It’s possible to make the border more subtle and still have it work:

In this version the circle borders are only a *very slightly* darker gray than the background, but it makes a big difference still.

Finally you could also remove the circle borders but make the background very dark, like this:

Not bad, though there issue becomes properly seeing the dark orange— especially smaller counties with very high pct Black. This would work better with one of the other palettes.

Interesting. Another win for ggplot.

How to code and impute income in studies of opinion polls?

Nate Cohn asks:

What’s your preferred way to handle income in a regression when income categories are inconsistent across several combined survey datasets? Am I best off just handling this with multiple categorical variables? Can I safely create a continuous variable?

My reply:

I thought a lot about this issue when writing Red Sate Blue State. My preferred strategy is to use a variable that we could treat as continuous. For example when working with ANES data I was using income categories 1,2,3,4,5 which corresponded to income categories 1-16th percentile, 16-33rd, 34-66th, 67-95th, and 96-100th. If you have different surveys with different categories, you could use some somewhat consistent scaling, for example one survey you might code as 1,3,5,7 and another might be coded as 2,4,6,8. I expect that other people would disagree with this advice but this the sort of thing that I was doing. I’m not so much worried about the scale being imperfect or nonlinear. But if you have a non-monotonic relation, you’ll have to be more careful.

Cohn responds:

Two other thoughts for consideration:

— I am concerned about non-monotonicity. At least in this compilation of 2020 data, the Democrats do best among rich and poor, and sag in the middle. It seems even more extreme when we get into the highest/lowest income strata, ala ANES. I’m not sure this survives controls—it seems like there’s basically no income effect after controls—but I’m hesitant to squelch a possible non-monotonic effect that I haven’t ruled out.

—I’m also curious for your thoughts on a related case. Suppose that (a) dataset includes surveys that sometimes asked about income and sometimes did not ask about income, (b) we’re interested in many demographic covariates, besides income, and; (c) we’d otherwise clearly specify the interaction between income and the other variables. The missing income data creates several challenges. What should we do?

I can imagine some hacky solutions to the NA data problem outright removing observations (say, set all NA income to 1 and interact our continuous income variable with whether we have actual income data), but if we interact other variables with the NA income data there are lots of cases (say, MRP where the population strata specifies income for full pop, not in proportion to survey coverage) where we’d risk losing much of the power gleaned from other surveys about the other demographic covariates. What should we do here?

My quick recommendation is to fit a model with two stages, first predicting income given your other covariates, then predicting your outcome of interest (issue attitude, vote preference, whatever) given income and the other covariates. You can fit the two models simultaneously in one Stan program. I guess then you will want some continuous coding for income (could be something like sqrt(income) with income topcoded at $300K) along with a possibly non-monotonic model at the second level.

Minor-league Stats Predict Major-league Performance, Sarah Palin, and Some Differences Between Baseball and Politics

In politics, as in baseball, hot prospects from the minors can have trouble handling big-league pitching.

Right after Sarah Palin was chosen as the Republican nominee for vice president in 2008, my friend Ubs, who grew up in Alaska and follows politics closely, wrote the following:

Palin would probably be a pretty good president. . . . She is fantastically popular. Her percentage approval ratings have reached the 90s. Even now, with a minor nepotism scandal going on, she’s still about 80%. . . . How does one do that? You might get 60% or 70% who are rabidly enthusiastic in their love and support, but you’re also going to get a solid core of opposition who hate you with nearly as much passion. The way you get to 90% is by being boringly competent while remaining inoffensive to people all across the political spectrum.

Ubs gives a long discussion of Alaska’s unique politics and then writes:

Palin’s magic formula for success has been simply to ignore partisan crap and get down to the boring business of fixing up a broken government. . . . It’s not a very exciting answer, but it is, I think, why she gets high approval ratings — because all the Democrats, Libertarians, and centrists appreciate that she’s doing a good job on the boring non-partisan stuff that everyone agrees on and she isn’t pissing them off by doing anything on the partisan stuff where they disagree.

Hey–I bet you never thought you’d see the words “boringly competent,” “inoffensive,” and “Sarah Palin” in the same sentence!

Prediction and extrapolation

OK, so what’s the big deal? Palin got a reputation as a competent nonpartisan governor but when she hit the big stage she shifted to hyper-partisanship. The contrast is interesting to me because it suggests a failure of extrapolation.

Now let’s move to baseball. One of the big findings of baseball statistics guru Bill James is that minor-league statistics, when correctly adjusted, predict major-league performance. James is working through a three-step process: (1) naive trust in minor league stats, (2) a recognition that raw minor league stats are misleading, (3) a statistical adjustment process, by which you realize that there really is a lot of information there, if you know how to use it.

For a political analogy, consider Scott Brown. When he was running for the Senate last year, political scientist Boris Shor analyzed his political ideology. The question was, how would he vote in the Senate if he were elected? Boris wrote:

We have evidence from multiple sources. The Boston Globe, in its editorial endorsing Coakley, called Brown “in the mode of the national GOP.” Liberal bloggers have tried to tie him to the Tea Party movement, making him out to be very conservative. Chuck Schumer called him “far-right.”

In 2002, he filled out a Votesmart survey on his policy positions in the context of running for the State Senate. Looking through the answers doesn’t reveal too much beyond that he is a pro-choice, anti-tax, pro-gun Republican. His interest group ratings are all over the map. . . .

All in all, a very confusing assessment, and quite imprecise. So how do we compare Brown to other state legislators, or more generally to other politicians across the country?

My [Boris’s] research, along with Princeton’s Nolan McCarty, allows us to make precisely these comparisons. Essentially, I use the entirety of state legislative voting records across the country, and I make them comparable by calibrating them through Project Votesmart’s candidate surveys.

By doing so, I can estimate Brown’s ideological score very precisely. It turns out that his score is -0.17, compared with her score of 0.02. Liberals have lower scores; conservatives higher ones. Brown’s score puts him at the 34th percentile of his party in Massachusetts over the 1995-2006 time period. In other words, two thirds of other Massachusetts Republican state legislators were more conservative than he was. This is evidence for my [Boris’s] claim that he’s a liberal even in his own party. What’s remarkable about this is the fact that Massachusetts Republicans are the most, or nearly the most, liberal Republicans in the entire country!

Very Jamesian, wouldn’t you say? And Boris’s was borne out by Scott Brown’s voting record, where he indeed was the most liberal of the Senate’s Republicans.

Political extrapolation

OK, now back to Sarah Palin. First, her popularity. Yes, Gov. Palin was popular, but Alaska is a small (in population) state, and surveys

find that most of the popular governors in the U.S. are in small states. Here are data from 2006 and 2008:

governors.png

There are a number of theories about this pattern; what’s relevant here is that a Bill James-style statistical adjustment might be necessary before taking state-level stats to the national level.

The difference between baseball and politics

There’s something else going on, though. It’s not just that Palin isn’t quite so popular as she appeared at first. There’s also a qualitative shift. From “boringly competent nonpartisan” to . . . well, leaving aside any questions of competence, she’s certainly no longer boring or nonpartisan! In baseball terms, this is like Ozzie Smith coming up from the minors and becoming a Dave Kingman-style slugger. (Please excuse my examples which reveal how long it’s been since I’ve followed baseball!)

So how does baseball differ from politics, in ways that are relevant to statistical forecasting?

1. In baseball there is only one goal: winning. Scoring more runs than the other team. Yes, individual players have other goals: staying healthy, getting paid, not getting traded to Montreal, etc., but overall the different goals are aligned, and playing well will get you all of these to some extent.

But there are two central goals in politics: winning and policy. You want to win elections, but the point of winning is to enact policies that you like. (Sure, there are political hacks who will sell out to the highest bidder, but even these political figures represent some interest groups with goals beyond simply being in office.)

Thus, in baseball we want to predict how a player can help his team win, but in politics we want to predict two things: electoral success and also policy positions.

2. Baseball is all about ability–natural athletic ability, intelligence (as Bill James said, that and speed are the only skills that are used in both offense and defense), and plain old hard work, focus, and concentration. The role of ability in politics is not so clear. In his remarks that started this discussion, Ubs suggested that Palin had the ability and inclination to solve real problems. But it’s not clear how to measure such abilities in a way that would allow any generalization to other political settings.

3. Baseball is the same environment at all levels. The base paths are the same length in the major leagues as in AA ball (at least, I assume that’s true!), the only difference is that in the majors they throw harder. OK, maybe the strike zone and the field dimensions vary, but pretty much it’s the same game.

In politics, though, I dunno. Some aspects of politics really do generalize. The Massachusetts Senate has got to be a lot different from the U.S. Senate, but, in their research, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty have shown that there’s a lot of consistency in how people vote in these different settings. But I suspect things are a lot different for the executive, where your main task is not just to register positions on issues but to negotiate.

4. In baseball, you’re in or out. If you’re not playing (or coaching), you’re not really part of the story. Sportswriters can yell all they want but who cares. In contrast, politics is full of activists, candidates, and potential candidates. In this sense, the appropriate analogy is not that Sarah Palin started as Ozzie Smith and then became Dave Kingman, but rather a move from being Ozzie Smith to being a radio call-in host, in a world in which media personalities can be as powerful, and as well-paid, as players on the field. Perhaps this could’ve been a good move for, say, Bill Lee, in this alternative universe? A player who can’t quite keep the ball over the plate but is a good talker with a knack for controversy?

Commenter Paul made a good point here:

How many at-bats long is a governorship? The most granular I could imagine possibly talking is a quarter. At the term level we’d be doing better making each “at-bat” independent of the previous. 20 or so at-bats don’t have much predictive value either. Even over a full 500 at-bat season, fans try to figure out whether a big jump in BABIP is a sign of better bat control or luck.

The same issues arise at very low at-bat counts too. If you bat in front of a slugger, you can sit on pitches in the zone. If you’ve got a weakness against a certain pitching style, you might not happen to see it. And once the ball is in the air, luck is a huge factor in if it travels to a fielder or between them.

I suspect if we could somehow get a political candidate to hold 300-400 different political jobs in different states, with different party goals and support, we’d be able to do a good job predicting future job performance, even jumping from state to national levels. But the day to day successes of a governor are highly correlative.

Indeed, when it comes to policy positions, a politician has lots of “plate appearances,” that is, opportunities to vote in the legislature. But when it comes to elections, a politician will only have at most a couple dozen in his or her entire career.

All the above is from a post from 2011. I thought about it after this recent exchange with Mark Palko regarding the political candidacy of Ron DeSantis.

In addition to everything above, let me add one more difference between baseball and politics. In baseball, the situation is essentially fixed, and pretty much all that matters is player ability. In contrast, in politics, the most important factor is the situation. In general elections in the U.S., the candidate doesn’t matter that much. (Primaries are a different story.) In summary, to distinguish baseball players in ability we have lots of data to estimate a big signal; to distinguish politicians in vote-getting ability we have very little data to estimate a small signal.

The four principles of Barnard College: Respect, empathy, kindness . . . and censorship?

A few months ago we had Uh oh Barnard . . .

And now there’s more:

Barnard is mandating that students remove any items affixed to room or suite doors by Feb. 28, after which point the college will begin removing any remaining items, Barnard College Dean Leslie Grinage announced in a Friday email to the Barnard community. . . .

“We know that you have been hearing often lately about our community rules and policies. And we know it may feel like a lot,” Grinage wrote. “The goal is to be as clear as possible about the guardrails, and, meeting the current moment, do what we can to support and foster the respect, empathy and kindness that must guide all of our behavior on campus.”

According to the student newspaper, here’s the full email from the Barnard dean:

Dear Residential Students,

The residential experience is an integral part of the Barnard education. Our small campus is a home away from home for most of you, and we rely on each other to help foster an environment where everyone feels welcome and safe. This is especially important in our residential spaces. We encourage debate and discussion and the free exchange of ideas, while upholding our commitment to treating one another with respect, consideration and kindness. In that spirit, I’m writing to remind you of the guardrails that guide our residential community — our Residential Life and Housing Student Guide.

While many decorations and fixtures on doors serve as a means of helpful communication amongst peers, we are also aware that some may have the unintended effect of isolating those who have different views and beliefs. So, we are asking everyone to remove any items affixed to your room and/or suite doors (e.g. dry-erase boards, decorations, messaging) by Wednesday, February 28 at noon; the College will remove any remaining items starting Thursday, February 29. The only permissible items on doors are official items placed by the College (e.g. resident name tags). (Those requesting an exemption for religious or other reasons should contact Residential Life and Housing by emailing [email protected].)

We know that you have been hearing often lately about our community rules and policies. And we know it may feel like a lot. The goal is to be as clear as possible about the guardrails, and, meeting the current moment, do what we can to support and foster the respect, empathy and kindness that must guide all of our behavior on campus.

The Residential Life and Housing team is always here to support you, and you should feel free to reach out to them with any questions you may have.

Please take care of yourselves and of each other. Together we can build an even stronger Barnard community.

Sincerely,

Leslie Grinage

Vice President for Campus Life and Student Experience and Dean of the College

The dean’s letter links to this Residential Life and Housing Student Guide, which I took a look at. It’s pretty reasonable, actually. All I saw regarding doors was this mild restriction:

While students are encouraged to personalize their living space, they may not alter the physical space of the room, drill or nail holes into any surface, or affix tapestries and similar decorations to the ceiling, light fixtures, or doorways. Painting any part of the living space or college-supplied furniture is also prohibited.

The only thing in the entire document that seemed objectionable was the no-sleeping-in-the-lounges policy, but I can’t imagine they would enforce that rule unless someone was really abusing the privilege. They’re not gonna send the campus police to wake up a napper.

So, yeah, they had a perfectly reasonable rulebook and then decided to mess it all up by not letting the students decorate their doors. So much for New York, center of free expression.

I assume what’s going on here is that Barnard wants to avoid the bad publicity that comes from clashes between groups of students with opposing political views. And now they’re getting bad publicity because they’re censoring students’ political expression.

The endgame seems to be to turn the college to some sort of centrally-controlled corporate office park. But that wouldn’t be fair. In a corporate office, they let you decorate your own cubicle, right?

Leap Day Special!

The above graph is from a few years ago but is particularly relevant today!

It’s funny that, in leap years, approximately 10% fewer babies are born on 29 Feb. I think it would be cool to have a Leap Day birthday. But I guess most people, not being nerds, would prefer the less-“weird” days before and after.

There’s lots of good stuff at the above link; I encourage you to read the whole thing.

In the years since, we’ve improved Stan so we can fit and improve the birthdays time series decomposition model using full Bayesian inference.

Here’s Aki’s birthday case study which has all the details. This will also be going into our Bayesian Workflow book.

“Exclusive: Embattled dean accused of plagiarism in NSF report” (yup, it’s the torment executioners)

The story is at Retraction Watch:

Erick Jones, the dean of engineering at the University of Nevada in Reno, appears to have engaged in extensive plagiarism in the final report he submitted to the National Science Foundation for a grant, Retraction Watch has learned.

The $28,238 grant partially supported a three-day workshop that Jones and his wife, Felicia Jefferson, held for 21 students in Washington, DC, in April 2022 titled “Broadening Participation in Engineering through Improved Financial Literacy.” Jefferson received a separate award for $21,757.

Jones submitted his final report to the agency in May 2023. Retraction Watch obtained a copy of that report through a public records request to Jones’s previous employer, the University of Texas at Arlington, and identified three published sources of extended passages he used without citation or quotation marks. . . .

Lots more details at the link.

Those torment executioners keep on tormenting us.

In all seriousness, between the University of Nevada salary and the National Science Foundation grants, this guy’s been taking a lot of public funds to produce some really bad work. Seems like a real failure of oversight at UNR and NSF to let this go on like this.

Good work by Retraction Watch to follow up on this story.

P.S. I forgot to include the quotations from UNR luminaries:

“In Erick Jones, our University has a dynamic leader who understands how to seize moments of opportunity in order to further an agenda of excellence,” University President Brian Sandoval said.

“What is exciting about having Jones as our new dean for the College of Engineering is how he clearly understands the current landscape for what it means to be a Carnegie R1 ‘Very High Research’ institution,” Provost Jeff Thompson said. “He very clearly understands how we can amplify every aspect of our College of Engineering, so that we can continue to build transcendent programs for engineering education and research.”

Also this:

Jones was on a three-year rotating detail at National Science Foundation where he was a Program Director in the Engineering Directorate for Engineering Research Centers Program.

Shameful that he would work for NSF and then pay that back by taking their money and submitting a plagiarized report. But, hey, I guess that’s what University President Brian Sandoval would call “understanding how to seize moments of opportunity in order to further an agenda of excellence.”

What could be more excellent than taking government funds and using it to publish plagiarized reports and crayon drawings?

It sounds like it’s fine with UNR if their dean of engineering does this. I wonder what would happen to any UNR students who did this sort of thing? I guess they wouldn’t get paid $372,127 for it, but maybe the university could at least give them a discount on their tuition?

P.P.S. That all said, let’s not forget that there are much worse cases of corruption out there. The UNR case just particularly bothers me, partly because it’s close to what I do—except that when my colleagues get NSF funds, we don’t use them to produce plagiarized reports—and partly because the problems are so obvious: as discussed in our earlier post, you can look at the papers this dean of engineering had published and see that they are incoherent and have no content, even before getting into the plagiarism. It’s hard to believe that his hiring was a mere lack of oversight; you’d have to work really hard to not see the problems in his publications. But, yeah, there’s lots of much worse stuff going on that we read about in the newspaper every day.

Blog is adapted to laptops or desktops, not to smartphones or pads.

Sean Manning writes:

People behave differently on the post-2008 Internet than before because most of them are on smartphones or pads not laptops or desktops. For example, its hard to copy and paste blocks of text on a touchscreen, but usually easy to make screenshots, so people move things from one site to another as screenshots. Its hard to jump precisely around a text and type punctuation marks, so its hard to enter bbcode. Its easy to scroll, so sites designed for smartphones often have an infinite scroll. Its easy to pull out a smartphone in breaks from other activities, so people visiting the Internet on a smartphone are often in a hurry. People do more of what their tools encourage (affordances) and less of what their tools discourage.

Good point! I hadn’t thought if it that way, partly I guess because I don’t have a mobile phone or pad, so I do very little interaction with touchscreens.

A few years ago someone contacted me with a proposal to fix up the blog and make it more friendly to mobile devices, but it wasn’t clear to me that these changes would actually work. Or, to put it another way, it seemed that any changes would either be too minor to make a difference, or so major that they wouldn’t work with the sort of content we have here. What I hadn’t thought about was Manning’s point, that the way we write and interact on this blog is in some ways a function of how we interact with it on the computer.

There probably are some ways of making the blog more mobile-friendly, but I guess the real point is that the style of communication we’ve developed here works for this format. Kinda like how some stories work better as movies, some as TV shows, and some as plays. You can transfer from one medium to another but they’re different.

Free online book by Bruno Nicenboim, Daniel Schad, and Shravan Vasishth on Bayesian inference and hierarchical modeling using brms and Stan

Shravan points us to these materials:

Hierarchical models are bread and butter stuff for psycholinguists, so we are trying hard to make Stan/brms mainstream through various means. Teaching this stuff feels like the most important work I am doing right now, more important even than the scientific side of things.

We have chapters on hierarchical modeling in our book (to be published soon with CRC Press), we use both brms and Stan:

https://vasishth.github.io/bayescogsci/book/ [edit: made it a live link]

The online version will remain available for free. Comments/corrections are welcome; one can open issues: https://github.com/vasishth/bayescogsci/issues

This summer, I [Shravan] am teaching an intro to Bayes using brms/Stan, with a focus on hierarchical modeling, especially directed at researchers in linguistics who do experimental work:

https://www.mils.ugent.be/courses/module-9-bayesian-data-analysis/

Plus, at Potsdam, for the last seven years I have been running an annual summer school on stats for linguistics and psych, where our focus is on hierarchical modeling using Stan/brms:

https://vasishth.github.io/smlp2024/

Here, we teach both frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hierarchical modeling.

Cool! Good to have these resources out there.

Tutorial on varying-intercept, varying-slope multilevel models in Stan, from Will Hipson

I was teaching varying-intercept, varying-slope multilevel models, and . . . I can get them to fit in Stan, but the code is kinda ugly, so I was struggling to clean it up, with no success. This will be a real research project, to add appropriate functions and possibly expand the Stan language so that these models can be written at a higher, more intuitive level.

Varying-intercept models aren’t so bad. In lme4 or blme or rstanarm or brms, you write something like:

y ~ 1 | group + x + z + x:z

and that transfers pretty directly into Stan. Just create the X matrix and go from there. Indeed, you can add as many batches of varying coefficients and it’s no biggie to code it up.

But once you get to varying intercepts and slopes, it all changes. In lme4 or blme or rstanarm or brms, you can just write things like:

y ~ (1 + z | group) + x + z + x:z

But if you want to program this directly in Stan, once you have varying intercepts and slopes, you have to deal with covariance-matrix decompositions and arrays of coefficient vectors, and it’s all a hairy mess.

What to do? For this semester’s class, Imma just gonna go with lme4/blme/rstanarm when fitting varying-intercept, varying-slope models. All this Stan coding is a rabbit hole that’s getting us away from the goal, which is to be able to fit, use, and evaluate statistical models for measurement and variation.

I would like to be able to more easily fit these in Stan, though. Why, you might ask? If we can fit them in lme4, or blme for more stability, or rstanarm for including more uncertainty in the inferences, then why bother coding directly in Stan?

The answer for why we want to code directly in Stan is that we’re often wanting to expand our models, for example adding mixture components, measurement error terms, time series or spatial dependence, etc.

For that reason, you will want to be able to code varying-intercept, varying-slope models in Stan—even if I won’t be teaching that in class this semester.

The good news is that I did some googling and found this tutorial by Will Hipson on programming hierarchical regressions in Stan. It’s from 2020 and I have not looked at every line of code there, but it all looks reasonable and there’s lots of explanation of the workflow. So maybe this is the best place to start, if you want to go in this direction, as you should!

On the border between credulity and postmodernism: The case of the UFO’s-as-space-aliens media insiders

I came across this post from Tyler Cowen:

From an email I [Cowen] sent to a well-known public intellectual:

I think the chance that the bodies turn out to be real aliens is quite low.

But the footage seems pretty convincing, a way for other people to see what…sources have been telling me for years. [Everyone needs to stop complaining that there are no photos!]

And to think it is a) the Chinese, b) USG secret project, or…whatever…*in Mexico* strains the imagination.

It is interesting of course how the media is not so keen to report on this. They don’t have to talk about the aliens, they could just run a story “The Mexican government has gone insane.” But they won’t do that, and so you should update your mental model of the media a bit in the “they are actually pretty conservative, in the literal sense of that term, and quite readily can act like a deer frozen in the headlights, though at some point they may lurch forward with something ill-conceived.”

Many of you readers are from Christian societies, or you are Christian. But please do not focus on the bodies! I know you are from your early upbringing “trained” to do so, even if you are a non-believer. Wait until that evidence is truly verified (and I suspect it will not be). Focus on the video footage.

In any case, the Mexican revelations [sic] mean this issue is not going away, and perhaps this will force the hand of the USG to say more than they otherwise would have.

The above-linked post seems ridiculous to me, while comments on the post are much more reasonable—I guess it’s not hard to be reasonable when all you have to do is laugh at a silly hoax.

From a straight-up econ point of view I guess it makes sense that there has been a continuing supply of purported evidence for space aliens: there’s a big demand for this sort of thing so people will create some supply. It’s disappointing to me to see someone as usually-savvy as Cowen falling for this sort of thing, but (a) there’s some selection bias, as I’m not writing about all the people out there who have not been snookered by this Bermuda triangle ancient astronauts Noah’s ark fairies haunted radios bigfoot ESP ghosts space aliens stuff.

Given my earlier post on news media insiders getting all excited about UFOs (also this), you won’t be surprised to hear that I’m annoyed by Cowen’s latest. It’s just so ridiculous! Amusingly, his phrasing, “I think the chance that the bodies turn out to be real aliens is quite low,” echoes that of fellow contrarian pundit Nate Silver, who wrote, “I’m not saying it’s aliens, it’s almost definitely not aliens.” Credit them for getting the probability on the right side of 50%, but . . . c’mon.

As I wrote in my earlier posts, what’s noteworthy is not that various prominent people think that UFO’s might be space aliens—as I never tire of saying in this context, 30% of Americans say they believe in ghosts, which have pretty much the same basis in reality—; rather, what’s interesting is that they feel so free to admit this belief. I attribute this to a sort of elite-media contagion: Ezra Klein and Tyler Cowen believe the space aliens thing is a possibility, they’re smart guys, so other journalists take it more seriously, etc. Those of us outside the bubble can just laugh, but someone like Nate Silver is too much of an insider and is subject to the gravitational pull of elite media, twitter, etc.

Mark Palko offers a slightly different take, attributing the latest burst of elite credulity to the aftereffects of a true believer who managed to place a few space-aliens-curious stories into the New York Times, which then gave the story an air of legitimacy etc.

The space aliens thing is interesting in part because it does not seem strongly connected to political polarization. You’ve got Cowen on the right, Klein on the left, and Silver on the center-left. OK, just three data points, but still. Meanwhile, Cowen gets a lot of far-right commenters, but most of the commenters to his recent post are with me on this one, just kind of baffled that he’s pushing the story.

Postmodernism

A couple days after seeing Cowen’s post, I happened to be reading a book that discussed postmodernism in the writing of history. I don’t care so much about postmodernism, but the book was interesting; I’ll discuss it in a future post.

In any case, here’s the connection I saw.

Postmodernism means different things to different people, but one of its key tenets is that there is no objective truth . . . uhhhh, let me just “do a wegman” here and quote wikipedia:

Postmodernism is an intellectual stance or mode of discourse which challenges worldviews associated with Enlightenment rationality dating back to the 17th century. Postmodernism is associated with relativism and a focus on the role of ideology in the maintenance of economic and political power. Postmodernists are “skeptical of explanations which claim to be valid for all groups, cultures, traditions, or races, and instead focuses on the relative truths of each person”. It considers “reality” to be a mental construct. Postmodernism rejects the possibility of unmediated reality or objectively-rational knowledge, asserting that all interpretations are contingent on the perspective from which they are made; claims to objective fact are dismissed as naive realism.

One thing that struck me about Cowen’s post was not just that he’s sympathetic to the space-aliens hypothesis; also it seems to bug him that the elite news media isn’t covering it more widely. Which is funny, because it bugs me that the media (including Bloomberg columnist Cowen) are taking it as seriously as they do!

Cowen writes, “It is interesting of course how the media is not so keen to report on this.” Doesn’t seem so interesting to me! My take is that most people in the media have some common sense and also have some sense of the history of this sort of nexus of hoaxes and credibility, from Arthur Conan Doyle onward.

The postmodernism that I see coming from Cowen is in statement, “the footage seems pretty convincing, a way for other people to see what . . . sources have been telling me for years,” which seems to me, as a traditional rationalist or non-postmodernist, to be a form of circular reasoning saying that something is real because people believe in it. Saying “this issue is not going away” . . . I mean, sure, astrology isn’t going away either! Unfortunately, just about nothing ever seems to go away.

Oppositionism

There’s something else going on here, it’s hard for me to put my finger on, exactly . . . something about belief in the occult as being oppositional, something “they” don’t want you do know about, whether “they” is “the media” or “the government” or “organized religion” or “the patriarchy” or “the medical establishment” or whatever. As we discussed in an earlier post on a topic, one interesting thing is how things happen that push certain fringe beliefs into a zone where it’s considered legitimate to take them seriously. As a student of public opinion and politics, I’m interested not just in who has these beliefs and why, but also in the processes by which some such beliefs but not others circulate so that they seem perfectly normal to various people such as Cowen, Silver, etc., in the elite news media bubble.

When Steve Bannon meets the Center for Open Science: Bad science and bad reporting combine to yield another ovulation/voting disaster

The Kangaroo with a feather effect

A couple of faithful correspondents pointed me to this recent article, “Fertility Fails to Predict Voter Preference for the 2020 Election: A Pre-Registered Replication of Navarrete et al. (2010).”

It’s similar to other studies of ovulation and voting that we’ve criticized in the past (see for example pages 638-640 of this paper.

A few years ago I ran across the following recommendation for replication:

One way to put a stop to all this uncertainty: preregistration of studies of all kinds. It won’t quell existing worries, but it will help to prevent new ones, and eventually the truth will out.

My reaction was that this was way too optimistic.The ovulation-and-voting study had large measurement error, high levels of variation, and any underlying effects were small. And all this is made even worse because they were studying within-person effects using a between-person design. So any statistically significant difference they find is likely to be in the wrong direction and is essentially certain to be a huge overestimate. That is, the design has a high Type S error rate and a high Type M error rate.

And, indeed, that’s what happened with the replication. It was a between-person comparison (that is, each person was surveyed at only one time point), there was no direct measurement of fertility, and this new study was powered to only be able to detect effects that were much larger than would be scientifically plausible.

The result: a pile of noise.

To the authors’ credit, their title leads right off with “Fertility Fails to Predict . . .” OK, not quite right, as they didn’t actually measure fertility, but at least they foregrounded their negative finding.

Bad Science

Is it fair for me to call this “bad science”? I think this description is fair. Let me emphasize that I’m not saying the authors of this study are bad people. Remember our principle that honesty and transparency are not enough. You can be of pure heart, but if you are studying a small and highly variable effect using a noisy design and crude measurement tools, you’re not going to learn anything useful. You might as well just be flipping coins or trying to find patterns in a table of random numbers. And that’s what’s going on here.

Indeed, this is one of the things that’s bothered me for years about preregistered replications. I love the idea of preregistration, and I love the idea of replication. These are useful tools for strengthening research that is potentially good research and for providing some perspective on questionable research that’s been done in the past. Even the mere prospect of preregistered replication can be a helpful conceptual tool when considering an existing literature or potential new studies.

But . . . if you take a hopelessly noisy design and preregister it, that doesn’t make it a good study. Put a pile of junk in a fancy suit and it’s still a pile of junk.

In some settings, I fear that “replication” is serving a shiny object to distract people from the central issues of measurement, and I think that’s what’s going on here. The authors of this study were working with some vague ideas of evolutionary psychology, and they seem to be working under the assumption that, if you’re interested in theory X, that the way to science is to gather some data that have some indirect connection to X and then compute some statistical analysis in order to make an up-or-down decision (“statistically significant / not significant” or “replicated / not replicated”).

Again, that’s not enuf! Science isn’t just about theory, data, analysis, and conclusions. It’s also about measurement. It’s quantitative. And some measurements and designs are just too noisy to be useful.

As we wrote a few years ago,

My criticism of the ovulation-and-voting study is ultimately quantitative. Their effect size is tiny and their measurement error is huge. My best analogy is that they are trying to use a bathroom scale to weigh a feather—and the feather is resting loosely in the pouch of a kangaroo that is vigorously jumping up and down.

At some point, a set of measurements is so noisy that biases in selection and interpretation overwhelm any signal and, indeed, nothing useful can be learned from them. I assume that the underlying effect size in this case is not zero—if we were to look carefully, we would find some differences in political attitude at different times of the month for women, also different days of the week for men and for women, and different hours of the day, and I expect all these differences would interact with everything—not just marital status but also age, education, political attitudes, number of children, size of tax bill, etc etc. There’s an endless number of small effects, positive and negative, bubbling around.

Bad Reporting

Bad science is compounded by bad reporting. Someone pointed me to a website called “The National Pulse,” which labels itself as “radically independent” but seems to be an organ of the Trump wing of the Republican party, and which featured this story, which they seem to have picked up from the notorious sensationalist site, The Daily Mail:

STUDY: Women More Likely to Vote Trump During Most Fertile Point of Menstrual Cycle.

A new scientific study indicates women are more likely to vote for former President Donald Trump during the most fertile period of their menstrual cycle. According to researchers from the New School for Social Research, led by psychologist Jessica L Engelbrecht, women, when at their most fertile, are drawn to the former President’s intelligence in comparison to his political opponents. The research occurred between July and August 2020, observing 549 women to identify changes in their political opinions over time. . . .

A significant correlation was noticed between women at their most fertile and expressing positive opinions towards former President Donald Trump. . . . the 2020 study indicated that women, while ovulating, were drawn to former President Trump because of his high degree of intelligence, not physical attractiveness. . . .

As I wrote above, I think that research study was bad, but, conditional on the bad design and measurement, its authors seem to have reported it honestly.

The news report adds new levels of distortion.

– The report states that the study observed women “to identify changes in their political opinions over time.” First, the study didn’t “observe” anyone; they conducted an online survey. Second, they didn’t identify any changes over time: the women in the study were surveyed only once!

– The report says something about “a significant correlation” and that “the study indicated that . . .” This surprised me, given that the paper itself was titled, “Fertility Fails to Predict Voter Preference for the 2020 Election.” How do you get from “fails to predict” to “a significant correlation”? I looked at the journal article and found the relevant bit:

Results of this analysis for all 14 matchups appear in Table 2. In contrast to the original study’s findings, only in the Trump-Obama matchup was there a significant relationship between conception risk and voting preference [r_pb (475) = −.106, p = .021] such that the probability of intending to vote for Donald J. Trump rose with conception risk.

Got it? They looked at 14 comparisons. Out of these, one of these was “statistically significant” at the 5% level. This is the kind of thing you’d expect to see from pure noise, or the mathematical equivalent, which is a study with noisy measurements of small and variable effects. The authors write, “however, it is possible that this is a Type I error, as it was the only significant result across the matchups we analyzed,” which I think is still too credulous a way to put it; a more accurate summary would be to say that the data are consistent with null effects, which is no surprise given the realistic possible sizes of any effects in this very underpowered study.

The authors of the journal article also write, “Several factors may account for the discrepancy between our [lack of replication of] the original results.” They go on for six paragraphs giving possible theories—but never once considering the possibility that the original studies and theirs were just too noisy to learn anything useful.

Look. I don’t mind a bit of storytelling: why not? Storytelling is fun, and it can be a good way to think about scientific hypotheses and their implications. The reason we do social science is because we’re interested in the social world; we’re not just number crunchers. So I don’t mind that the authors had several paragraphs with stories. The problem is not that they’re telling stories, it’s that they’re only telling stories. They don’t ever reflect that this entire literature is chasing patterns in noise.

And this lack of reflection about measurement and effect size is destroying them! They went to all this trouble to replicate this old study, without ever grappling with that study’s fundamental flaw (see kangaroo picture at the top of this post). Again, I’m not saying that they authors are bad people or that they intend to mislead; they’re just doing bad, 2010-2015-era psychological science. They don’t know better, and they haven’t been well served by the academic psychology establishment which has promoted and continues to promote this sort of junk science.

Don’t blame the authors of the bad study for the terrible distorted reporting

Finally, it’s not the authors’ fault that their study was misreported by the Daily Mail and that Steve Bannon associated website. “Fails to Predict” is right there in the title of the journal article. If clickbait websites and political propagandists want to pull out that p = 0.02 result from your 14 comparisons and spin a tale around it, you can’t really stop them.

The Center for Open Science!

Science reform buffs will enjoy these final bits from the published paper:

“Not once in the twentieth century . . . has a single politician, actor, athlete, or surgeon emerged as a first-rate novelist, despite the dismayingly huge breadth of experience each profession affords.”

Tom Bissell writes:

Recently, in The Spooky Art, Norman Mailer [wrote that] Not once in the twentieth century . . . has a single politician, actor, athlete, or surgeon emerged as a first-rate novelist, despite the dismayingly huge breadth of experience each profession affords. For better or worse, and I am prepared to admit worse, writers are writers are writers. This explains why so many mediocre fiction writers sound the same, why there exist so many books about writers, and why many talented fiction writers seem to think that their best option to distinguish themselves is to flee the quotidian to explore more fanciful subject matter.

That’s an interesting point. Here in the twenty-first century, novel writing is a niche art and a niche business. In the previous century, though, the novel was a major popular art form, and lots of people were motivated to write them, both for artistic and financial reasons. Great novels were written in the twentieth century by people with all sorts of social backgrounds, high, low, and various steps in between—George Orwell was a police officer!—, but I think Mailer was right, that none of these great novels were written by politicians, actors, athletes, or surgeons. Perhaps the closest candidate is Michael Crichton (not a surgeon but he was trained as a doctor; no great novels but he did write Jurassic Park, which was solid genre fiction). Had his novels not been successful, it seems likely he would’ve just become a doctor, which indicates a bit of selection bias in Mailer’s statement. Jim Bouton authored the literary classic Ball Four, but it’s not a novel and presumably the writing was mostly done by his coauthor, who was a professional writer. OK, I guess my best shots on this are George V. Higgins (author of some arguably-great novels (see also here) and also a practicing lawyer) and Scott Turow (also a practicing lawyer as well as an author of several excellent legal thrillers which, ok, they’re not great novels but they have a lot of strengths, I guess I’d say they’re better than Michael Crichton’s even if they don’t have the originality of someone like Jim Thompson). But “lawyer” is not quite the same category as “politician, actor, athlete, or surgeon”—indeed, a lawyer is already a sort of professional fiction writer.

I dunno, it’s an interesting question. I assume there were a fair number of twentieth-century politicians, actors, athletes, and surgeons who had the capacity to write a great novel, or at least make a fair attempt, but it doesn’t seem to have happened. Maybe it would just have taken too much effort, to the extent that, had they gone all-in to write a great novel or a reasonable attempt, they would’ve just become full-time writers and that what’s we’d remember them as. I’m not sure.

Gore Vidal was a politician (kind of) and wrote some excellent novels, maybe they don’t count as “great” but maybe they do. He’s the closest match I can think of—but maybe not, because he was a writer before going into politics, so he doesn’t really count as a politician emerging as a novelist.

P.S. Bissell’s article also discusses the idea of writers being outsiders, which motivates me to point to these two posts:

There often seems to be an assumption that being in the elite and being an outsider are mutually exclusive qualities, but they’re not.

The insider-outsider perspective

As I wrote in the comments to one of those posts:

Saying someone is an outsider doesn’t convey much information, given that just about anyone can grab that label. However, as an observer of politics (and science), I notice that people sometimes highlight their outsider status, and as a political scientist I find that interesting. For example, what’s interesting about Steven Levitt in Freakonomics is not so much that he thinks of himself as a “rogue” but that he decided to label himself that way. Rather than presenting himself as an informant from the inside, he presented himself as an outsider. He had the choice of taking either tack, and he decided on the outsider label. That’s interesting.

Why would people want economics advice from a “rogue” outsider who thinks that drunk walking is more dangerous than drunk driving, thinks we are assured of 30 years of global cooling, and believes that beautiful parents are 36% more likely to have girls? Wouldn’t you prefer economics advice from an insider, someone with a Harvard and MIT education who’s now the William B. Ogden Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago? That’s what baffles me.

The outsider-novelist thing is more clear, in that different authors offer different perspectives. We read Jack London for one thing and Jane Austen for another.

“Science as Verified Trust”

Interesting post by Sean Manning:

There seems to be a lot of confusion about the role of trust in science or scholarship. Engineers such as Bill Nye and political propagandists throw around the phrase “trust the science”! On the other hand, the rationalists whom I mentioned last year brandish the Royal Society’s motto nullius in verba “Take nobody’s word for it” like a sword. I [Manning] think both sides are working from some misconceptions about how science or scholarship work. . . .

What makes this scientific or scholarly is not that you do every step yourself. It is that every step of the argument has been checked by multiple independent people, so in most cases you can quickly see if those people disagree and then trust those preliminary steps. Science or scholarship is not about heroes who know every skill, its about systems of questioning and verification which let us provisionally assume that some things are true while we focus on something where we are not sure of the answer. . . .

The New York Young Republican Club

This story hit the news yesterday:

Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Georgia) entertained Republicans in Manhattan Saturday night with a range of one-liners trolling the political left on hot-button topics.

“I want to tell you something, if Steve Bannon and I had organized that, we would have won. Not to mention, we would’ve been armed,” she said of her role at the Jan. 6, 2021 attack on the US Capitol. . . .

The controversial congresswoman was one of several high-profile conservative firebrands . . . at the annual event hosted by the New York Young Republican Club.

Her speech took a strange turn while she noted how “you can pick up a butt plug or a dildo at Target nowadays” . . .

I was curious so I did a quick search:

OK, yeah, I guess she’s right!

Anyway, this all reminded me that I spoke at the Young Republican Club once! It was in February, 2009, and I talked about our book, Red State Blue State. It was a mellow occasion. As I recall they told me they were looking forward to an upcoming softball game with the Young Democrats. I remember telling the Young Republicans that I’d recently given a talk at the Princeton Club of New York, and that 50 years earlier there would’ve been a big overlap between the Princeton Club and the Young Republican Club but not anymore.

It seems that the organization has changed even more in the past decade or so. I can’t imagine speaking at a club where they joke about armed overthrow of the government. That really bothers me. I guess that’s how they were talking 55 years ago at the Young Communist Club, or the Students for a Democratic Society.

Stepping back, we can understand this as part of the residue of a couple hundred years of 1776 rhetoric. If it was ok for Sam Adams, George Washington, etc., to have an armed insurrection against the British, and if it was ok to have a bunch of slaveowners have an armed insurrection against the U.S. government in 1861, then what exactly is wrong with modern-day congressmembers talking about shooting up the Capitol building? Once you accept the idea that Joe Biden and Abraham Lincoln are worse than George III, the rest all follows. From that perspective, it makes me wonder why there isn’t more of this sort of talk in public. Ultimately I guess it’s more of a pragmatic issue than a moral issue. It’s against the law to threaten to shoot people, so keep talking like that and you might go to jail. Also most voters aren’t into the whole insurrection thing, so if you’re a politician and you’re not in a safe seat, this sort of extremism could be politically risky. But from a theoretical perspective, sure, if 1776 or 1861 is the standard, then, yeah, shooting at government officials could be considered to be just fine.

There’s a difference. King George was not elected by the public; Abraham Lincoln and Joe Biden were. But, once you accept the idea that overthrowing the government is OK, I guess it’s no big deal if guns are involved.

Back in 2009, nobody at the Young Republican Club was talking about hijacking Congress. Or butt plugs, for that matter. At least not on the day I was there. Things have changed.

Why we say that honesty and transparency are not enough:

Someone recently asked me some questions about my article from a few years ago, Honesty and transparency are not enough. I thought it might be helpful to summarize why I’ve been promoting this idea.

The central message in that paper is that reproducibility is great, but if a study is too noisy (with the bias and variance of measurements being large compared to any persistent underlying effects), that making it reproducible won’t solve those problems. I wrote it for three reasons:

(a) I felt that reproducibility (or, more generally, “honesty and transparency”) were being oversold, and I didn’t want researchers to think that just cos they drink the reproducibility elixir, that their studies will then be good. Reproducibility makes it harder to fool yourself and others, but it does not turn a hopelessly noisy study into good science.

(b) Lots of research are honest and transparent in their work but still do bad research. I wanted to be able to say that the research is bad without that implying that I think they are being dishonest.

(c) Conversely, I was concerned that, when researchers heard about problems with bad research by others, they would think that the people who are doing that bad research are cheating in some way. This leads to the problem of researchers saying to themselves, “I’m honest, I don’t ‘p-hack,’ so my research can’t be bad.” Actually, though, lots of people do research that’s honest, transparent, and useless! That’s one reason I prefer to speak of “forking paths” rather than “p-hacking”: it’s less of an accusation and more of a description.

Michael Lewis.

I just read this interesting review by Patrick Redford of the new book by journalist Michael Lewis on Sam Bankman-Fried, the notorious crypto fraudster.

We discussed earlier how the news media, including those such as Michael Lewis and Tyler Cowen who play the roles of skeptics in the media ecosystem, were not just reporters of the crypto fraud; they also played an important part in promoting and sustaining the bubble. As I wrote when all this came out, the infrastructure of elite journalism was, I think, crucial to keeping the bubble afloat. Sure, crypto had lots of potential just from rich guys selling to each other and throwing venture capital at it, and suckers watching Alex Jones or whatever investing their life savings, but elite media promotion took it to the next level.

We’ve talked earlier about the Chestertonian principle that extreme skepticism is a form of credulity, an idea that seems particularly relevant to the comedian and political commentator Joe Rogan, whose twin stances of deep skepticism and deep credulity are inextricably intertwined. To be skeptical about the moon landing or the 2020 election requires belief in all sorts of ridiculous theories and discredited evidence. Skepticism and credulity here are not opposites—we’re not talking “horseshoe theory”—; rather, they’re the same thing. Skepticism of the accepted official view that the moon landings actually happened, or that the laws of physics are correct and ghosts don’t exist, or that UFOs are not space aliens, or that Joe Biden won the 2020 election by 7 million votes, is intimately tied to active belief in some wacky theory or unsubstantiated or refuted empirical claim.

I’m not saying that skepticism is always a form of credulity, just that sometimes it is. When I was skeptical of the Freakonomics-endorsed claim that beautiful parents are 36% more likely to have girls, no credulity was required, just some background in sex-ratio statistics and some basic understanding of statistics. Similarly if you want to be skeptical of the claim that UFOs are space aliens etc. There’s ordinary skepticism and credulous skepticism. Ordinary skepticism, though, it easy to come by. Credulous skepticism, by its nature, is a more unstable quantity and requires continuing effort—you have to carefully protect your skeptical beliefs and keep them away from any stray bits of truth that might contaminate them. Which I guess is one reason that people such as Rogan who have the ability to do this with a straight face are so well compensated.

But what about Michael Lewis? Like everybody else, I’m a fan of Moneyball. I haven’t read any of his other books—I guess a lot of his books are about rich financial guys, and, while I know the topic is important, it’s never interested me so much—but then last year he interviewed me for a podcast! I was kinda scared at first—my previous experiences with journalists reporting on scientific controversies have been mixed, and I didn’t want to be walking into a trap—but it worked out just fine. Lewis was straightforward, with no hidden agenda. The podcast worked out just fine. Here’s a link to the podcast, and here’s an article with some background. Perhaps I should’ve been more suspicious given that the podcast is produced by a company founded by plagiarism-defender

Of Lewis’s new book, Redford writes:

A common thematic thread, perhaps the common thread, wending throughout Michael Lewis’s bibliography is the limits of conventional wisdom. His oeuvre is stuffed with stories about the moments at which certain bedrock ideas—ones about finance, or baseball, or electoral politics—crumble under their own contradictions. This is helped along, often, by visionary seers—like Michael Burry, Billy Beane, or John McCain—who put themselves in position to take advantage of those who are either too blinkered or too afraid to see the unfamiliar future taking shape in front of them.

That describes Moneyball pretty accurately, and at first it would seem to fit a podcast called “Against the Rules,” but actually that podcast was all about how there was existing expertise, settled enough to be considered “conventional wisdom,” that was swept aside in a wave of confusion. In particular, Lewis talked about the Stanford covid crew, a group of well-connected iconoclasts in the Billy Beane mode, but he showered them with criticism, not praise. Maybe that podcast worked because he was going against type? I don’t know.

Just speaking in general terms, we shouldn’t ignore the visionary seers—Bill James, imperfect though he may have been, was really on to something, and even his missteps are often interesting. But we can’t assume the off-the-beaten-path thinkers are always right: that way lies Freakonomics-style madness, as here and here.

It’s too bad what happened to Lewis with the Bankman-Fried thing, but I wouldn’t attribute it to a general problem with his take on conventional wisdom. It’s more of an omnipresent risk of journalism, which is to frame a story around a hero, which creates problems if the hero isn’t even a plausible anti-hero. (Recall that an “anti-hero” is not the opposite of a hero; rather, he’s someone who doesn’t look or act like a conventional hero but still is a hero in some sense.)

Hey! A new (to me) text message scam! Involving a barfing dog!

Last year Columbia changed our phone system so now we can accept text messages. This can be convenient, and sometimes people reach me that way.

But then the other day this text came in:

And, the next day:

Someone’s dog has been vomiting, and this person is calling from two different numbers—home and work, perhaps? That’s too bad! I hope they reach the real Dr. Ella before the dog gets too sick.

Then this:

And now I started getting suspicious. How exactly does someone get my phone as a wrong number for a veterinarian? I’ve had this work number for over 25 years! It could be that someone typed in a phone number wrong. But . . . how likely is it that two unrelated people (the owner of a sick dog and the seller of veterinary products) would mistype someone’s number in the exact same way on the exact same day?

Also, “Dr. Ella”? I get that people give their doctors nicknames like that, but in a message to the office they would use the doctor’s last name, no?

Meanwhile, these came in:

Lisa, Ella, whatever. Still it seemed like some kinda mixup, and I had no thought that it might be a scam until I came across this post from Max Read, “What’s the deal with all those weird wrong-number texts?”, which answered all my questions.

Apparently the veterinarian, the yachts, and all the rest, are just a pretext to get you involved in a conversation where the scammers then befriend you before stealing as much of your money as they can. Kinda mean, huh? Can’t they do something more socially beneficial, like do some politically incorrect p-hacking or something involving soup bowls or paper shredders? Or just plagiarize a book about giraffes?

Stabbers gonna stab — fraud edition

One of the themes of Dan Davies’s book, Lying for Money, was that fraudsters typically do their crimes over and over again, until they get caught. And then, when they are released from prison, they do it again. This related to something I noticed in the Theranos story, which was that the fraud was in open sight for many years and the fraudsters continued to operate in the open.

Also regarding that interesting overlap of science and business fraud, I noted:

There seem to have been two ingredients that allowed Theranos to work. And neither of these ingredients involved technology or medicine. No, the two things were:

1. Control of the narrative.

2. Powerful friends.

Neither of these came for free. Theranos’s leaders had to work hard, for long hours, for years and years, to maintain control of the story and to attract and maintain powerful friends. And they needed to be willing to lie.

The newest story

Ben Mathis-Lilley writes:

On Wednesday, the Department of Justice announced that it has arrested a 48-year-old Lakewood, New Jersey, man named Eliyahu “Eli” Weinstein on charges of operating, quote, “a Ponzi scheme.” . . . How did authorities know that Weinstein was operating a Ponzi scheme? For one thing, he allegedly told associates, while being secretly recorded, that he had “Ponzied” the money they were using to repay investors. . . . Weinstein is further said to have admitted while being recorded that he had hidden assets from federal prosecutors. (“I hid money,” he is said to have told his conspirators, warning them that they would “go to jail” if anyone else found out.) . . .

These stories of “least competent criminals” are always fun, especially when the crime is nonviolent so you don’t have to think too hard about the victims.

What brings this one to the next level is the extreme repeat-offender nature of the criminal:

There was also one particular element of Weinstein’s background that may have alerted the DOJ that he was someone to keep an eye on—namely, that he had just been released from prison after serving eight years of a 24-year sentence for operating Ponzi schemes. More specifically, Weinstein was sentenced to prison for operating a Ponzi scheme involving pretend real estate transactions, then given a subsequent additional sentence for operating a second Ponzi scheme, involving pretend Facebook stock purchases, that he conducted after being released from custody while awaiting trial on the original charges.

Kinda like when a speeding driver runs over some kid and then it turns out the driver had 842 speeding tickets and the cops had never taken away his car, except in this case there’s no dead kid and the perp had already received a 24-year prison sentence.

How is it that he got out after serving only 8 years, anyway?

In January 2021, Weinstein was granted clemency by President Donald Trump at the recommendation of, among others, “the lawyer Alan Dershowitz,” who has frequently been the subject of news coverage in recent years for his work representing Trump and his relationship with the late Jeffrey Epstein.

Ahhhhh.

This all connects to my items #1 and 2 above.

The way Weinstein succeeded (to the extent he could be considered a success) at fraud was control of the narrative. And he got his get-out-of-jail-free card from his powerful friends. “Finding your roots,” indeed.

Stabbers gonna stab

This all reminded me of a story that came out in the newspaper a few decades ago. Jack Henry Abbott was a convicted killer who published a book while in prison. Abbott’s book was supposed to be very good, and he was subsequently released on parole with the support of various literary celebrities including Norman Mailer. Shortly after his release, Abbott murdered someone else and returned to prison, where he spent the rest of his life.

The whole story was very sad, but what made it particularly bizarre was that Abbott’s first murder was a stabbing, his second murder was a stabbing, and his most prominent supporter, Mailer, was notorious for . . . stabbing someone.

A gathering of the literary critics: Louis Menand and Thomas Mallon, meet Jeet Heer

Marshall McLuhan: The environment is not visible. It’s information. It’s electronic.

Normal Mailer: Well, nonetheless, nature still exhibits manifestations which defy all methods of collecting information and data. For example, an earthquake may occur, or a tidal wave may come in, or a hurricane may strike. And the information will lag critically behind our ability to control it.

Regular readers will know that I’m a big fan of literary criticism.  See, for example,

“End of novel. Beginning of job.”: That point at which you make the decision to stop thinking and start finishing

Contingency and alternative history (followup here)

Kazin to Birstein to a more general question of how we evaluate people’s character based on traits that might, at least at first glance, appear to be independent of character (followup here)

“Readability” as freedom from the actual sensation of reading

Things that I like that almost nobody else is interested in

Anthony West’s literary essays

I recently came across a book called “Sweet Lechery: Reviews, Essays and Profiles,” by literary journalist Jeet Heer. The “Lechery” in the title is a bit misleading, but, yes, Heer is open about sexual politics. In any case, like the best literary critics, he engages with the literary works and the authors in the context of politics and society. He has some of the overconfidence of youth—the book came out ten years ago, and some of its essays are from ten or more years before that—, and there’s a bunch of obscure Canadian stuff that doesn’t interest me, but overall I found the writing fun and the topics interesting.

One good thing about the book was its breadth of cultural concerns, including genre and non-genre literature, political writing, and comic books, with the latter taken as of interest in themselves, not merely as some sort of cultural symbol.

I also appreciated that he didn’t talk about movies or pop music. I love movies and pop music, but they’re also such quintessential topics for Boomer critics who want to show their common touch. There are enough other places where I can read about how Stevie Wonder and Brian Wilson are geniuses, that Alex Chilton is over- or under-rated, appreciation of obscure records and gritty films from the 1970s, etc.

My comparison point here is Louis Menand’s book on U.S. cold war culture from 1945-1965, which made me wonder how he decided what to leave in and what to leave out. I’m a big fan of Menand—as far as I’m concerned, he can write about whatever he wants to write about—; it was just interesting to consider all the major cultural figures he left out, even while considering the range of characters he included in that book. Heer writes about Philip Roth but also about John Maynard Keynes; he’s not ashamed to write about, and take seriously, high-middlebrow authors such as John Updike and Alice Munro, while also finding time to write thoughtfully about Robert Heinlein and Philip K. Dick. I was less thrilled with his writing about comics, not because of anything he said that struck me as wrong, exactly, but rather because he edged into a boosterish tone, promotion as much as criticism.

Another comparison from the New Yorker stable of writers is Thomas Mallon, who notoriously wrote this:

Screen Shot 2015-06-14 at 12.32.19 PM

Thus displaying his [Mallon’s] ignorance of Barry Malzberg, who has similarities with Mailer both in style and subject matter. I guess that Malzberg was influenced by Mailer.

And, speaking of Mailer, who’s written some good things but I think was way way overrated by literary critics during his lifetime—I’m not talking about sexism here, I just think there were lots of other writers of his time who had just as much to say and could say it better, with more lively characters, better stories, more memorable turns of phrase, etc.—; anyway, even though I’m not the world’s biggest Mailer fan, I did appreciate the following anecdote which appeared, appropriately enough, in an essay by Heer about Canadian icon Marshall McLuhan:

Connoisseurs of Canadian television should track down a 1968 episode of a CBC program called The Summer Way, a highbrow cultural and political show that once featured a half-hour debate about technology between McLuhan and the novelist Norman Mailer. . . .

McLuhan: We live in a time when we have put a man-made satellite environment around the planet. The planet is no longer nature. It’s no longer the external world. It’s now the content of an artwork. Nature has ceased to exist.

Mailer: Well, I think you’re anticipating a century, perhaps.

McLuhan: But when you put a man-made environment around the planet, you have in a sense abolished nature. Nature from now on has to be programmed.

Mailer: Marshall, I think you’re begging a few tremendously serious questions. One of them is that we have not yet put a man-made environment around this planet, totally. We have not abolished nature yet. We may be in the process of abolishing nature forever.

McLuhan: The environment is not visible. It’s information. It’s electronic.

Mailer: Well, nonetheless, nature still exhibits manifestations which defy all methods of collecting information and data. For example, an earthquake may occur, or a tidal wave may come in, or a hurricane may strike. And the information will lag critically behind our ability to control it.

McLuhan: The experience of that event, that disaster, is felt everywhere at once, under a single dateline.

Mailer: But that’s not the same thing as controlling nature, dominating nature, or superseding nature. It’s far from that. Nature still does exist as a protagonist on this planet.

McLuhan: Oh, yes, but it’s like our Victorian mechanical environment. It’s a rear-view mirror image. Every age creates as a utopian image a nostalgic rear-view mirror image of itself, which puts it thoroughly out of touch with the present. The present is the enemy.

That’s great! I love how McLuhan keeps saying these extreme but reasonable-sounding things and then, each time, Mailer brings him down to Earth. Norman Mailer, who built much of a career on bloviating philosophizing, is the voice of reason here. The snippet that I put at the top of this post is my favorite: McLuhan as glib Bitcoin bro, Mailer as the grizzly dad who has to pay the bills and fix the roof after the next climate-induced hurricane.

Heer gets it too, writing:

It’s a measure of McLuhan’s ability to recalibrate the intellectual universe that in this debate, Mailer—a Charlie Sheen–style roughneck with a history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and public mental breakdowns—comes across as the voice of sobriety and sweet reason.

Also, Heer’s a fan of Uncle Woody!